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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays on the political economy of development and
focuses on topics related to democratization, redistribution and conflict. It studies
one the largest countries in Latin America, Colombia, and examines mostly his
history during the 20th century.
The first chapter, "Buying off the Revolution: Evidence from the Colombian Na-
tional Peasant Movement, 1957-1985", studies the relationship between democrati-
zation and redistribution during periods of revolutionary threats. Far from causing
an increase in broad redistribution (e.g. social spending), I show that the state or-
ganization of a social movement that extends the political rights of the threatening
group can be used to identify rebel leaders and provide private goods to them, in
return for preventing social unrest and demobilizing their supporters. I study the
context of the organization by the state of the most important social movement in
Colombian history -the National Peasant Movement (ANUC)- during the decades
of a threat of Communist revolution (1957-1985), when the government gave ANUC
direct political participation in the executive branch and economic support. Using
three newly digitized data set of the Colombian municipalities, I find that this re-
form did not lead to higher broad redistribution towards the peasantry but it led to
an increase in targeted redistribution in terms of public jobs and lands. By matching
the names of the peasant leaders to the beneficiaries of the land reform, evidence
suggests that peasant leaders disproportionally benefited from land reform and that
targeted redistribution towards the peasant leaders was a mechanism to restrain
the Communist threat. Finally, I find suggestive evidence that buying off the rebel
leaders was an effective counter-revolutionary strategy as it led to less revolutionary
activities after the support to ANUC was terminated (1972-1985).
The second chapter, "Roads or Schools? Political Budget Cycles with different
types of voters" also studies one form of democratization: the franchise extension. It
uses a new Colombian data set (1830-2000), to analyze how changes in the electoral
legislation with regard to the characteristics of voters (in terms of education and
income levels) have affected fiscal policy in election years. In line with economic
theory, I show that after the male universal suffrage law was reformed in 1936
the composition of the expenditure shifted towards social spending (like education,
health, and welfare benefits) but there was a decrease in spending on infrastructure
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and investment projects (like roads). Consistent with the literature, I also find:
1.The timing and the size of the political budget cycles changed after 1936 and 2.
After 1936 there was a shift in the funding mechanisms from indirect tax revenues
to more debt.
In addition to democratization and redistribution, the third chapter examines the
causes of the civil conflict in Colombia. The third chapter "On the agrarian origins
of civil conflict in Colombia", co-authored with Fabio Sanchez, investigates the im-
pact of land dispossessions by landlords on the origin of the civil conflict in Colombia.
The study exploits variation in floods to identify how peasants’ land dispossessions
during the export boom (1914-1946) determine the rise of rural guerrilla movements
and the consolidation of their rebel activities. It uses a novel municipal-level dataset
on natural disasters and land dispossession, and documents that municipalities ex-
periencing floods during the years 1914-1946 were substantially more likely to have
land dispossessions than municipalities where floods was not severe. Floods reduced
temporarily the conditions of the land and its value, facilitating the dispossession of
the peasants of their lands by large landowners. Using a matching-pair instrumental
variable approach, we show that the historical dispossession of lands by landlords
that led to the rise of peasant grievances is associated with the presence of the rural
guerrilla movement -The Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC)- during the first
stage of the Colombian civil conflict.
We propose two mechanisms through which previous land dispossessions facil-
itated the emergence of rebel armed groups and use a mediation analysis to test
the indirect effects. On the one hand, exposure to previous civil wars gave military
training and access to weapons and military experience to the rural population that
likely created incentives for the formation of rebel groups. On the other hand, the
ideological politics of rebellion by the Communist party exacerbated the grievances
and helped to the emergence of rebel armed groups.
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Preface
In this thesis I examine two important questions. First, what is the relationship
between redistribution and different types of democratization in Colombia. Specif-
ically, the thesis analyses the effect of two types of democratization -franchise ex-
tension and extension of political rights of an underrepresented group- on public
good provision and discusses potential mechanisms that explains this relationship.
Second, I also examine the potential causes of the civil conflict the country has ex-
perienced since 1960s and how this is related to the extension of the political rights
of the peasantry, the co-optation of the peasant leaders and to old grievances, in
particular to peasants’ land dispossessions.
The thesis contains three essays. The first investigates the experience of the
organization of the Colombian National Peasant Movement -ANUC- within the con-
text of the threat of a Communist revolution in Latin America during 1957-1985.
The Colombian government organized this movement in 1967, a time when peas-
ants could already vote and run for public office. This paper studies the effect of
this form of participation -the organization of a social movement by the state- on
both, broad and targeted redistribution and their effectiveness in averting social
unrest. I use a difference in difference strategy that takes advantage of the variation
in the timing of participation -a municipal association getting legal entitlement-,
and solve the potential self-selection problem in the voluntary organization of the
association by restricting the main specification to a sample that compares only
municipalities that obtained legal entitlement with those that only managed to ob-
tain legal status -recognition- during the years that the government supported the
movement (1967-1972). To test the main theoretical predictions of the link between
threat of revolution, democratization, and redistribution, I use a newly digitized
and hand-coded municipal dataset which includes detailed information about local
public expenditure and revenues, ANUC and public land allocations from 1957 to
1975. I also digitized the names of over 2,500 peasant leaders and contrasted them
with the names of over 10,000 peasants that received public lands during 1967-1972
to suggest that peasants leaders benefited more from the land reform than other
peasants in their municipalities.
The empirical analysis suggests four findings. First, obtaining legal entitlement
did not lead to higher broad redistribution from the landowners towards the peas-
antry. Second, this type of empowerment led to higher targeted redistribution.
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Third, targeted redistribution occurred more intensively in municipalities which ex-
perienced more violence in the previous years or where the communist threat was
stronger. Fourth, by merging all data about public disorder activities in Colom-
bia between 1972 and 1995, I find a negative correlation between co-optation of
the peasant leaders and public disorder, which is consistent with the idea that the
strategy was successful at buying off the revolution.
To the best of my knowledge, the present paper contributes to the existing litera-
ture in two different ways. First, it studies the effect of another form of democratiza-
tion, the state organization of a social movement that empowered a particular group
of the society, during periods of a threat of revolution. This type of democratization
differs from the existing literature as it focus on a democratic mechanism that gives
de facto decision power to peasants and goes beyond the traditional de jure decision
power, universal suffrage. Second, in contrast to the existing literature, it quantifies
the effect of democratization on both types of redistribution, broad and targeted,
by exploiting a unique dataset that allows to identify simultaneously the leaders of
the threatening group and the beneficiaries of the land reform and using it to build
a proxy of co-optation.
In addition to study the organization of the social movement by the state, I also
investigate in the second chapter a constitutional reform that changed the charac-
teristics of voters in Colombia. Since independence and before this reform, the law
stated that only literate men with properties or a certain amount of income per
year could vote. Following the constitutional reform in 1936, the group of potential
voters changed. The legislative act established that, starting from the next elections
(1938), all men older than 21 years of age could vote irrespective of their income
or education. This reform transformed the group of voters from a small group of
high income, literate, and informed men to a large and heterogeneous group with
a majority being low-income and illiterate uninformed men. I collect data on na-
tional revenues and expenditure starting in 1830 and ending at the beginning of the
21th century (1830-2000) to study how this democratic reform -franchise extension-
affects redistribution and incumbents incentives during electoral years.
This paper yields three main findings. First, after the law was reformed in 1936
the composition of the expenditure shifted towards social spending (like education,
health, and welfare benefits) but there was decreased spending on infrastructure
and investment projects (like roads). Second, the timing and the size of the political
budget cycles changed after 1936. Third, after 1936 there was a shift in the funding
mechanisms from indirect tax revenues to more debt.
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This paper makes two contributions to the existing literature. First, although I
study just one country, I study the political budget cycles during a longer period,
starting just after independence and ending at the beginning of the 21th century.
Unlike most existing studies, my work covers 170 years (1830-2000). Second, I focus
on the changes in the policy instruments and politicians’ platforms when the charac-
teristics of the voters change. Instead of giving priority to the type of government or
democracy and studying the political budget cycle with reference to those categories,
I concentrate on the particularities of voters. In this sense, I try to answer how,
depending on the characteristics of the different groups of voters, the politicians use
different policy instruments to attempt to get re-elected.
In the third paper, written jointly with Fabio Sanchez, we investigate the impact
of peasants’ land dispossessions on the origin of the civil conflict in Colombia. In
addition to the conventional causes of conflict such as poverty and low economic
growth, we examine the role of old land dispossessions as a historical cause of con-
flict. Using a matching neighbor-pair and instrumental variable approach, we find
that the historical dispossession of lands (1914-1946) by landlords that led to the
rise of peasant grievances is associated with the presence of the rural guerrilla move-
ment -The Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC)- during the first stage of the
Colombian civil conflict (1974-1985). The variable land dispossessions suffer of mea-
surement error, so we instrument it with a measure of floods during the same period
(1914-1946). We build and test empirically the hypothesis that during periods of
higher peasant vulnerability, such as floods that reduced temporarily the conditions
of the land and its value, the weak enforcement of property rights facilitated land
dispossessions by large land owners.
In this paper, we also propose two mechanisms to explain this correlation and
use a mediation analysis to test them. On the one hand, the military feasibility
that is viable during civil war periods when peasants groups had access to weapons
and military equipment. On the other hand, the ideological political of rebellion
developed by the guidance and support of the revolutionary parties that may trigger
peasants grievances, generate political awareness among the peasantry and foster the
formation of rebel groups.
Different from the literature which focuses on poverty or inequality as the ul-
timate cause of civil conflict, this chapter concentrates on the role of historical
peasants’ land dispossessions and in a window of opportunity that gave a political
and military opportunity to the peasants to organize and rebel. Our paper builds
and contributes to the literature on grievances and conflict and in terms of the in-
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strument; this paper also contributes to the literature that relates natural disasters
or climate variables and conflict by proposing a different channel between rainfall
shocks that lead to floods and conflict: land dispossessions that lead to the rise of
peasant’s grievances.
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Chapter 1
Buying off the Revolution: Evidence from the Colom-
bian National Peasant Movement, 1957-1985.
1.1 Introduction
Governments often face threats to the status quo from groups of the society that
are politically and economically excluded. One response to the threat is the im-
plementation of democratic reforms that increase the political participation of the
threatening group. Most prominently, scholars have studied reforms such as exten-
sion of the franchise, and introduction of elections, as means to reduce revolutionary
threats, and have concentrated on their effect on broad redistribution, assuming that
once they take place, the original status quo will be permanently secured. However,
even after implementing reforms that extend de jure decision power, governments
may still face a threat from uprisings. In this scenario, elites need to provide de
facto power, through giving the excluded group a direct voice in the policy making
process.
If democratization is defined as a process that extends the political participa-
tion of underrepresented groups, one of its form that has received little attention in
the literature, is a state-sponsored participatory reform, namely the organization of
a social movement by the state.1 This democratic reform empowers the threaten-
ing group by giving them direct political representation in the executive branch of
government and it is a mechanism that gives de facto power after the franchise is
extended.
Moreover, the organization of a social movement also helps governments to iden-
tify who are the leaders, the people elites should be worried about. Large scale
social movements have a vertical structure that allow their own members to select
the representatives that participate in the policy making process.
This paper studies the effect of this democratic reform on both, broad and tar-
geted redistribution and their effectiveness in averting social unrest. I find that elites
use this form of democratization not as a device to increase broad redistribution -
which is expected when elites do not know who is the threat- but as a mechanism to
1In this paper, a social movement is defined as a process of mobilization that stretch across
space and time, linking persons, and groups identified with particular claims and values (Escobar
1995).
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identify leaders of the dissatisfied group and buy them off, in return for preventing
social unrest and demobilizing their supporters.
Specifically, this paper draws on the experience of the organization of the Colom-
bian National Peasant Movement -ANUC- within the context of the threat of a
Communist revolution in Latin America during 1957-1985. The Colombian govern-
ment organized this movement in 1967, a time when peasants could already vote
and run for public office. Through a direct alliance between peasantry and the na-
tional state that lasted until 1972, the central government gave the peasants direct
political participation in the local executive branch (a seat in local committees) and
economic support (resources to organize and train peasants leaders). ANUC had a
vertical organization where the peasant members elected their own and permanent
leaders, who would represent them with the local and regional authorities.
In this context, a democratic reform is the extension of the political represen-
tation of a group which is dissatisfied with the status quo -peasantry- and it is
measured as a municipal peasant association affiliated to ANUC obtaining legal
entitlement during the years that the government supported the movement (1967-
1972). Getting legal entitlement is a de facto devolution of power from landlords
to peasants, that allows the peasantry to participate directly in the local policy
making process: ANUC peasant leaders meet local authorities regularly to discuss
investment projects, revise budgets and activities of their agencies and to coordinate
future activities.
Crucially for my empirical strategy, obtaining legal entitlement is a two-stage
process and includes an element of voluntary organization. First, an association has
to get legal status (recognition) for which its members have to organize themselves
and convene a local assembly. Then, it obtains legal entitlement (empowerment) by
sending some documents to the Ministry of Agriculture in Bogota, which grants the
new legal recognition in a process that takes, on average, between 9 to 11 months.
I use a difference in difference strategy that takes advantage of the variation
in the timing of democratization, and solve the potential self-selection problem in
the voluntary organization of the association by restricting the main specification
to a sample that compares only municipalities that obtained legal entitlement with
the compliers, those that only managed to obtain legal status due to the end of
the alliance in 1972. To test the main theoretical predictions of the link between
threat of revolution, democratization, and redistribution, I use a newly digitized
and hand-coded municipal dataset which includes detailed information about local
public expenditure and revenues, ANUC and public land allocations from 1957 to
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1975.
My empirical analysis yields four key findings. First, a democratic reform that
empowered the peasants did not lead to higher redistribution from the landowners
towards the peasantry. Results suggest deterioration in the broad redistributive
policies such as social expenditure (primary education and basic health) as well as
land tax revenues, due to an heightened tax evasion.
Second, the empowerment of the peasants led to higher targeted redistribution.
In places where the democratic reform took place, there is an increase in bureaucratic
expenditure and in the number of public lands given to peasants. I provide evidence
showing that the change in bureaucratic expenditure was driven by an increase in the
number of employees in the section of public administration, in line with previous
qualitative findings (Bagley 1989, Escobar 1988, Archer 1990). By matching the
names of approximately 2,500 peasant leaders and the names of over 10,000 peasants
that received public lands during 1967-1972, the analysis also reveals that peasant
leaders benefited disproportionately from the land reform.2 These private goods
-public jobs and lands- represent more than just a temporary change in income and
they are political (contacts) and economic (collateral) assets that can be used in the
future (Lehman, 1971).
Third, targeted redistribution and co-optation occurred more intensively in mu-
nicipalities which experienced more violence in the previous years or where the
communist support was stronger. In contrast, wealth, collective action capacity and
inequality do not seem to affect the results. This finding supports the hypothe-
sis that the mechanism behind the increase in the targeted redistribution was the
potential threat of a revolution.
Assuming that targeted redistribution is an informal contract between the leaders
and the state in exchange for demobilizing their followers (Lehman 1971), I test
whether municipalities where peasant leaders were co-opted through public land
allocations experienced less violence following the end of the alliance. I merge all
data about public disorder activities in Colombia between 1972 and 1995, which
includes the number of land invasions, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
-FARC- guerrilla rebel activities and peasant protests at municipal level. I find a
negative correlation between co-optation of the peasant leaders and public disorder,
which is consistent with the idea that the strategy was successful at buying off the
revolution.
2Albertus (2013, 2015) suggests similar findings in the case of Velasco dictatorship in Peru
during 1968-1980, where the land was redistributed to "middle-class" peasants instead of landless
peasants because they had the greatest potential to organize against the regime.
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The study of mechanisms that increase participation is rapidly expanding as
democratic reforms are seen as key drivers of redistribution and development. This
paper contributes to this existing literature by studying the effect of another demo-
cratic reform, namely the organization of a social movement by the state, and how
this type of representation can affect redistribution. This type of democratic reform
differs from the one studied in the existing literature as it gives de facto decision
power to peasants and goes beyond the traditional de jure decision power, universal
suffrage. This paper also adds to the growing literature on democratization and
redistribution during a threat of revolution, as it shows that the organization of a
social movement by the state is a mechanism which allows the local associations to
select their leaders and at the same time allows governments to identify the potential
rebel leaders and buy them off. The paper exploits a unique dataset that allows to
identifying simultaneously the leaders of the threatening group and the beneficiaries
of the land reform. The results also complement the literature as they quantify
the effect of democratization on both types of redistribution, broad and targeted.
Finally, the threat of a Communist revolution and the end of the alliance between
government and peasants provides a unique context to study the effectiveness of this
strategy as a mechanism to avoid revolution.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature
review. Section 3 describes the institutional framework of Colombia and the National
peasant movement during the period of study 1957-1985. Section 4 presents the
conceptual framework. Section 5 discusses the econometric specifications of the
relationship between democratization and redistribution during periods of a threat
of revolution. Section 6 presents the mechanisms. Section 7 presents the econometric
specifications and results of the relationship between democratization, co-optation
and threat of revolution. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on democratization and redistribution
during periods of a threat of a revolution. A prolific body of work has explored the
different strategies that governments can implement when there is a threat to the
status quo from a group that are politically and economically excluded. One strategy
to deal with the threat is to rely on repression for survival, becoming dependent on
the police force or military and using a large share of resources on keeping this
control. In addition to the notorious consequences of displacement and mortality,
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the use of repression as a long-term strategy could facilitate that this force turned
against governments. Moreover, this strategy may undermine the ability of the
government, which is populated by the repressed members, to function (Haber,
2006).
Another commonly studied response by the elite is the implementation of demo-
cratic reforms, with franchise extension and the introduction of election the most
commonly used and studied type of reforms (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2006;
Tilly, 1995; Weyland, 2010; Przeworski, 2009; Chaney 2013; Aidt and Jensen, 2014;
Aidt and Franck, 2015; Aidt and Leon, 2015). These works have suggested that these
forms of democratization will lead to an increase in broad redistribution (Meltzer
and Richard 1981) and public good provision (Musgrave 1969; Lindert 1994; Peltz-
man 1980) and have assumed that once they take place, the original status quo will
be permanently secured.
However, franchise extension is only one step forward in the process of democ-
ratization. In many democracies real power is rarely vested in formal political insti-
tutions and even when peasants, workers and urban poor enjoy political rights such
as voting, they lack access to effective and informal channels of influence (Eckstein
2001).
There is another democratic mechanism that governments can use to restrain
threats to the status quo and that has received little attention in the literature: the
organization of a social movement by the state. Social movements are a democ-
ratizing mechanism because, through collective action, generate new channels of
influence and people that have been traditionally excluded have now a united voice
that allow them to participate directly in the policy making process (Meyer, 1994;
Tarrow, 1994; Tilly 1978; Roberts 1996; Jelin and Hershberg 1996; Campbell et al,
2010; Eckstein 2001; Escobar 1998). In Latin American history, social movements
have served as vehicles for the achievements of more political and economic benefits
(Roberts 1996; Jelin and Hershberg, 1996).
Although the literature about social movements and their empowerment role
is extensive, this work is the first attempt to study the organization of a social
movement by the state in the context of a threat of revolution. Moreover, the idea
proposed in this paper about the organization of social movements as a mechanism
to identify leaders of the dissatisfied group and buy them off, in return for preventing
social unrest and demobilizing their supporters has not been previously explored in
the quantitative political economy literature.
This paper is also related to the empirical literature that studies the effect of
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democratization on redistribution, regardless of the revolutionary threats. A prolific
body of work suggests that introduction of election and franchise extension increase
broad redistribution and public good provision (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Lindert
1994; Peltzman, 1980; Husted and Kenny 1997; Vernby 2013; Martinez-Bravo et al
2014; Kroth et al 2016). For example, in Britain, France and Germany democratic
reforms during the 19th and 20th century coincided with important educational
reforms and progressivity of the tax system (Musgrave 1969; Lindert 1994; Flora
1983). In a similar spirit, Corvalan et al (2017) show that the right to run has a
greater effect on redistribution than the right to vote.
The role of democratic reforms as mechanisms to identify the leaders in au-
thoritarian regimes and co-opted them has been discussed extensively. Elections
have often been used as a mechanism to identify opposition leaders in authoritar-
ian regimes whereas parliament provide them with some policy influence (Boix and
Svolik, 2007; Gandhi 2008; Malesky and Schiler 2010). Once the opposition lead-
ers3 are identified, they are co-opted and the status quo is secured as it was the
case in Russia (Reuter and Robertson 2014), Argentina during the dictatorships in
the 1970s-1980s (Rock, 1987) and Mexico during the Porfiriato (Haber, Razo and
Maurer, 2003).4
Finally, the type of democratic reform I study is closest to quotas and reservation
seats for underrepresented groups. Pande (2003) provides evidence that reservation
for minority groups in India -underrepresented castes and tribes- can enhance groups’
influence in the policy making process and that legislators belonging to these groups
have used this influence to increase targeted redistribution. Similarly, in the case of
gender quotas in India, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) find that the reservation
of a council seat for women led to more investment in infrastructure that is directly
relevant to women’s needs. Despite the importance of this issue, very little is known
about the causal effect of quotas or reservation seats on redistribution in the context
of a threat of revolution.
3Opposition leaders can be politicians as in the Russian case or senior entrepreneurs as in
Argentina and Mexico.
4More recently, Nicolas Maduro’s government in Venezuela has clearly identified the military
as a potential threatening group and has promoted more than 2000 military to general positions
-US has more than double military force and only 900 generals- and has allowed them to run the
oil-state enterprise or to be in charge of different Ministries as a strategy to avoid an uprising of
the military forces.
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3 Historical Background
The beginning of a revolutionary socialist state in Cuba in 1959 exerted a great
stimulus on the aspirations of the peasants in Latin America and it was perceived
by the governments in the region, including the United States, as a threat to the
status quo (U.S Senate 1966, 1967; Archila 2001, Hobsbwam 2001; Hirschman 1963;
Reyes 1987; Gilhodes 1988; Bagley and Botero 1994).
In particular, Colombia was seen as one of the countries with a castroite insur-
gency problem in the region (C.I.A 1961, 1967)5 due to the spontaneous mobilization
of peasants during the civil war "La Violencia" between 1948 and 19586. In terms
of the political structure, Colombia was under the "National Front" coalition (1958-
1974), in which the two main political parties, the Liberal and the Conservative
parties, agreed to alternate power for a period of four presidential terms. However,
other parties such as the Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL), National Popu-
lar Alliance (ANAPO) and the Communist party actively participated in local and
regional elections.
To respond to the threat, Latin American governments, pressured by the US gov-
ernment and the Alliance for Progress, focused on implementing important agrarian
reforms and rural development programs. One of the responses of the political ur-
ban elite was the implementation of democratic reforms that expand the political
opportunities to peasants. Table 1 indicates that during the 1960s this policy was
implemented in other countries of the region such as Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru
and Venezuela. The empowerment was materialized in the organization and support
of social movements in the name of general national goals that transcended political
party interests (Perez, 2010).
In Colombia, President Carlos Lleras Restrepo, supported by the urban elite7,
founded in May 1967 the Colombian National Peasant Movement -ANUC- (Ministry
of Agriculture, 1968)8, considered the most important movement in the country’s
history (Gilhodes, 1988)9. ANUC had some features that distinguished it from any
5Other countries that were considered to have a future prospect of insurgency were Guatemala,
Nicaragua and Bolivia.
6According to Hobsbwam (1963) this mobilization was greater than anywhere else in the Latin
American history, with the exception of Mexico.
7At this time, the political national elite that controlled the central government had started to
separate from the local/regional rural elite due to differences in their economic interests.
8To found ANUC, the president skipped the traditional process through the congress and
signed directly the decree of foundation (Ocampo, 2014).
9Its national protests achieved important press coverage and gathered more than 500.000 people
in 155 cities ("El Tiempo", June 3 1968).
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other rural movement in the country.10 First, it had national scope. Two years after
its creation it had offices in almost 50% of the municipalities and had approximately
a million members. Second, it claimed to be politically independent and its members
came from different political ideologies (Zamosc, 2006; Escobar 1982). Third, mem-
bers were heterogeneous. Small landowners, tenants, sharecroppers, settlers and
agricultural workers were part of it (Zamosc, 2006; Bagley and Botero, 1994).The
goals of the movement were the improvement of the living and labor conditions of
the peasantry and the implementation of an structural agrarian reform that redis-
tribute land to the peasants (Zamosc, 2006). The government stipulated that only
members of the movement would be potential beneficiaries of the agrarian policies,
making compulsory to show a membership card when a service was requested or a
benefit was received11.
ANUC had a vertical organization. It had a national committee that partici-
pated in the meetings with the central government, regional associations that took
part in the different state assemblies and municipal associations which elected five
representatives to participate in the local committees. Each municipality was in
charge of organizing its own association and of getting its legal recognition. The
legal process had two stages: first, the association had to obtain legal status and
then the legal entitlement was granted. To get legal status, members had to convene
a local assembly with a 10% minimum quorum of the registered members and to
agree on the statutes of the association. This assembly also required the presence of
a delegate of the Ministry of Agriculture who had to sign the act of foundation. His
presence relied on the budget that the ministry had to organize the movement12.
In total, 75 delegates had to travel around the country to attend these assemblies
(Ministry of Agriculture, 1968). After an association got legal status it had to send
some documents (constitutive act of the assembly, electoral results of the board of
directors of the associations and a copy of the statutes) directly to the Ministry of
Agriculture in Bogota who was in charge of granting the legal entitlement. The time
to get legal entitlement once an association had obtained legal status varied between
nine and eleven months.
10The other important rural association at the time was the National Federation of Coffee
growers (FEDECAFE). However, this organization did not compete directly with ANUC. Its goals
and demands from the government were different. FEDECAFE’s main demands were subsidies,
reduction of export tariffs, improvement of mechanisms of commercialization and access to credit.
11To become a member, a peasant has to show evidence of being a rural worker: laborer,
sharecropper, settler or small land owner.
12The financial support comes mainly from the Alliance for Progress and from international
organizations such as the Interamerican Development Dank (IDB).
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Once an association got legal entitlement, its leaders were able to directly par-
ticipate in the policy making process in their municipalities. Officials of the local
entities met with peasants representatives to revise budgets and activities of their
agencies and to coordinate future activities. With this representation, it was en-
sured that the local officials fulfilled their tasks taking into account the needs of the
peasants and ensured that local entities had to study the how, when and where to
provide public goods (Ministry of Agriculture, 1968)13.
The alliance between the state and ANUC lasted until 1972 when the government
signed a new pact or agrarian counter-reform, known as the Chicoral agreement,
which protected large properties and landowners. With the end of the alliance, the
economic and political support of the state finished, some associations lost their
legal entitlement and repression against the peasants started.14
As a result of internal divisions and the lack of mechanisms to get new eco-
nomic resources, in October 1972 the movement split into two. A first group -"linea
Sincelejo"- had a radical position, declared itself independent of the government and
kept the revolutionary ideology of transforming the economic structure in the coun-
tryside by abolishing all type of capitalist structure. Some of ANUC members also
joined the rural guerrilla group FARC that emerged in 1964 after the civil war -La
Violencia- and some others founded the indigenous peasant group known as Quintin
Lame (CQL) in 197415. A second group -"linea Armenia"- supported the reforms
proposed by the government and insisted upon peaceful and legal solutions through
the dialogue with the authorities (Rudqvist, 1983). These two lines continue over
time and although ANUC is still active, it has lost its strength and its influence in
the national matters (Zamosc, 2006).
ANUC was a form of democratic reform that empowered the peasants and can be
thought as a substitute for repression. Several factors can explain why the Colom-
bian government preferred not to employ a violent strategy. First, it was costly
compared to the other strategy -the organization of the peasant movement-. Bagley
and Botero (1994) estimate that the cost of organizing ANUC was less than a dol-
13Other benefits that the associations received once they obtained legal entitlement were training
to their leaders and access to credit quotas, revolving funds and marketing and technical assistance.
14In the region, military governments took power in Uruguay and Chile in 1973, and Argentina
in 1976. In these countries, militaries removed presidents they saw as moving dangerously to
the left and to counter guerrilla movements that threatened to topple the governments. In these
three cases, the immediate threat to national security was translated as "communism or fidelismo"
(Wright, 1991).
15The Quintin Lame group received military training from the Marxist-Leninist Communist
Party and was formed after the killing of indigenous leaders in the state of Cauca by the repressive
forces of the state and landowners (Penaranda, 2015).
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lar per member. Second, between 1948 and 1958, the country had experienced the
longest and most crude bipartisan civil war in the countryside, "La Violencia", that
left around 200.000 deaths. When the war ended the state had a large deficit and
lost part of the monopoly over violence in the rural areas. Third, international orga-
nizations encouraged governments to take control of the rural areas using peaceful
means and conditioned their credit and economic resources to its achievement.
4 Conceptual Framework
Threats arise in response to grievances or unfulfilled needs that groups experience
in a shared way (McAdam, 1982) and materialize when they develop a shared con-
sciousness and collective identities (Taylor and Whittier, 1992, Johnson 1999) or
with the presence of political opportunities (Tarrow 1998; McAdam, Tarrow and
Tilly 2001).
The triumph of peasant revolutions in neighboring countries can exert a great
stimulus on peasant aspirations, provide new political opportunities and exacerbates
peasant grievances over poverty and landholding inequality, transforming the peas-
antry into a threat. Revolutionary events abroad also represent exogenous shocks to
the information set of the elites and may be a trigger of reforms to reduce grievances
(Aidt and Jensen, 2014).
Grievance accounts of peasant support for revolutionary ideas -such as the com-
munist ideology- and guerrilla movements suggest that fulfilling their grievances
should reduce peasants’ support for rebels. Hence, the state can address peasants’
grievances by implementing reforms that meet peasant’s demands and, it can poten-
tially "buy" peasants away from supporting revolutionary ideas and turning them
into a force that supports the status quo (Huntington 1968; Paige 1975).
One response to address the grievances is to implement democratic reforms that
gives de facto power to underrepresented groups. Elections and franchise extension
are only the first step moving forward in the process of democratization. These
reforms are intended to improve the welfare of the excluded group and in turn
prevent social unrest when employed as commitments to future broad redistribution
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2006). However, revolutionary threats may still
occur after franchise extension. In democracies, where regular elections are already
taking place and all citizens have been enfranchised, the representation of some
groups remains limited. When there is a threat to the status quo in this context,
governments have to repress the threat, implement other democratic reforms to
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empower the dissatisfied group or carry out redistributive policies directly.16
One reform aimed at preventing revolution is the organization of social move-
ments by the state, which is a state-sponsored participatory reform that generates
new channels of influence by giving underrepresented groups political participation
in the executive branch of the government.
The participation of the threatening group in the policy-making process is also a
way to control it, as it was the case of the Latin American labor movements during
the 1920s (Collier and Collier, 2012). Participation channels the threat toward
administrative functions and resembles the impression that its demands are being
addressed and as a result, they no longer need to be at the forefront of its activities
(Murphree et al 1996).
What are the possible consequences of the organization of a social movement by
the state? One possibility is that increased participation by the peasantry leads to
greater broad redistribution in the form of land tax revenues and higher public goods
provision. In particular, when the excluded group is the peasantry, its discontent is
primarily distributive, not ideational (Finkel et al, 2015), so its empowerment will
lead to demand more redistribution from the elite (landlords) to the excluded group
(peasants). This broad redistribution will decrease grievances and the perceptions
of inequality, by taking resources from the landowners and invest them in improving
the living conditions of the rural population. By redistributing to the threatening
group, it helps to appease the grievances and hence to reduce peasants’ attempt to
revolt.
However, larger-scale reforms that lead to higher broad redistribution are po-
litically and economically costly. They require important economic resources and
have the potential to harm elite interests.17 Because they are politically difficult
to implement18, the effectiveness of the government’s broad redistributive policies
intended to undercut revolutionary threats and guerrilla expansion is limited, as it
was the Colombian case during the 1980s and 1990s (Albertus and Kaplan, 2012).
Large-scale reforms are also the strategy that governments tend to use when they
have uncertainty about who can revolt or who are the leaders. For this reason,
16For example, during Velasco dictatorship in Peru between 1968-1980, the regime targeted
directly the largest and most influential landowners for expropriation, redistributing to peasant
workers (Albertus, 2013, 2015).
17This is not the case in nondemocratic regimes where the interest is precisely to destroy the
power of economic elites and to diminish their influence, as it was the case of Peru during the
1970s.
18In Colombia, powerful landowners blocked extensive land reforms and successfully lobbied for
INCORA to focus its efforts at those projects least disturbing to the existing land tenure (Albertus
and Kaplan, 2012).
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looking only at the effect of a participatory reform on broad redistribution as a way
to avoid revolution is incomplete.
Governments have another, potentially effective, strategy: use the organization
of the peasant movement to identify the leaders of the group. Social movements are
a device to identify the leaders since they have a vertical structure and through an
internal process they select their representatives. Once identified, the leaders can
be bought off with particularistic benefits such as patronage jobs or public lands in
exchange for demobilizing their followers.19
Whether the demobilization occurs as a result of an implicit contract between
leaders and elites or because leaders have now a vested interest in the status quo
due to an increase in "ownership" and "identification" leads to similar outcomes.20
Demobilization and the appeasement of a threat to the status quo occur when leaders
with significant power over their followers are co-opted by the state. Elites have
incentives to use the organization of the social movement as a tool of political control
and the co-optation of leaders strengthens the state’s control over the threatening
group while reducing the bargaining power of the rest of the movement’s members.
When leaders become part of the status quo, members face higher costs to organize
against the government and overcoming the collective action problem is harder due
to the loss of trust.21 Leaders can exploit their power over the members to encourage
demobilization and any attempt to revolt. Hence, the co-optation of leaders will be
negative correlated with violent activities against the status quo.22
In terms of the role of the leaders, they will serve as a link between the state and
the movement’s members. Followers are grateful to leaders for speaking and acting
on their behalf, even though leaders can potentially become part of the political
elites.23 Followers willingly cede agency to their leaders, for example due to their
19This strategic policy is similar to the political economy theory proposed by Biais and Perotti
(2002) in which a government implements a Machiavellian privatization that allocates a significant
share ownership to a targeted section of the population, leading to a shift in the political preferences
that ensures reelection. Similarly, the selectorate theory proposed by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
(2012) also suggests that the elites will use private goods to buy off the "essentials", those whose
support guarantee the permanence of the status quo.
20This increase in identification can occur even when these policies do not imply substantial
changes or outcomes are not very satisfactory to the group goals.
21For example, Mattingly (2016) shows how the inclusion of lineage leaders in village political
institutions in China weakens villagers’ land rights and is used by the elite to elicit compliance
from villagers for land expropriation policies.
22Future work might study whether co-opting the leaders is an effective long-term strategy.
23Michels’s (1962) theory of political leadership suggests that in large-scale movements, leaders
inevitable become oligarchical as they are motivated to preserve their own power and positions
and are more concerned with organizational maintenance than the original goals of the movement.
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apathy or lack of competence in comparison to their skilled leaders (Michels 1962).24
If this is the case, the empowerment of peasants will redistribute private goods
which are political and economic assets for the peasant leaders.25 Receiving private
goods will also help the leaders to keep the vertical structure of the movement by
consolidating their economic and/or political power and help them to differentiate
from the rest of the members. The advantages of this strategy are its political and
economic costs as it requires less economic resources (near zero in terms of the public
budget) whereas it protects the elite interests.
By extending the political rights of the threatening group, governments also need
to manage the balancing act of increase representation of this group without threat-
ening the stability of the status quo. When governments decide to empower these
groups they cannot risk their own power. In the case of social movements organized
by the state, governments control their economic resources and their participation
gives them a voice but not a vote over policy decisions, limiting their access to the
state budget.
This framework relies on two assumptions. First, it assumes that leaders have
sufficient control over their followers in order to avoid revolution if they decide it.
Leader’s power is particularly strong in large-scale social movements as they need
to have a considerable influence on their followers in order to keep the movement
cohesive (Hobsbawm 1993; McCarthy and Zald 1977).26 Second, it assumes that
leaders value more private goods than public goods.
I apply this framework to the Colombian case during the 1960s when there was
a threat of a Communist revolution. The threatening group -the peasantry- was
empowered by the state in order to avoid it being captured by the communists and
rebel against the status quo. The empowerment occurred through the voluntary
organization of a peasant association that gave the peasants direct participation in
the policy making process. Their representatives in the local state organizations were
the peasant leaders, who were elected by each municipal association. The strategy of
the government in order to avoid a potential unrest was to give the peasant leaders
economic -lands- and/or political -public jobs- assets and in exchange, these leaders
24Marx and Engels (1968) and Lenin (1975) also shared the view that only intellectuals should
be the leaders of revolutionary movements because they are able to understand the meaning of
revolutionary struggle.
25Public jobs are seeing as political assets that facilitate building contacts, political capital
and networks that give political gains. In particular, public jobs in administrative sections allow
employees to become familiar with both legal and administrative complexities of the State (Lehman,
1971).
26As Morris and Staggenborg (2012) suggest leaders help to create or undermine political and
economic realities that influence the trajectories and outcomes of social movements.
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had to demobilize their followers and avoid potential revolts.
5 Democratization and Redistribution
The objective of the empirical exercise is to estimate the effect of peasant empower-
ment during the period 1967-1972 on two types of redistribution, broad and targeted.
I employ a difference in difference regression with municipality and year fixed ef-
fects and state specific-time trends in a panel data of 1088 Colombian municipalities
between 1957 and 1975. I use obtaining legal entitlement as a proxy for peasant
empowerment and exploit the variation in the timing of obtaining it.
During the years that the peasant movement had the support of the state, 552
municipalities got empowerment (legal entitlement and legal status) and 92 only got
recognition (legal status). 444 municipalities did not get any type of legal recogni-
tion. Table 2 shows yearly the number of municipalities that obtained legal entitle-
ment and legal status and its variation over time and Figure 2 presents the spatial
distribution of the municipalities that got legal entitlement and legal status only.
To test the effect of the participation of peasants in the policy-making process
on broad redistribution I use information on land tax revenues, central transfers
and social expenditure. Land tax revenues are a good proxy of broad redistribution
since relate three actors: landowners who pay the taxes, local governments who
collect them and peasants who are the potential beneficiaries. Land tax revenues
were the main component of a municipality’s revenues but the enforcement of their
collection was very low. Local social expenditure includes the spending of projects
in primary public schools and health centers reported by a municipality and central
transfers are additional revenues for specific projects related to health, education
and infrastructure that municipalities received from the central government.
To test the effect on targeted redistribution I collected data on bureaucratic
expenditure, number of public employees and hectares of public lands given to peas-
ants. This type of expenditure redistributes resources to selected people by giving
them private goods such as jobs and lands. Bureaucratic expenditure includes all
the spending in the general direction of a municipality. This refers to the spending
in general administration and executive power such as majors, local assemblies and
local administrative directions (government, education, health, justice, infrastruc-
ture, finance, labor, agriculture and economic performance). This spending is a good
proxy of targeted redistribution because it includes the budget spent in public jobs
that are potential political assets and job positions that facilitate building contacts
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and clientelistic relations.
The second proxy of targeted redistribution is the number of hectares of public
lands allocated to peasants. Land is considered the most valuable asset for a peasant.
Although agrarian reforms are aimed at benefiting most of the rural population,
the policy is selective and usually ends up assisting only a small fraction of the
peasants27. Theoretically, all the agricultural workers could be potential beneficiaries
of the agrarian reform. In practice, less than 5% of the peasants received public lands
during these years28. Because of selectivity in targeted redistribution, some members
have disproportionately benefited from this type of redistribution.
Table 28 presents the descriptive statistics of the different variables used in the
specifications.29 The treatment are those 552 municipalities that obtained legal
entitlement. In the case of the full sample the control group is all the municipalities
that did not get this legal recognition and in the case of the restricted sample the
control group is the 92 municipalities that obtained legal status but did not get legal
entitlement.
5.1 Identification Strategy
My main specification uses a restricted sample of 644 municipalities to solve for a
potential self-selection problem in the voluntary organization of the association. In
this sample, I compare only municipalities that got both legal entitlement and legal
status (treatment) with municipalities that only got legal status (control) during
the years that the government supported the organization of the peasant movement
(1967-1972). Given that the average time to get legal entitlement after obtaining
legal status was between 9 and 11 months, the control group includes municipalities
that were pending to obtain the legal entitlement when the alliance between gov-
ernment and peasants ended in October 1972 and hence only obtained legal status.
The self-selection problem is solved in the restricted sample because all the munici-
palities in it follow the requirement of voluntary organization and they only differ in
27Law 135 of 1961 provides to peasants two different mechanisms to receive public lands. First,
through the regular process of public land allocations in which the peasants have to demonstrate
that they have worked on at least 2/3 parts of the land they are claiming. Second, through
colonization in which public lands are allocated free of charge to "poor rural workers or low income
families". The decision relies on the Colombian Institute of Agrarian Reform (INCORA) which is
a public national institution with administrative autonomy.
28Rural population during these decades was around 14 million and overall the agrarian reform
implemented since 1961 gave out around 300.000 plots of lands to peasants
29Table 38 shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables for both treatment and
control groups during the pre-treatment years (1957-1966).
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the legal entitlement requirement which was a process that depends on the Ministry
of Agriculture.
I also include other controls in the main specification. First, I control for potential
income shocks that municipalities may experience every year. This captures changes
in yearly municipalities’ income depending on their suitability to produce some
crops. This variable is the average of the land suitability of the main four crops
(coffee, sugar, tobacco, banana) weighted by the national average price of each crop
in 1957 COP. Second, I include other variables that might affect the timing of getting
legal entitlement. These variables are population in 1964 and the number of tractors
in 1960 interacted with a linear time trend t to allow their impact to vary over time.
The following difference in difference model is estimated:
yi,j,t = αi + δjt+ β1D(peas_asso)i,j,t + β2xi,j,t + β3(Xi1960/4 ∗ t) + λt + εi,j,t
where yi,j,t is measured as the log of both broad -land tax revenues, central transfers
and social expenditure- and targeted -bureaucratic expenditure and public lands
granted to peasants- redistributive variables in municipality i, state j in year t; xi,j,t
is the income shock; Xd1960/4 is a vector of baseline demographic and economic vari-
ables (population and tractors) obtained in 1964 and 1960, t is a linear trend and
αi, δjt and λt are municipality, state specific-time trend and year fixed effects respec-
tively. The inclusion of municipality fixed effects in the main specification controls
for any selection into treatment that is due to municipality time-invariant factors.
Year fixed effects capture the influence of aggregate shocks and state specific-time
trend control for the economic and institutional differences across states in Colombia
during 1957-1975. The variable D(peas_asso)i,j,t takes value 1 from the year t that
a municipality i in state j gets legal entitlement until 1972 and 0 otherwise. The
standard errors are clustered at municipality level to allow for within-municipality
correlations.
The coefficient β1 is the difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of legal
entitlement of the municipal peasant association on the outcome variables during
the years that the government supported the peasant movement (1967-1972). In-
terpreting β1 as the causal effect of obtaining legal entitlement does not require to
assume that the legal entitlement timing within municipalities was random. In-
stead, it requires the weaker assumption that conditional on the baseline controls,
obtaining legal entitlement is not correlated with time-varying municipality char-
acteristics that affect broad and targeted redistributive variables through channels
other than the peasant movement. The second assumption that the identification
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strategy relies on is the standard parallel trends in the absence of the shock to
peasant organizations.
5.2 Results
I test the hypothesis that averages of both broad and targeted redistributive vari-
ables in municipalities that got full empowerment and those that got just legal
status (partial empowerment) were different during the years that the government
supported the peasant movement (1967-1972). Table 4 presents the effects of legal
entitlement on broad redistribution and Table 6 presents the estimations on targeted
redistribution. All estimations include municipality and year fixed effects. Columns
1, 4 and 7 in both tables include state specific-time trend, columns 2, 5 and 8 include
state fixed effect and municipality specific-time trend and as a comparison columns
3, 6 and 9 present results for the full sample.
5.2.1 Broad Redistribution
Columns 1-3 in Table 4 report the results of obtaining legal entitlement on land tax
revenues, columns 4-6 on central transfers and columns 7-9 on social expenditure.
Results indicate that obtaining legal entitlement did not lead to higher broad re-
distribution towards the peasantry. This implies a change in policy variables when
a peasant association only got recognition compared to when it got full empow-
erment30. The magnitude for the coefficient on land tax revenues is about 0.114
relative to the sample mean 12.0, which implies a 12%31 decrease in land tax rev-
enues once an association got legal entitlement. The decrease in land tax revenues
seems to be offset by an increase in transfers from the central government of around
10% but this coefficient is not significant 32. The magnitude of the coefficient of
social expenditure is 0.19 relative to the sample mean 10.4, which implies a decrease
of 21% in municipalities that got legal entitlement with respect to those that only
obtained legal status and is significant at 5%.
The negative and significant estimates for the legal entitlement dummy are ro-
bust when I use the alternative specification -municipality time-trend-, while the
coefficient on central transfers remains insignificant. The magnitude of the coef-
ficients is larger when I use the full sample and include as a control group not
30The size of the coefficients is larger when the full sample is used.
31Because the dependent variable is in log, this result is obtained from exp(0.114) -1=0.12.
32Although results are not significant, Table 45 in the Appendix B also indicates that indirect
tax revenues, such as local taxes on alcohol and cigarettes, increased during the same period and
could have helped to offset the reduction in land tax revenues.
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only municipalities that just got legal status but also municipalities that did not
get any type of recognition. Moreover, the coefficient on central transfers becomes
considerably larger and statistically significant.
In order to have a better understanding of the results, I explore different expla-
nations behind the reduction in land tax revenues. The main payers of land taxes,
given the exemptions to small plots of lands, were the landowners. There are four
plausible explanations for the reduction in land tax revenues: i) cadastral updates,
ii) changes in the tax rate, iii) changes in the statutory tax base or iv) changes in
the effective tax base (tax evasion).
There was not cadastral update33 or evidence of a tax rate change during this
period.34 To study changes in the statutory tax base I collect cadastral informa-
tion between 1957 and 1972 at municipal level -number and value of taxable rural
properties-. Table 5 tests whether obtaining legal entitlement between 1967-1972
have an effect on the number of rural taxable plots and their land values. Results
suggest that in municipalities where peasants were empowered, both the number
of taxable plots and their cadastral value increased with coefficients significant at
1%. Consequently, the decrease in tax revenues can only be due to a decrease in the
effective tax base, which is related to higher tax evasion by the main taxpayers, the
landlords.
Theoretically, this result is also consistent with the idea that social movements
also create, expand and amplify the political or economic opportunities for the
opponents, which in this context were the rural elites (Tarrow, 1994). Landowners
could have benefited from the organization of the peasant movement through a lower
enforcement in the land tax collection in exchange for not interfering in the campaign
to organize the movement and for recognizing the participation of the peasants in
the policy making process.
33The official newspaper Diario Oficial indicates that the only cadastral update that took place
during the period 1957-1975 was during the the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla in 1957-1958 (Decree
2317 and 2615, 1953).
34Since the government of Lopez Pumarejo (1934-1938) land was subject to taxation through
two different and fixed taxes: the main municipality revenue, the real estate land (land tax) of
4 x 1000 and a state tax, patrimony (net worth) tax of 1.35 x 1000 to 15 x 1000 in taxable
property in excess of one million. Exemptions in both cases were applied to subsistence properties
and communal lands (Pecaut 2006, Gonzalez and Calderon, 2002 and Hirschman, 1963). During
the second government of President Lleras Camargo (1958-1962) a new tax bill that proposed a
"territorial tax" and increased the cultivation requirements and the penalties for non-compliances
was not approved by the Congress (Hirschman, 1963).
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5.2.2 Targeted Redistribution
Table 6 test the effect of obtaining legal entitlement on the targeted redistributive
variables: bureaucratic expenditure and public lands allocated to peasants. These
variables redistribute resources to the peasantry, but instead of benefiting the group
as a whole they aim at favoring a selected group within the peasantry.
Column 1 indicates that obtaining legal entitlement will increase bureaucratic
expenditure by 0.26 relative to the mean. This expenditure is around 30% higher
for municipalities that got legal entitlement than for those that only got legal status.
This expenditure includes all the spending in the general administration of a munic-
ipality. While the relevance of bureaucratic jobs is the potential access to political
networks, peasant leaders could also get jobs in other sectors such as education,
health or judicial system, but these would give them less political gains. If public
jobs are seeing as political assets that facilitate building contacts and clientelistic
relations, general direction job positions in the municipality executive power are the
closest ones to achieve this objective.
To link the increase in bureaucratic expenditure with public jobs I collected
information about the number of municipal employees in the different administrative
sections. This data is only aggregated at state level for the period 1957-1972, so
in this case I regress the percentage of municipalities in the state that got legal
entitlement out of the total that got either entitlement or legal status on the number
of municipal public employees.
Results in Table 7 show that the total number of municipal public employees
increases in those states that have a higher share of municipalities that got legal
entitlement. This increase is due to a substantial expansion in the number of jobs
in the general administration section. An increase of 1 percentage point in this
share is associated with an increase of 59% in the number of employees in general
administration. Other sections such as education, health, judicial system or tax
collection did not experience a significant increase in the number of employees.
The second channel of targeted redistribution, public lands granted to peasants,
is measured as the total number of hectares (in thousands and log) allocated to
peasants at municipal level.35 Column 4 in Table 6 indicates that obtaining legal
35I use the average measure of a Family Agriculture Unit (UAF) as the threshold. A UAF is
defined as the number of hectares that a family of four needs to subsist for a month. This number
varies depending on the soil conditions and type of crops produced but Tobon (1972) calculated
that plots of land that are 20 hectares or larger can give a family an annual income of 8800 COP.
I use this number to define the lands given to the peasantry and aggregated all allocations below
this number to calculate the total number of hectares given to peasants yearly.
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entitlement increases the number of hectares allocated to the peasants by 0.014
relative to the mean 0.02. This represents an increase of 1.5%. This change is small
compared to the coefficients found in the other policy variables, indicating that the
empowerment of peasants had a limited effect on implementation of the agrarian
reform.
In order to establish who received public lands in the municipalities with legal
entitlement during the years the government supported the movement, I match
the list of names of the five municipal peasant leaders that attended the second
national assembly of ANUC in 197136 in Bogota to the names of approximate 10.000
peasants that were listed as beneficiaries of public lands and were daily reported in
the newspaper Diario Oficial between 1967 and 1972.
This exercise allows me to identify whether the peasant leaders were the main
beneficiaries of the agrarian reform. Table 8 shows the number of municipalities that
allocated lands to peasants, that obtained legal entitlement and that had peasant
leaders that received public lands. Out of 1088 municipalities, 462 implemented an
agrarian reform (=42%) during the years 1967-1972.. Out of these 462 municipali-
ties, 63% (295) of them had a peasant association that got legal entitlement. Finally,
210 of the 295 had at least one peasant leader that received land during the years
1967-1972. This represents 71% of the total municipalities that got both agrarian
reform and peasant association. Overall, 20% of the peasant leaders received land
in this period. Based on the Ministry of Agriculture estimates of the number of
members of ANUC (approximately one million members) and on INCORA reports
on the number of public lands allocations (10.000 plots of lands in the empowered
municipalities), only 1% of the members were beneficiaries of the state policy during
the years that the peasants participated in the policy making process.
Moreover, I compare the average size of a plot of land with the average size of
the land given to the peasant leaders and find that the land given to the leaders is
twice greater than the average size of the land granted to peasants: 10.82 against
5.33 has respectively. In terms of the distribution, Figure 5 shows that more than
50% of the public lands given to peasants were smaller than 5 has, regardless of the
characteristics of the peasant association.
The timing of co-optation is also consistent with the hypothesis that the gov-
ernment organized the peasant movement to identify the leaders and buy them
off. Only 22% of the leaders received their land before their association was orga-
36Although I only observe the name of the five peasant leaders once (1971), I had access to the
list of peasant leaders in two states -Huila and Meta- in the following year. Only two leaders in
the municipalities of Tarqui and Gigante were dropped of the lists and replaced by a new leader.
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nized, whereas 78% received it after the movement was organized, their leaders were
elected and the association obtained legal status.37 Overall, these results suggest
that municipalities that got legal entitlement experienced on average higher targeted
redistribution, with peasant leaders disproportionately benefiting from it.
Results are still robust to different specifications. First, when I allow hetero-
geneity in the trends of the outcome variables across municipalities by including
municipalities specific-time trends (results presented in Tables 4 and 6). Second,
when I use the full sample the magnitude of the coefficients on both variables is
smaller but still statistically significant at 1%.
I also report additional robustness checks to address other potential concerns
about the estimates for both types of redistribution.38 Table 48 uses just the sample
of municipalities that got legal status during 1971 (95) using as a treatment group
those that obtained legal entitlement either in 1971 or 1972 (33 municipalities) and
as a control municipalities that only managed to get legal status in 1971 due to
end of the alliance between the movement and the government (62 municipalities).
Although results are not significant due to the low power of the sample, all the signs
are consistent with the results presented in Tables 4 and 6.
Table 49 includes indicator variables for 1 and 2 years before and after getting
legal entitlement. The coefficients on the legal entitlement leads are close to zero,
showing little evidence of an anticipatory response within a municipality about to
obtaining legal entitlement. In the year that an association gets legal entitlement
the change in land tax revenues, social expenditure and bureaucratic expenditure is
around 25%, after which the change is much smaller. Although for this specification
the estimates of the public land allocations are not significant, the size of the co-
efficients increases substantially the year that an association gets legal entitlement
compared to the previous and following years.
5.3 Validation of assumptions
One of the main assumptions in a difference in difference framework is the parallel
path: the trends for treated and non-treated municipalities would be the same in
3712% of the peasant leaders received land during the months between obtaining legal status
and legal entitlement and 66% obtained land after the legal entitlement was granted.
38I also run a seemingly unrelated regression where I allow errors associated with the dependent
variables to be correlated across different equations. Results are still robust for three of the
dependent variables (land tax revenues, central transfers and bureaucratic expenditure) and are
presented in the Appendix B, Table 50. A jointly significant test rejects the hypothesis that the
coefficients on legal entitlement are jointly zero in the four simultaneous equations.
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the absence of treatment (Lechner, 2010). To validate this assumption I run two
exercises.
I run the main specification for the pre-treatment period (1957-1966) and regress
the outcome variables against an indicator of whether the municipality received
treatment or not.39 Results are presented in Table 39 for the restricted and full
sample and suggest that neither the broad nor the targeted redistributive variables
in municipalities that received the treatment differ from those that did not receive
it.40 These results are also shown in Figure 3 which presents the pre-trends of the
five outcome variables for the two groups (legal status only and legal entitlement)41.
I also estimate a placebo experiment only using the pre-treatment period (1957-
1966) of the data and moving the legal entitlement years from 1969-1972 to 1960-
1963 and results are reported in Table 40. The coefficients for the restricted sample
are all close to zero, and none of them are significant, indicating that outcomes
variables in municipalities that later obtained legal entitlement were not already on
a similar trend before 1967.42
The second assumption is that the timing of obtaining legal entitlement in Colom-
bian municipalities depends on pre-determined variables that are accounted for in
the main specification. I estimate the following specification to check this assump-
tion:
D(peas_asso)i,j = β1Xi,j + εi,j
where D(peas_asso)i is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if an association got
legal entitlement during the period 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise and Xi,t is a vector
39These regressions include year fixed effect, state fixed effect and geographical and economic
controls. This shows whether there is any difference in broad and targeted redistribution between
municipalities that got legal entitlement and those that only got legal status before the foundation
of the peasant movement.
40When the specification includes region instead of state fixed effect, the effect on transfers is
significant and positive, indicating that differences on the central transfers between municipalities
that got legal entitlement and the control group in pre-treatment years are mainly driven by state
characteristics.
41The figures indicate an important reduction in revenues and expenditure in 1963. The signif-
icant reduction in the dependent variables in this year is the result of an increase in inflation of
around 400% between 1962 and 1963 (6.3% in 1962, 33.6% in 1963 and 8.8% in 1964). The large
change in inflation was the result of two different policies: a decree that increased the minimum
wage issued at the beginning of 1963 and a drastic devaluation of the Colombian peso implemented
by the Central Bank due to a currency shortage because of low coffee prices, the main export.
42In the case of the full sample, the coefficients of land tax revenues and public land allocations
are significant, but in the case of the land tax revenues is the opposite to the one observed once
the municipalities received the treatment.
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of different time variant and invariant variables.43
Table 41 presents the results of an OLS and probit estimation for both full and
restricted sample. As expected, more variables are correlated with legal entitlement
in the full than in the restricted sample. In both samples, the difference between
getting legal entitlement or getting partial or not treatment depends mainly on
geographical variables, which is expected given that one requirement to get full legal
recognition was to send paperwork to Bogota for approval. Experience in organizing
(historical peasant leagues) and the support to communist parties is also correlated
with obtaining legal entitlement, but only in the full sample.
As an additional validation, Table 42 shows the results of an ordered response
model44 to explain differences in the timing of obtaining legal entitlement. Results
indicate that municipality characteristics such as temperature and experience in or-
ganizing are correlated with the timing of obtaining legal entitlement. The marginal
effects indicate that having one more peasant league during the 1920s -which is a
proxy of collective action capacity-, relative to the mean 0.76, increases the proba-
bility of obtaining legal entitlement during the first year (1970) by 0.08 percentage
points. In addition, places less urbanized but with higher average wage are also
correlated with a higher probability of obtaining legal entitlement earlier.
These variables are controlled in the main specification by the municipality-fixed
effect. Other time-varying economic and political variables such as literacy rate,
political competition, land tenure distribution, infrastructure, and lands for coffee
or banana production are not correlated with receiving the treatment.
6 Heterogenous Effects
Results in Tables 4- 8 suggest that the empowerment of the peasants, measured
by a peasant association obtaining legal entitlement, led to a decrease in broad
redistribution but an increase in targeted redistribution. In this section, I try to
deepen potential mechanisms through which empowerment can affect broad and
targeted redistribution. While it is infeasible to study all possible channels, existing
43This vector includes variables such as rainfall, altitude, temperature, area, distance to capital,
population, peasant leagues (1945), "La Violencia", land reform (1930-1960) and for the year 1960
data on roads, railroads, irrigated lands (has), coffee lands (plots), banana lands (plots), literacy
(%), tenants (%), number of tractors, number of workers, share of votes of radical left-wing parties
in presidential elections in 1946 and share of votes of the winner in presidential elections in 1966.
44In this model the dependent variable takes value 3 if a municipality gets legal entitlement
during the first year (1970), 2 if it is in 1971, 1 if it is in 1972 and 0 otherwise (full sample) or if
it gets just legal status (restricted sample).
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literature provides some guidance on the mechanisms that are especially important.
6.1 Threat of a Communist Revolution
I start providing some empirical evidence supporting the plausibility of a threat of a
communist revolution as a central channel through which democratization have an
effect on redistribution.
Before the Cuban revolution, the communist ideology was asleep in Colombia
and did not have a real chance to translate into a serious and credible speech that
could get into power. The events in Cuba inspired the peasants to try to break the
deadlock of landless, political exclusion and low public good provision, threatening
the political elite with the loss of their traditional political power based on exclusion
(Wright, 1991).45
The influence of the Cuban revolution was higher in places characterized by a
historical "revolutionary spirit" where the leftist and revolutionary ideas were deeply
embedded in the society (Hobswam, 1973). Municipalities with a stronger support
to the communist party and ideologies were more vulnerable and sensitive to the
Cuban situation and hence, more willing to protest and rebel for a potential change
in the status quo.
I use the political support to radical left-wing parties (communist, socialists,
maoists and radical liberals) as a first proxy of the threat of revolution. In order
to avoid potential reverse causality with the outcome variables, I exploit the per-
sistence in the communist support over time and its variation across municipalities
by using the share of votes that the radical left wing parties obtained during the
presidential elections in 1946, when all radical lefty parties jointly supported one
candidate.46 The second proxy of a threat of revolution is the exposure to the civil
war "La Violencia" during the years 1948-1958. During the war, conservative guer-
rillas started to go after the liberals and communist peasants, who also had access to
weapons and military armament. The civil war took place in municipalities where
peasants were highly influenced by either the radical wing of the liberal party or the
45In Colombia, the influence of Cuba was manifested in the radicalization of left-wing parties
such as the communist party and the liberal revolutionary movement (MRL), which started to
pursue a change "a la cubana" (Romero and Castro, 1978) and were fed on the legacy of the past
civil wars.
46Table 51 suggests a strong correlation between the share of votes of the communist party
in departmental assemblies elections in 1966 -one year before the movement was founded- and
previous elections. The correlation is around 0.4 with the previous presidential election in 1962
and is smaller but still statistically significant at 1% when I compare it with the elections in 1966.
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communists, which were also the target of the Conservative army (Trejos, 2011).47
Both of these proxies are transformed into binary variables to facilitate the in-
terpretation of results and are included in the main specification as an interacted
variable with the legal entitlement dummy.48Panel A in Table 9 presents the results
for the first proxy of threat -communist support- and Panel B in the same table for
the second proxy -exposure to civil war. I test whether broad and targeted redistri-
bution are affected by variation in the threat of a revolution. In panel A of Table
9, column 1 and 3 indicate that broad redistribution is smaller in places where the
peasants are empowered and the threat of an uprising is stronger. However, just the
coefficient of the interaction variable in the case of land tax revenues is statistically
significant. Column 4 also indicates that targeted redistribution, measured as bu-
reaucratic expenditure, increases significantly in municipalities empowered and with
high support to the communist, compared to the national average.
Similarly, panel B in Table 9 suggests that broad redistribution in municipalities
where the peasants are empowered falls significantly more if they have been exposed
to the civil war during the previous decade (1948-1958). The interaction term in
panel B in column 1 and 3 implies a decrease of around 25% in land tax revenues and
social expenditure in municipalities that get legal entitlement and also are exposed
to La Violencia. The positive and statistically significant coefficients in column 4
and 5 capture the intensification of the effect of the democratic reform on targeted
redistribution in municipalities that participate in the civil war during the 1950s.
In addition, I run a standard OLS regression using two measures of peasant
leaders co-optation (number and land share) as dependent variables on different
geographical, economic, social, historical and political variables. Table 10 suggests
that co-optation of the peasant leaders is significantly and positively correlated with
previous exposure to violence and with revolutionary threats. Graphically, Figure 6
shows a positive correlation between the share of land given to peasant leaders and
the communist support. Other geographical, economic and social variables are not
correlated with leaders co-optation.
An interesting result in Table 10 is that leaders co-optation is not correlated with
47To respond to this persecution, the communist party organized "self-defense" groups in areas of
their influence, that later were known as "independent republics", due to the lack of state presence
(Medina, 1980). The "self-defense" communist peasants groups founded the Revolutionary Forces
of Colombia -FARC- in 1964.
48The communist support in 1946 that takes value 1 if the percentage that the communist
parties obtained in the presidential elections in 1946 is above the median and 0 otherwise and
the exposure to civil war takes value 1 if a municipality experienced any violent event during "La
Violencia" and 0 otherwise.
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political competition, measured as the share of votes of the winner candidate in the
presidential elections in 1966. This result suggests that land allocations to peasant
leaders are not rewards in exchange of mobilizing political support and votes.
6.2 Alternative mechanisms
While I have argued that the threat of a revolution is an important mechanism link-
ing democratization to broad and targeted redistribution, an alternative hypothesis
is that experience at organizing facilitates the process of voluntary democratization
and due to higher levels of collective action capacity, governments will have more
incentives to co-opt the leaders and capture these groups49.
I define collective action capacity as the ability of organizations to independently
recruit and mobilize members and use two proxies to measure it.50 The first one
is the number of peasant leagues that obtained legal entitlement between 1918 and
194751. The second one is a measure of colonial collective organizations: the presence
of slave palenques or indigenous resguardos between 1500 and 1851. 52 Both of these
measures reflect previous experience and history at organizing since they require high
levels of coordination, networking and strong ties among their members and within
communities.
Table 11 explores this hypothesis and columns 4 and 5 examine the effect of
democratization and collective action capacity on targeted redistribution. None
of the coefficients of the interaction variable are statistically significant. However,
49 Seabright (2000) has explained how cooperation may be self-reinforcing or habit-forming in
South India. Bardhan (2000) studies 48 irrigation communities in South India and shows more
cooperative behavior in communities where the water-user’s organization has existed for more
than 20 years. Shin (1994) demonstrates how prior collective actions contributed to the Korean
peasant uprisings of 1946 by developing a political and national consciousness. In a recent paper,
Finkel, Gehlbach and Kofanov (2017) show that the persistence in repertoires of collective action
are potential determinants of the peasant organization and disturbances that Russia experienced
between March and October in 1917. On the same lines, Golden (1988), Hammond (2009), Jenkins
and Perrow (1977) and Gurr (1968) show how previous social movements or past struggles facilitates
the development of a consciousness that result in subsequent collective actions.
50 They are measured before 1948, when the civil war "La Violencia" started.
51Although the law that allowed workers and peasants to organized was issued in 1931 (Law
83), the first peasant organizations were founded at the end of the 1920s in areas of agricultural
exports such as Santa Marta (United Fruit Company), Viota (coffee plantations), Puerto Berrio
(league of settlers from Antioquia) and in some indigenous areas of Cauca (Sanchez, 1977).
52Slave palenques were free-black agricultural communities and defensive centers that sought
self-sufficiency and were founded by escaped slaves. Indigenous resguardos were territorial units
that comprised communal lands administrated by native authorities. They are measured as dummy
variables that take value 1 if there was either a palenque or an indigenous resguardo in the mu-
nicipality between 1500 and 1851, year in which slavery was abolished and indigenous resguardos
were dissolved.
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the coefficients on legal entitlement is positive and statistically significant for both
measures and their size is very similar to the baseline coefficients.53 These results
suggest that targeted redistribution was not higher in places where the collective
action capacity was stronger. On the contrary, results indicate that municipalities
with no history at organizing were easier to co-opt.
The relative wealth or agricultural development of a municipality can be an al-
ternative mechanism that affects the intensity of the effect of democratization on
broad and targeted redistribution. Poor municipalities have lower living conditions
and hence higher economic grievances, which give them more incentives to organize
and rebel. If this is the case, threat would be higher in poorer municipalities and
the government would try to co-opt the leader in those places. Table 12 explores
this hypothesis using as a measure of wealth and agricultural development the daily
wage in 1968 and the number of tractors in 1960.54 None of the interaction vari-
able coefficients in Panel A in Table 12 are statistically significant. In the case of
tractors in Panel B, the interaction term on column 4 is not significant and the
coefficient on legal entitlement is larger than the baseline coefficient. The coefficient
estimate -0.019 on the (legal_entitlement x tractors) interaction in column 5 cap-
tures the elimination of the effect of legal entitlement on public land allocations in
municipalities with higher agricultural development. Table 12 suggest that wealth or
agricultural development were not mechanisms driving the effect of democratization
on broad and targeted redistribution.
Table 13 presents results of heterogeneous effects using variation in inequality in
the rural areas. I measure inequality as the share of no owners (settlers, sharecrop-
pers, tenants, agricultural workers) working on rural areas in terms of the number of
properties and of area cultivated.55 In the case of broad redistribution, none of the
coefficients are significant for both type of measures (Panel A -number of properties
or Panel B-area). In the case of targeted redistribution, the coefficients estimates of
0.362 and 0.019 on legal entitlement in column 4 and 5 of Panel A imply that the
effect of legal entitlement on targeted redistribution is 35% higher in municipalities
with lower percentage of no owners relative to the baseline results. However, the
53This result is also suggested in Table 10 where the history at organizing (peasant leagues
1918-1945) is negative correlated with the number of peasant leaders co-opted.
54For means of comparison, a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the log of the daily wage in
1968 or the number of tractors in 1960 are above the median and 0 otherwise. For the specification
that uses the interaction with the number of tractors as one of the explanatory variables, I drop
the variable that is interacting tractors with a time trend in the original specification.
55I transform these two variables as binary indicators equal to 1 if they are above the median
and 0 otherwise.
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coefficient estimates on (legal_entitlement x %_no_owners) of -0.128 and -0.017
reduce the bias when municipalities with higher percentage of no owners are taken
into account. These results indicate that inequality in land tenure is not a factor
that explains the differences in the effect of legal entitlement on redistribution.
7 Democratization, Co-optation and Threat of Rev-
olution
A Colombian liberal politician recognized that with the foundation of ANUC "the
goal of the state was not to organize a peasant revolution but to avoid one" (Perez,
2010). I then explore whether the results on targeted redistribution reported in
Tables 6-8 are consistent with a government strategy to avoid violent activities by
using a data set that contains economic, social and political information about 1088
municipalities from 1972 to 1995. I test whether the strategy of the government
-once the leaders are identified to co-opt them- was effective at reducing violent
activities after 1972, when the alliance between the government and the peasant
movement ended.
With this cross-section data set, I study the relationship between legal entitle-
ment, co-optation of peasant leaders and revolutionary activities. I work with a
restricted sample of 644 municipalities that includes only municipalities that got
legal entitlement or just legal status and I use legal entitlement (1967-1972) as a
proxy for empowerment.56
After matching the names of peasant leaders with the names of peasants that re-
ceived land, I calculate three measures of co-optation. First, a dummy variable that
indicates whether the municipality experienced co-optation of their leaders or not.
Second, the number of municipal peasant leaders -of the 5 delegates that attended
the II ANUC national assembly in 1971- that received a public land between 1967
and 1972. Finally, the share of land that peasants leaders received during the same
years relative to the total land that was granted to the municipality.
I use three different proxies for revolutionary activities. First, the number of
land invasions after the alliance between government and ANUC ended (1972-1978).
When the relationship between the government and the peasants officially ended in
1972, a section of ANUC announced the direct opposition to the government and a
wave of land invasions started across the country.57
56Results when using the full sample are presented in the Appendix B, Table 53.
57Figure 7 shows the number of land invasions during the 1970s: while there were not more
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Second, FARC rebel actions during the years 1974-1985, which include the num-
ber of threats to civilians, attacks, assaults and extortions. When the alliance ended
in 1972, a faction of ANUC decided to continue the fight and joined the newborn
rural guerrilla group FARC, whose aspirations were aligned with ANUC goals: im-
provement of the living conditions of the peasants and the implementation of an
agrarian reform that transforms the economic structure of the rural areas (Molano,
2015).58
Finally, I use the number of peasant protests over the period 1974-1995. These
protests reflect more spontaneous associations either organized by ANUC or by other
sectors of the peasantry, and aim at bringing government attention to rural areas59.
I run a standard OLS and a negative binomial estimation60 to test whether
obtaining legal entitlement and co-opting the peasant leaders during the years that
the government supported the movement (1967-1972) is correlated with the increase
in revolutionary activities that is observed after the alliance between government
and ANUC ended (1972-1995). The following equation is estimated:
threati,j = γ0 + γ1D(peas_asso)i,j + γ2cooptationi,j +X
′
i,jβ + αj + εi,j
where threati,j is any of the three measures of public disorder -number of land
invasions (1972-1978), number of FARC rebel actions (1974-1985) or number of
rural protests (1975-1995)- in municipality i in state j, D(peas_asso)i,j is a dummy
variable equals to 1 if municipality i obtained legal entitlement during 1967-1972
and 0 if just got legal status.
The variable cooptationi,j is measured as the number of peasant leaders (takes
value between 0 to 5) that received land during 1967-1972, as the share of land
granted to peasant leaders relative to the total land that the municipality received
during the same period or as a dummy variable that takes value 1 if municipality
experienced co-optation of their leaders during these years and 0 otherwise. X ′i,j
than 30 in 1971, this number exceeded 600 in 1972. These invasions were initiated and supported
by ANUC and were the result of the unfulfilled government promises (Escobar, 1972).
58FARC was considered the military wing of the communist party and its influence is reflected
by the fact that Manuel Marulanda Velez, main leader of the guerrilla group, was a leader of this
party before the foundation of FARC.
59The main causes of rural protest during these years were access to land and public good
provision. Since the 1990s the human rights motive was also part of the protests.
60Due to the characteristics of the dependent variables (nonnegative count values reflecting
the number of occurrences of an event in a fixed period of time) OLS models are not the best
method because they usually violate two of their main assumptions: conditional normality and
homoscedasticity. Both of these problems are solved with the negative binomial model which is
flexible in the error structure and assumes a Poisson distribution of errors.
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contains a vector of time invariant geographic characteristics and other controls. 61
Table 14 shows the results of the ordinary least squares estimates. The dependent
variables are specified in the headers of the columns. Columns 1-3 look at the number
of land invasion between 1972 and 1978, column 4-6 look at the number of FARC
rebel activities between 1974 and 1985 and column 7-9 look at the number of peasant
protests over the period 1974-1995.
Overall, this table shows a strong negative correlation between the co-optation of
peasant leaders through public land allocations and the posterior violent activities
that the country experienced (1972-1995). As it is expected, results are stronger in
the case of land invasions since they were greatly linked to the peasant movement
and its members. Most of the land invasions were called under ANUC name and
the movement publicly supported them (Escobar, 1982).
The results in the second row of the table indicate that a peasant leader co-opted
reduces the number of rebel activities, on average, by 1 event. All of these results
are statistically significant at 1% level. The third row shows that an increase in the
number of peasant leaders that received private benefits leads to, on average, a 0.3
decrease in the number of rebel activities. These results are statistically significant
at 1% level for land invasions and peasant protests and at 5% level for FARC rebel
activities. The fourth row indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the share
of land that peasants’ leaders received is correlated with a 2.5 to 3 decrease in the
number of rebel activities. This coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level
for land invasions and FARC rebel activities but it is not significant in the case of
peasant protests.
Table 15 and 16 show the estimates of the negative binomial model and its
incidence rate ratios respectively. Municipalities where the peasant leaders were
co-opted are expected to have a rate 0.6 times lower for land invasions and FARC
rebel activities. The coefficient when the explanatory variable is the number of
peasant leaders co-opted indicates that if a municipality were to increase its number
of peasant leaders co-opted by one, its rate for land invasions and FARC activities
would be expected to decrease by a factor 0.7 and 0.8 respectively. These coefficients
have the expected sign in the case of peasant protests but are not statistically
significant. Similarly, if a municipality increases the share of land given to its leaders
by 1%, its rate for land invasions would be expected to decrease by 0.03, while
holding all other variables in the model constant. The results of both the standard
61This vector includes variables such as land tenancy (1960), population (1964), communist
support (1946), dummy of "La Violencia", historical peasant leagues (1931-1947) and land conflicts
(1878-1964) and αj is a state fixed effect.
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OLS estimation and negative binomial indicate a negative correlation between co-
optation of the peasant leaders and revolutionary activities, suggesting that the
co-optation strategy was, to some extent, effective.
Results in Table 52 in the Appendix B show the relative importance of the
extensive margin over the intense margin: the largest and significant difference is
when three or four peasant leaders are co-opted. This is consistent with the idea
that members in a large-scale movement do not follow a charismatic leader but a
cohesive group of leaders. When the majority of the leaders are co-opted and use
their influence to demobilize their followers, it is harder for their members to oppose
and replace them.
In addition, I also find a positive correlation between municipalities that got legal
entitlement but were not co-opted and land invasions. Although the sign of this
correlation holds for the negative binomial estimation, this result is not significant.
This result suggests that municipalities that were organized and empowered but did
not benefit from targeted redistribution are correlated with higher public disorder
afterwards.
This empirical result must be interpreted cautiously, as elites strategically se-
lected where to co-opt the leaders. However, if elites co-opted them when the threat
of a revolution was higher, then it is arguable that the estimates are likely to be
downward biased (in absolute values).
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper I estimate the effect of a type of democratic reform -organization and
political participation of a peasant movement- on broad and targeted redistribution
in Colombian municipalities during the years of a potential threat of a Communist
revolution (1957-1985).
In the Colombian case during the 1960s when there was a threat of a Communist
revolution, the threatening group -the peasantry- was empowered by the state in
order to avoid it being captured by the Communist and rebel against the status
quo. The empowerment occurred through the voluntary organization of a peasant
association that gave the peasants direct participation in the policy making process.
Their representatives in the state organizations were the peasant leaders, who were
locally elected by each municipal association. The strategy of the government in
order to avoid the Communist revolution was to provide the peasant leaders with
economic -lands- or political -public jobs- assets.
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I show that in municipalities were the peasants were empowered -an association
getting legal entitlement- broad redistributive variables decrease during the years
that the government supported the peasant movement (1967-1972), while simulta-
neously targeted redistribution increases. I provide evidence on the drivers of the
increase in targeted redistribution: more public jobs in municipalities empowered
and more public lands for the peasant leaders. I also provide suggestive evidence
of the negative correlation between the co-optation of the peasant leaders and the
public disorders events that Colombia experienced during the 1970s and 1980s.
This papers studies the effect of democratization on a particular type of redis-
tribution -targeted-, transcending the idea that democratization only is correlated
with broad redistribution. These results also confirm previous findings in the au-
tocracy case regarding the strategies of the government to co-opt potential opposite
groups such as the provision of rent-seeking positions in the legislatures. But the
evidence go further, as they provide direct evidence of the private goods received
-lands- and how this is linked to revolutionary activities. Finally, this paper explores
a particular democratic mechanism that extend the political rights in democracies
beyond the de jure decision power, such as universal suffrage.
The findings of this paper, insofar as they provide evidence on the effects of
democratic reforms on targeted redistribution and the effectiveness of this strategy
during times of a threat of revolution, have important implications for theories of
conflict, democratization and redistribution. If governments recognize that to avoid
public disorder, targeted redistribution to well-connected social movements leaders
can be more successful than reforms aimed at increasing broad redistribution, par-
ticularistic benefits to the leaders become more likely despite increases in inequality
with the threatening group.
Future research must try to explore the effect of other type of democratic reforms
such as quotas in the legislative branch as a mechanism to prevent unrest. In the case
of Colombia, more research needs to be done related to the effectiveness at increasing
public good provision in terms of of the different repertoires -land invasions or new
political parties- that were used once the peasant movement lost the state support.
Moreover, there is a research gap in the study of the new clientelistic relationships
that arise with the emergence of peasant leaders as political actors and their different
implications on public good provision and state capacity in the medium and long
term.
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Chapter 2
Roads or Schools? Political Budget Cycles with dif-
ferent types of voters.
2.1 Introduction
An important question in political economy is how, if at all, policy instruments affect
voting behavior. Although there is a large literature that has studied evidence of
politically-driven manipulations of economic policy in electoral periods, most studies
have focused attention on developed economies or on the type of government or
form of democracy in place. However, the strongest evidence of opportunistic cycles
in economic policy has been found in what is called "weak democracies", mainly
developing economies in Latin America and Africa.
Evidence has shown that political budget cycles are persistent in developing
countries and in particular in nascent democracies that are vulnerable, have weaker
institutions, impose fewer restrictions on government actions and usually do not
have independent central banks (Brender and Drazen, 2005). However, in recent
decades these democracies have become more inclusive, which has augmented pop-
ular pressures on political leaders (Remmer, 2003).
The size and the composition (taxes vs. spending) of the electoral policy cycle
also depend on the political and institutional features of the country. In partic-
ular, Latin America has been characterized as having unsophisticated voters and
simple economies, creating greater incentives and opportunities for politicians to
manipulate fiscal variables in order to increase the probability that they will stay in
power.
Within Latin America, Colombia has been a country of electoral traditions,
strongly rooted in the 19th century and reinforced by intense election campaigns
and by a commitment to suffrage that grew to involve substantial sectors of Colom-
bia society during the 20th century (Posada Carbo, 1997). Without denying the
problems of the electoral system, historians such as David Bushnell (1993) and Mal-
com Deas (1993) have emphasized the early expansion of Colombian suffrage, the
relatively high levels of voter participation in certain periods, the intensity of the
competition, and the long-term impact of frequent electioneering.
These electoral traditions and political contests make Colombia an interesting
case for study. In particular, the constitutional reform established in 1936 by the
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liberal President Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo can be viewed as a natural experiment in
politics.62
Since independence and before this reform, the law stated that only literate men
with properties or a certain amount of income per year could vote.63These laws had
reduced the number of potential voting block to a limited group of rich and edu-
cated men with access to government information and as a result, electioneering was
concentrated on just a small group of homogeneous voters. Following the consti-
tutional reform in 1936, the group of potential voters changed. The legislative act
established that, starting from the next elections (1938), all men older than 21 years
of age could vote irrespective of their income or education. This reform transformed
the group of voters from a small group of high income, literate, and informed men
to a large and heterogeneous group with a majority being low-income and illiterate
uninformed men.
This paper studies this constitutional reform, which changed the characteristics
of the voters, by reference to the theory of Political Budget Cycles. In particular, it
is based our paper on the theoretical approach proposed by Rogoff and Sibert (1988),
Rogoff (1990), and Drazen and Eslava (2010). The former papers introduced the
signaling role of a pre-election fiscal expansion under asymmetric information and
unobserved competence.64 In these models, incumbents want to appear competent
in the eyes of voters during electioneering because more competent politicians can
generate higher welfare and they are then preferred by voters. They have the in-
centive to do this by manipulating fiscal instruments during electoral periods. One
important characteristic of these signaling models is the voters’ incomplete ability
to observe the overall level of spending or revenues. Were they able to do so, they
could perfectly infer politicians’ competence.
Drazen and Eslava (2010) proposed an alternative signaling model: even if voters
are well-informed or fiscal conservatives, during electoral periods fiscal manipulation
may be observed via the composition of the budget (expenditure or revenues) being
targeted at some particular voters at the expenses of others. If it is the composition
of spending or revenues that is manipulated for electoral purposes, rational voters
may infer something different from, or additional to, competence. In this view,
voters who are targeted before elections want to know the incumbent’s competence
62 This constitutional reform also stipulated among other things, agrarian reform, private prop-
erty reform and a list of rights for workers (Botero, 2006).
63 The value of property and the level of income required were updated in each new Constitution
during the 19th century.
64Competence is defined as the ability to deliver more public goods for the same level of taxes.
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and also whether they will be still favored after the election. This is a different
signaling problem faced by the voters: whether receiving high targeted expenditures
before elections signals a greater weight of their group in the incumbent objective
function than other voters’ groups or whether it signals the interest of the incumbent
in increasing the number of votes by targeting their group with more expenditure or
raising less revenues. Drazen and Eslava (2010) show that even with fully rational
voters, there exists an equilibrium in which voters rationally respond to electoral
years’ expenditure or revenues and politicians make budgetary decisions according
to this behavior.
Politicians target spending or revenues towards electorally attractive groups in
electoral periods and choose their platform depending on the type of voters. Based
on this, we test how the characteristics of the voters (in terms of income, education
and information access) determine politicians’ platforms.
Our hypothesis states that when the potential voters were a small but well spec-
ified economic group (high income, literate and well-informed men), politicians de-
cided to target the expenditure that benefited them more (infrastructure) and this
strategy shifted when the characteristics of potential voters changed. After 1936,
when the majority of voters were illiterate, low-income and uninformed men, incum-
bents decided to target a different type of expenditure (social) that mainly affected
this new majority. In this way, they increased their probability of staying in power.
However, eventually some minorities can still have political power to make this new
decision non trivial to the politicians and thus the policy manipulation less strong
and clear in time.
We expect that the incumbent will always prefer to choose an electoral platform
that targets the expenditure and the revenues that benefit the voters most. The
targeted expenditure, or revenue, changes according to the characteristics of the
majority of voters. In the Colombian case, prior to 1936 when this group was
homogeneous and better informed, voters belonged to the high-income group. They
were mainly landowners and traders who were usually interested in increasing their
profits and economic activity. Although the government could directly benefit firms
in several ways, primary sources show that voters usually requested better railroads,
highways, roads and bridges that could help to improve trade inside and outside the
country. This particular group of voters did not request more social expenditure,
such as schools or public hospitals, from the government, since they could afford
this type of expenditure by themselves.
After 1936, when voters were on average less informed and more heterogeneous
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and the majority belonged to an illiterate low- or medium- income group, the in-
centives for the political parties were different. Since a higher portion of voters
valued more basic or subsistence necessities, politicians preferred to focus on so-
cial expenditure (public schools and hospitals) instead of investing in development
projects. This could also partly explain the lag in new roads and railway system
that Colombia experienced during the 20th century.
This hypothesis agrees with the results found by Lopez-Uribe and Espinosa
(2012) in Colombia during the 19th century. They followed presidents’ political ca-
reers, and showed that being Minister of Infrastructure during this period increased
the probability of becoming President by 30% while being Minister of Education
decreased it by 22%.
We keep the usual assumptions of the Political Business Cycles theories: (i)
politicians are identical and opportunistic (their only interest is to remain in power)
and (ii) voting rule is rationally retrospective: voters are naive and support the
incumbents based on observed outcomes; if they are favorable, the incumbent is
re-elected, otherwise the challenger wins.65 These models assume that voters have
imperfect information about politicians’ competence and that they know it only in
retrospect, while politicians know their competence from the outset. In this sense,
voters base their decision on the information that is available, linked to what they
observe. Hence, before elections incumbents attempt to signal their competence and
have incentives to manipulate the public expenditure and revenues in an effort to
show the results of their policies. This will increase their chances of re-election. How-
ever, the imperfection of the information, the characteristics of the voters and the
tools that politicians use to stay in power (monitoring institutions) change between
periods.
We should also note that, fortunately for us, the timing of presidential elections
in the whole period under study was determined by the constitution, even during
war periods. Since independence, Constitutions established the exact timing of
presidential elections (two, four or six years).66 In this sense, we can take election
years as exogenous since these were pre-determined by the law. Going even further,
presidential elections always took place in the first semester of the year, and most
of them during March and May.
65Studies have criticized the characterizations of the opportunistic politician framework (see
Hibb (1977), Lohmann (1998), Rogoff and Sibert (1988))
66Article 102 of the 1832 constitution, article 87 of the 1843 constitution, article 27 of the 1853
constitution, article 61 of the 1858 constitution established presidential elections every four years.
Article 64 of the 1863 constitution established presidential elections every two years and article
114 of the 1886 constitution established presidential elections every six years.
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We focus upon the influence of electoral cycles on fiscal policies instead of deal-
ing with how governments attempt to manipulate the economy. It seems easier to
manipulate budgets than macroeconomics outcomes such as GDP, inflation or unem-
ployment. Economic performance is the outcome of decisions taken by consumers,
workers, producers and others countries as well as national and local governments.
In particular, during the 19th century the economy depended mainly on imported
goods for consumption and there was not a clear monetary policy and central bank
did not exist. Governments are in control of their budgets, whereas they can only
hope to have some indirect impact on the economy. Hence, increasing spending dur-
ing electoral periods must appear a much simpler and potentially rewarding strategy
than trying to produce a business cycle through fiscal and monetary policies (Blais
and Nadeau, 1992). As Rogoff (1990) has pointed out, it is "more promising to focus
empirical research for electoral cycles on taxes, transfers and government consump-
tion".
We limit the analysis to presidential elections based on the idea that they have
a more direct impact upon power than elections for senators and councilors. We
might expect stronger electoral cycles under presidential regimes given that individ-
ual political accountability gives stronger incentives than collective accountability
(Persson and Tabellini, 2003). This has also been proved empirically in the U.S
states by Lowry, Alt and Ferree (1998) who show that voters respond more to pol-
icy in gubernatorial elections than in legislative ones.
To test our hypothesis we run different exercises with two groups of dependent
variables (fiscal policy). The variables in real terms help to understand the changes
in magnitude of the fiscal policies while the variables in percentage as a fraction of
total expenditure or revenues help to understand the changes in distribution of its
components.
One caveat that we should note is an overestimation of the results as a con-
sequence of the time period of the law change. The 1930’s was also a decade of
important changes in terms of the role of the state as a provider of public goods.
Although the notion of the welfare state was not officially established in Colombia
until 1991, the idea of a major state intervention in social issues was intensified
during these years. So, a higher social expenditure could not only be a result of the
new type of voters but of a global change of perspective. However, we run some
robustness tests showing that the main change in the political budget cycles was
around 1936 compared with the years before and after. This result reinforces our
hypothesis of the relationship between the change in the electoral law and a different
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expenditure and revenue composition in electoral periods.
This paper differs from the existing literature in two different respects. First,
although we study just one country, we study the political budget cycles during a
longer period, starting just after independence and ending at the beginning of the
21th century. Unlike most existing studies, our work covers 170 years (1830-2000).
Second, we focus on the changes in the policy instruments and politicians’ platforms
when the characteristics of the voters change. Instead of giving priority to the type
of government or democracy and studying the political budget cycle with reference
to those categories, we concentrate on the particularities of voters. In this sense, we
try to answer how, depending on the characteristics of the different groups of voters,
the politicians use different policy instruments to attempt to get re-elected.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short historical
background on Colombian politics. Section 3 briefly reviews the existing literature
on political budget cycles. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 describes the em-
pirical setup and section 6 presents the results. Section 7 discusses some robustness
tests. Finally, section 8 offers some conclusions.
2.2 Literature Review
In the last three decades there have been many works in the literature on political
business cycles and political budget cycles. The pioneering work by Nordhaus (1975)
considered the idea that governments may act opportunistically by adapting fiscal
policy to the electoral cycle. He linked the opportunistic manipulation of economic
policy to election times - making decisions biased against future generations - and
showed the long-run and short-run equilibrium in the economy when politicians face
choices between present and future welfare 67.
There are two types of model in the political business cycle research. One of these
models assumes that voters are myopic, non-rational and easily fooled by policymak-
ers, in which case it is simple to predict the existence of a systematic opportunistic
cycles in fiscal policy and macroeconomic variables. The other model rejects the ir-
rationality of voters, limiting the ability of government to manipulate the economy
in order to be re-elected. Nevertheless, still appears to be opportunistic behavior by
policy makers as an equilibrium to a signaling game under asymmetric information,
67 In this literature there are two types of model. One is the traditional opportunistic model
derived by Nordhaus (1975) and the other one, called the "rational political business cycle", in-
corporates rational expectation and suggests strategic behavior and asymmetric information. The
most relevant works in this line are papers by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990).
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where voters do not know the government’s competence while government does.
In the structure of these models the incumbent government values being re-
elected but governments differ in their levels of "competence": governments with
high competence value being re-elected more highly than governments with low com-
petence. One important feature of these models is the moral hazard problem: the
incumbents’ ability to manipulate policy instruments in order to bias the voters’
perception in their favor. Another key feature is the existence of information asym-
metry. While incumbents know their level of competence, voters can not observe
it: they must try to perceive it by observing economic outcomes, in this case the
production of public goods, in retrospect. Then, incumbents must signal their com-
petence to voters to increase their chances of re-election through a higher provision
of public goods, hoping that voters would attribute the increase to their competence.
In our paper, we assume the existence of asymmetric information on the part of
the voters but assume that there are two levels of it (one less informed that the other
one): uninformed voters (after 1936) and informed voters (before 1936). None of
them observe politician’s competence perfectly, but voters before 1936 had a better
signal of it.
Rogoff(1990) refined to these competency models to distinguish between different
types of government expenditures: "current" or "visible" expenditures,the benefits
of which can be easily observed by voters before elections; and "capital or "less
visible" expenditures, the benefits of which are less easy to observe prior to elections
and which in many cases are realized in subsequent periods. In this sense, an
incumbent government has the incentive to focus in "visible" expenditure in order
to send as efficient a signal as possible about its competence. Signals must be seen
to be effective, and therefore it is more important for the government to focus on
areas with the most visible expenditures instead of thinking about the timing of the
benefits. In our paper, both social and infrastructure expenditure could be included
in the "visible" category while the other components (finance, institutional, defense
and debt) would be part of the "less visible" expenditure.
The evidence about political business cycles is not conclusive. Therefore, em-
pirical studies began to focus on cycles in policy instruments, in particular, fiscal
expansions before elections and contractionary policies once the election is over,
known as "Political Budget Cycles". A political budget cycle is defined as a period
of fluctuation in a government’s fiscal policies, which is induced by the cyclicality
of election (Shi and Svensson, 2003).The main idea in this literature is that vot-
ers make their decision based on visible economic policies. Policymakers have the
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incentives to stimulate the economy with the help of fiscal or monetary policies in
order to generate employment gains or wealth transfers that increase their’s pop-
ularity, but these policies have to be visible to the voters. Once the elections are
over, contractionary policies are pursued to reduce a fiscal deficit or inflation.
The literature on political budget cycles has concentrated on the manipulation
of government expenditures by the incumbents in order to get re-elected. It does
not give an important role to revenues and taxes.
Empirical’ works on Political Budget Cycles are extensive and have found dif-
ferent evidence about the incidence of fiscal deficits, total expenditures and total
revenues before elections. The results differ between the group or country under
study. For developed and less developed countries, Persson and Tabellini (2003) did
not find any change of government expenditure before elections. Shi and Svensson
(2006) provide an empirical analysis based on a large panel of developed and de-
veloping countries and found that, on average, the fiscal deficit increases by 22%
in election years. However, the size of political budget cycles is much larger in de-
veloping countries. They argue that the main reason for this difference is that in
developed countries there exist strong institutional constraints on politicians and a
large section of informed voters, which makes fiscal policy manipulation less effective.
Similar results were found by Brender and Drazen (2005) in a broad cross-section of
democracies over the period 1960-2001. However, they highlight that the existence
of a political expenditure cycle in the fiscal balance is extremely sensitive to the
set of countries included and that once they drop "new democratic" countries the
effect disappears. At the same time, they find a significant revenue cycle (revenues
fall in an election year) when they only include "old democracies". In the same
wave, for developing countries between 1970 and 1992, Schunknecht (1996, 2000)
found increases in public expenditures and in fiscal deficits in pre-electoral periods
and contractionary policies thereafter, emphasizing that these fiscal policy cycles
are stronger in less trade-oriented economies68.
Additionally, Block (2002) found evidence of pre-election manipulation of fiscal
policies (fiscal deficit, public expenditure, tax revenue and government consumption
as a share of GDP) in a sample of 44 Sub-Saharan African countries between 1980-
199569. An explication of this result is given by Brender and Drazen (2005) who
argue that this could happen to "new democracies" in the first years after their
68He also found that natural catastrophes affect current expenditure, probably through expen-
diture on emergency relief and improvements in the terms of trade decrease current expenditure.
69He also found strong evidence of political business cycles in monetary policy. In particular,
election years see faster monetary expansions and lower nominal interest rates.
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transition to democracy. This might suggest that political deficit cycles only emerge
when voters and the media have not yet developed the ability to monitor fiscal
policy.
The literature on Latin American political budget cycles has yielded inconclusive
findings. Ames(1987) found that government expenditure increased in the year
before elections and decreased in the year after elections for a pool of seventeen
Latin America countries between 1947 and 1982. Remmer (1993) reports that the
quarterly percentage change in the fiscal balance is heterogeneous across eight South
American democracies during the 1980s. Mejia Acosta and Coppedge (2001), and
Amorim Neto and Borsani (2004), found that budget deficits worsen during elections
but government expenditure does not increase. This result has been strengthened
recently by the work of Barberia and Avelino (2011) who argue that the increase
in the deficit and the fiscal difficulties during elections are mainly driven by the
reluctance of governments to increase taxes.
Studies focused on particular countries and on particular political levels (na-
tional, regional or municipal) have found, in general, that the share of votes obtained
by the incumbent party is negatively related to the level of government spending
and/or the fiscal deficit observed just before elections, but they do not agree on the
changes in the expenditure composition before elections.
In this sense, at municipal level in Israel Brender (2005) found between 1989-
1998 that voters reward high expenditure in development projects and education
expenditure (measured as the education system’s performance), but they penal-
ized increases in deficits70. Similar results were found in Canada by Kneebone and
McKenzie (2001) where there was a clear electoral cycle in revenues and spending:
in particular, an increase in education, transportation, recreation and culture spend-
ing and a decrease in spending in health, social services and industrial development
during electoral years. At national level, Gonzalez (2002) did not find evidence of
pre-electoral increases in aggregate spending in Mexico, but there are indications
that just before elections, spending on social services and health increase while the
increase in investment in infrastructure starts early in the pre-election period. In
addition, in Mexico Gamez and Ibarra-Yunez (2009) and in Russia Akhmedov and
Zhuravskaya (2004)71 examined the existence of an expansionary political cycle in
70 In particular, Brender (2005) found that the fiscal performance was only relevant in the 1998
campaign when the political environment changed.
71 Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) also found evidence that the magnitude of the cycles
decreases with education, urbanization, level of democracy, transparency and freedom of media
and also that cycles have become smaller over time.
57
regional public expenditure during election years and a contractionary cycle in post-
electoral years, but they did not find evidence of a cyclical behavior in infrastructure
spending in electoral years.
Nevertheless, Khemani (2004) has found in local governments in India that pub-
lic expenditure on investment areas rises before elections; Faal (2007) found pre-
election manipulation of fiscal instruments, mainly development spending and over-
all primary expenditure, in Papua New Guinea during 1988-2004; Vega (2004) re-
ports increases in infrastructure projects before elections in Portugal; Medina (2003)
concludes that fiscal deficit and capital expenditure increased in election years at
provincial level in Argentina during 1985-2001; and Larrain and Assael (1997) found
qualitative evidence of increases in fiscal deficits in Chile before elections in the pe-
riod 1939-1993. For Colombia, the works of Eslava (2006) and Drazen and Eslava
(2005) at municipal level, for the period 1987-2000 have shown that the share of votes
received by the incumbent party in elections increases with capital expenditures and
decreases with fiscal deficits.
In contrast to previous studies we use disaggregated data on the government
budget of a single country. This allows us to run a series of regressions using 15
different budget items as dependent variables. Compared to the previous literature
our data set is also larger, in the sense that we have homogenized fiscal policy
variables for 170 years (from Independence up to today). This data enables us
to examine sustainable changes in political budget cycles. The major difference
with respect to the previous literature is that we concentrate on the relationship
between different types of voters and political budget cycles instead of focusing on
the relationship between the latter and political regimes.
2.3 Historical Framework
Since Colombia became a republic and during different state forms that it has had
between the 19th century and today (the unitary state of "Gran Colombia" (1819-
1830) and "Nueva Granada" (1830-1853), the federal Regime known as "Estados
Unidos de Colombia" (1853-1886), and the unitary state of "Republica de Colom-
bia" (1886-today)); elections have been part of the daily life of its citizens. Some
estimations calculate more than 200 elections during this period.
Since independence, politics in Colombia has been dominated by two strong,
opposing ideologies that became official parties in 1850, with the names of the Con-
servatives and Liberals.72 Although for some short periods these parties had internal
72 Before 1850, the traditional parties were not officially founded and named as they are today.
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divisions and formed different coalitions, these were not strong enough to persist and
were easily reabsorbed into the traditional parties.73 Some politicians also tried to
establish new political parties away from the traditional ideologies and more in line
with the changes that the world had, but none prospered and they were easily over-
come by the traditional parties in elections.74 The founding and development of
new political parties was not guaranteed until the new Constitution in 1991, and
finally in 2002 a candidate who did not belong to the traditional parties won the
presidential elections.
Between 1830 and 2000, Colombia had 43 presidential elections and 6 coups, but
5 out of the 6 lasted less than 2 years in power and were the result of struggles
by the opposition party. Only the military dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla was able
to stay in power for a longer period (1953-1958), but he was defeated in the next
presidential election by the Liberal candidate.
According to the national constitutions, presidential elections were to take place
every four years for most of the period, on the date established by the Constitution.
The only exceptions were during the "radical era" (1861-1884), when the liberal
constitution established the timing at every 2 years; and during the first years of
the "Regeneration era" (1886-1898), when the Conservative constitution changed
the timing to every 6 years.
Presidents were elected through indirect vote until 1910, via a system in which
voters chose an electoral council which in turn elected the President over the fol-
lowing two weeks. From 1910 until now, Colombian voters have used the direct
vote.
The voters were an essential part of the election campaign. The constitution
always established who could vote and what the process was, although in some
important cases these decrees were renewed or changed.75 Until 1936, the constitu-
However, there existed two opposing political groups that are normally associated with the tradi-
tional parties in their ideologies: Bolivaristas with the Conservatives and Santanderistas with the
Liberals.
73 Among the most important divisions we found: Golgotas and Draconianos within the Liberal
party (Jordan Florez, 2000) and historicos and nacionalistas within the Conservative party.
74These parties include: Unión Patriótica (UP), Partido Nacional Cristiano, Alianza
Democrática M-19 (AD M-19), Nueva Fuerza Democrática, Movimiento de Salvación Nacional,
Movimiento Unitario Metapolítico, Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST), Partido Comu-
nista de Colombia - Marxista Leninista (PCdeC-ML), Grupo Comunista Revolucionario (GCR),
Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO), Unión Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionaria, Partido Social-
ista Revolucionario and Unión Republicana.
75 For example, the 1853 constitution established direct voting without income and education
restriction, but only one election took place under these conditions before the traditional constraints
were re-established.
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tion specified that only literate males older than 21 years old who were tax payers,
property owners or industry employees could vote.76
Each Constitution established the minimum amount of money (in terms of prop-
erty or rents) required to become a voter. For example, the constitution in 1832
recognized that all men older than 21 years old with property valued at a minimum
of $1.000 pesos or annual income of $500 pesos, could become voters. This mini-
mum amount changed with the Constitution in 1843 and once again in 1886, when
the lower minimum established $1.500 pesos for property and $500 pesos for annual
rents.
Urrutia’s (2010) work on urban wages during the 19th century allows us to make
some comparisons with these minimums. The annual nominal wage of a doorkeeper
in 1832 was $200 pesos and a minister earned $2.400 pesos, whilst in 1886 the
doorkeeper earned $250 pesos annually and the minister $3.000 pesos. The upgrade
threshold was not an issue for the government. Since this minimum was established
based on nominal wages, the rigidity that urban wages showed during the entire
19th century meant that there were few big real-terms changes in the threshold of
the income needed to vote. Urrutia (2010) showed that public wages changed only
once or twice during fifty or sixty years in the 19th century.
Although historians (Posada Carbo, 1997) have argued that these voting re-
quirements were not rigorously enforced, we can observe an important increase in
the percentage of voters just after the change in the law in 1936. It has been roughly
calculated that during the 19th century only 10% of adult male had the right to vote
(Bushnell, 1993).
In 1936, President Lopez Pumarejo introduced universal suffrage for all men over
21 years old, and in 1957 Rojas Pinilla’s government introduced suffrage for women
over 21 years old77.
The importance of President Lopez Pumarejo’s government in 1934 and 1938
goes beyond this electoral policy. His government, known as "The Revolution in
Motion", promulgated constitutional, agrarian, educational, labor and tax reforms.
However, all these reforms, including the electoral one, had begun to be discussed
under the previous liberal government of Enrique Olaya Herrera.
In particular, the two most important newspapers in the 1930s ("El Tiempo"
76 The Constitution of 1853 established universal suffrage, saying that all men older than 25
years old could vote directly to elect the President. In this sense, the requirement of education
and income was eliminated. However, only one election took place under these conditions (1856),
since the Constitution in 1858 once again stipulated this restriction and the indirect vote.
77 Women obtained this right through the Legislative Act no.3 in 1954 and exercised their right
for the first time at the presidential elections in 1957.
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and "El Espectador") had begun to claim the need to extend the electoral suffrage
in 1931, long before Lopez Pumarejo’s government started. The frequent discussions
on this subject in national newspapers and in political speeches make us think that
the electoral reform in 1936 was the consequence of a long process of debating that
ended in this particular year. In other words, 1936 was not chosen as the year of the
electoral reform for a specific reason: on the contrary, the reform could have taken
place some years before or after.
To summarize, Colombia has been a country of electoral traditions and elections
occurred with constitutional regularity. Although political institutions were weak
in some periods, traditional political parties are well established; leading to a high
degree of institutionalization of competitive politics.
2.4 Data
The database holds information in standard format between 1831 and 2000. The na-
tional annual series of fiscal instruments and outcomes comes from different sources:
Informes del secretario de Hacienda al Congreso (1841-1844, 1846-1859), Memo-
ria del Ministro de Hacienda (1860-1895, 1904), Liquidaciones de los Presupuestos
de Rentas y Gastos (1831-1848, 1853-1860, 1870-1878, 1884-1892, 1895-1896, 1899-
1902), Informes Especiales del Secretario de Hacienda (1863-1867, 1874-1875, 1877-
1882) and Boletines de Estadistica (1915-2000). For the years that the information
was missing, we used official newspapers as Gaceta de la Nueva Granada (1840-
1848), Gaceta Oficial (1849-1861), Registro Oficial (1862-1864) and Diario Oficial
(1865-1915). We also reviewed the information provided by Soto (1837) and Galindo
(1874) for the years prior to 1840.
The database has information on total revenues and expenditure liquidated and
their respective disaggregated components. For the years where the expenditure was
biannual (1886-1909), we checked the Diario Oficial daily and sum up any addition
that was included to the original budget.
We aggregate the different categories of revenues and expenditure in order to
homogenize them across time. For the revenues, we compress the information into
five categories: indirect taxes (customs and consumption taxes), direct taxes (income
and land taxes), fees and fines from public services (institutional fees), transfers and
contributions from national properties (monopolies and national properties that were
sold) and treasury balance resources (revenues left from the previous year). The
expenditure was aggregated in six categories: Finance (including spending related
to collection of taxes), Institutional (including justice, diplomatic and legislative
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spending), Social (including education, health and cultural spending), Infrastructure
(including investment and development projects), Defense (military spending) and
National Debt (interest). We also include fiscal deficit as a dependent variable .
Once we had all the real variables, we decided to separate the data into two
groups in order to test the hypothesis of political budget cycles: real variables and
percentage as a fraction of total expenditure and total revenues. For each of these
groups we ran exercises taking into account different time periods: 1. The entire
period, to study the relationship between the change in the law in 1936 and the
elections with the fiscal policy variables and 2. Separately, before and after the
law was changed (1936) in order to get the sign and significance of the relationship
between elections and fiscal policy for each period.
We check the stationarity of all the variables using the augmented Dickey Fuller
Test of unit root. We run this test for each variable in three different time periods:
1830-2000, 1830-1936 and 1937-2000. No variable was I(2). Those that resulted
being I(1) were converted to stationary variables using first differences and the unit
root test was run again to assure that all the variables were I(0)78.
We converted the variables that were in the reales currency into pesos. According
to Camacho Roldan (1871), the conversion was approximately 8 reales to 1 peso.
Although the law of June 2, 1846 was the first one regarding currency units and
nominated the real de plata as the official currency, this conversion was used from
1847. The data appears in this currency until 1853 when the government returned
to the currency unit granadino o peso de 10 reales (Vergara and Vergara, 1915).
Besides, at the end of the hyperinflation (1903) prices had multiplied by 40
compared to 1899 levels, and to stabilize them a new rate of $100 for $1 peso oro
was established in 1905 (Ocampo, 1998). Thus, we converted the data for these
years into pesos oro.
The Urrutia-Ruiz Price Index for the 19th century was interpolated using a
Newton interpolation with the Ocampo Trade Index (1998) for the years that were
missing. This was then homogenized to the same year base (1878) for the 20th
century with the GRECO (2002) price index and inflation rate.
78For the period 1830-2000 the nonstationary variables are: total expenditure, finance expendi-
ture, social expenditure, infrastructure expenditure, defence expenditure, debt expenditure, social
percentage, infrastructure percentage, total revenues, direct taxes, indirect taxes, direct taxes per-
centage, indirect taxes percentage, national properties percentage. For the period 1830-1936 they
are: infrastructure expenditure, infrastructure percentage, total revenues, direct taxes, indirect
taxes, direct percentages, indirect percentages, fees and fines percentages, national properties per-
centage. For the period 1936-2000 the nonstationary variables are the same as for the entire period,
plus the finance percentage and the treasury balances resources revenues.
62
The nominal GDP for the 19th century series was taken from Kalmanovitz and
Lopez (2009) and that for the 20th century from GRECO (2002). The population
series was constructed using census data and GRECO estimations. Once we had the
complete series of GDP, we estimated the cyclical component using different filters:
Hodrick and Prescott, Baxter and King, Christiano and Fitzgerald and Butterworth,
and we generated a new variable that measures the difference between the cyclical
component and the trend. This new variable captures time variation in fiscal policy
due to shocks to aggregate output and income.
Information about elections, party hegemonies, wars, constitutions and coups
were taken from Gaceta de la Nueva Granada (1840-1848), Gaceta Oficial (1849-
1861), Registro Oficial (1862-1864) and Diario Oficial (1865-2000) and from Urrutia
and Arrubla (1970).
2.5 Empirical Strategy
2.5.1 First estimation
As we focus on the manipulation of policy tools instead of the changes in macroe-
conomic variables, we must test the existence of cycles in spending, revenues and
deficit rather than looking directly at the behavior of real variables.
The analysis of the changes in expenditure and revenues in electoral years ac-
cording to the type of voter begins with a simple specification. This allows us to
verify how politicians react in electoral periods to changes in fiscal variables when
only a small portion of the population could vote (only educated and high-income
men older than 21 years old), compared to periods when a higher proportion of
the population can vote and their characteristics are more heterogeneous (all men
older than 18 years old) 79. We are interested in the sign and magnitude of the
relationship between electoral and fiscal policy variables. We estimate the following
equation for the two periods separated (1830-1936 and 1937-2000):
79 For the non-stationary variables, we applied first differences in order to proceed with a
dynamic specification in differences. This specification was applied by Levitt (1997) in his work
on electoral cycles in police hiring. Thus, we ended up estimating the following equation:
∆fiscal_policyt = β0 + β1t+ β2outputgapt + β3∆fiscal_policyt−1 + β4electiont+i + β′5γt + εt
where we first difference the dependent variable -measured initially in levels or as a percentage-.
In this sense, we put more structure on the data for the identification of the election effect.
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fiscal_policyt = β0i + β1it+ β2ioutputgapt + β3ifiscal_policyt−1
+β4ielectiont+i + β
′
5iγt + εti
where fiscal_policyt is each component of the expenditures and revenues in
real terms or the percentage as a fraction of the total expenditure, t is a trend
that measures the effect of time on the dependent variable, outputgapt is a measure
of cyclical deviations from GDP trend in year t, since fiscal instruments tend to
be highly cyclical. The variable electiont+i takes the value 1 if in the year t a
presidential election took place and 0 otherwise and where i = −2,−1, 0, 1. In
the case when i = −2 the variable takes the value 1 in the first and second year
before elections (not only in the second year), in order to test for the existence of a
consistent and longer effect of elections80.
γt is a matrix that includes others controls: the variable hegemonytthat takes
the value 1 if the conservative party was in power in year t and 0 if it was the liberal
or a dictator; the variable wart takes the value 1 if in year t there was a civil war
and 0 otherwise81; the variable constitutiont takes the value 1 in the years where
a new constitution was established and 0 otherwise82, the variable coupt takes the
value 1 in the years where there was a coup and 0 otherwise, the dummy d_1910
takes the value 1 in 1910 and 0 otherwise and measures the change from the indirect
to the direct voting system and the variable d_1957 takes the value 1 in 1957
and 0 otherwise and measures the year that women’s suffrage was introduced. We
are interested in the coefficient β4, which measures the relation between elections
(including periods before and after) and fiscal policy variables.
80This variable was also constructed for the year of the election t and for two years before
elections t− 2 (this includes t− 1 and t− 2).
81 During the 19th century, Colombia had 9 civil wars and just four of them lasted just one
year, two lasted two years, two lasted three years and one lasted four years. Hence, we have 18
observations with value 1. The length of the wars was taken from Vergara y Gaitan (1866), Espana
(1985) and Pardo (2004).
82 In total there were 7 constitutions: 1832, 1843, 1853, 1858, 1863, 1886 and 1991. In years
where there was an interim pact (as in 1861) or partial changes to the constitution (as during
Reyes’ government) we established the value 0, since these changes did not generate important
changes in the political, economic or electoral system and their effects and scope were lower than
during periods of constitutional change.
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2.5.2 Second Estimation
Our hypothesis states that depending on the type of voters politicians choose a
different platform to increase their probability of being re-elected. In our approach,
we proxy the type of potential voters according to the period of time (before or after
1936). In this sense, the effect of elections may depend on the year. In all the years
up to and including 1936, voters can be associated with literate and high-income
men, and after 1936 they are associated with a more heterogeneous group, with a
majority of illiterate and low- and medium-income voters.
The new specification is:
fiscal_policyt = α0i + α1it+ α2ioutputgapt + α3i(fiscal_policyt−1)
+α4i(d_1936 ∗ electiont+i) + α5ielectiont+i + α6id_1936
+α′7iγt + εti
where fiscal_policyt is the percentage as a fraction of the total expenditure or
revenues or the logarithm of the fiscal policy variables in real terms. The variable
d_1936 is a dummy that takes the value 1 for the years between 1937 and 2000 and
the value 0 for the years between 1830 and 1936. The rest of the variables are the
same.
We are interested in the coefficient α4, which measures whether the relationship
between elections and fiscal policy variables is different before or after 1936.
2.6 Results
Tables 17 to 23 report OLS estimations and p-values for different dependent vari-
ables. Table 17 shows results when the dependent variable is total expenditure,
Table 18 when they are infrastructure expenditure and social expenditure, Tables
19 and 20 for the other components of expenditure ( finance, institutional, defense
and debt) and deficit, Table 21 when the dependent variable is total revenues, and
Tables 22 and 23 for each of the revenues’ components.
All of the tables have the same structure. For each one, column (1) indi-
cates the period that is included in the estimation (1830-1936, 1937-2000, 1830-
2000). Columns (2) to (9) indicate different values of the variable electiont+i where
i−2,−1, 0, 1. Columns (2) and (3) reports the results when i = −2 83, columns (4)
83Strictly, column (2) and (3) are a dummy variable which take the value 1 one and two years
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and (5) when i = −1, columns (6) and (7) when i = 0 and columns (8) and (9) when
i = 1. For each combination of the dependent variable and the election variable we
ran two types of regressions: without84 controls and with controls.
For each dependent variable we report separate estimates of β4 in equation (1)
for the periods 1830-1936 and 1937-2000 in real terms and as percentage (when is
not total expenditure or revenues variable). We also present separate estimates of
the interaction coefficient α4 in equation (2) for the entire period 1830-2000. These
estimates are reported in real terms (log) and as percentages. Variables in absolute
terms help to understand changes in magnitude, while variables in percentage terms
let us study changes in distribution of its components and make comparisons between
them.
Equation (2) allows us to estimate the relation between elections and fiscal policy
variables before and after the electoral reform. Here, the interaction coefficient, α4,
shows the difference between electoral and non-electoral years regarding fiscal policy
variables for the two periods under study (i.e. before and after 1936). The coefficient
α5 shows the difference in fiscal policy variables between electoral and non-electoral
years before 1936. Likewise, the coefficient α6 shows the difference before and after
1936 for non-electoral years. We only report results for α4
Hence, each cell in each Table is the β4 coefficient or α4 interaction coefficient for
the respective combination of fiscal policy variable and election variable (columns).
Significant results are highlighted and p-values are in parentheses. We report all the
outcomes independently of the significance.
2.6.1 Total Expenditure
Table 17 reports the relationship between electoral years and total expenditure for
the three periods of study and with different measures of the dependent variable.
Panel a. shows the estimates of β4 for the two periods of study (1830-1936, 1937-
2000) and panel b shows the estimates of α4 for the entire period (1830-2000).
The estimate results indicates a clear and strong expenditure cycle before 1936 in
pre-electoral years. This table indicates that total expenditure increases by around
2,000,000 pesos in pre-election years, but decreases by 1,300,000 pesos in election
years. Compared to the sample average, pre-election years can explain a 21% (for
one and two years before elections) and a 32% (for just one year before elections)
before elections. We decided to include both years to study persistence in the changes made by
the budget.
84In the regressions without controls we only included the trend and cyclical component.
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increase in total expenditure, and post-election years can explain an 18% decrease in
total expenditure. This finding is consistent with the evidence found in developing
countries for the recent years (Gonzalez, 2002; Brender and Drazen, 2005; Akhmedov
and Zhuravskaya, 2004).
For the second period (1937-2000), results shift considerably. Total expenditure
only increases in election years but it does not change significantly before elections.
In real terms, during election years total expenditure rises by 17,000,000 pesos on
average compared to non-elections years. In terms of the sample average, during
these years total expenditure grows by 9.4%.
If we compare the two political budget cycles (before and after 1936) in terms
of the sample average, the first effect is twice that of the second one (21% vs 9.4%),
showing a strong cycle before 1936. This could be a consequence, amongst other
things, of a greater flexibility available to the government when controlling the
budget, and of fewer government monitoring agencies before 1936.
Results in panel b. reinforce the findings: a decrease in total expenditure in pre-
electoral years and an increase in electoral years after 1936 (smaller and significant
only at 10%). This estimation also highlights an important change in terms of the
timing and size of the cycle. Before 1936, political cycles start in the pre-election
period, but this trend changes to the election year after 1936. Besides, the cycle’s
size is bigger before 1936 compared to the ones observed after 1936.
We can also follow the theory applied by Brender and Drazen (2005) about new
and established democracies and try to study the Colombian case as a process, which
started when the country became a republic and then evolved towards an established
democracy. In this case, each new election is a further step in consolidating democ-
racy in the country. Thus, according to their results and our findings in panel b.,
we can expect stronger political budget cycles before 1936 than after.
2.6.2 Infrastructure and Social Expenditure
Table 18 reports OLS estimates and p-values for equations 1 and 2. The Table
presents two panels. Panel A. shows different results when the dependent variable
is infrastructure expenditure and panel B. when the dependent variable is social
expenditure. Within each panel we present estimates with different measures of the
dependent variable. Sub-panels a and b report α4 coefficient in equation (1) for
the two periods of study when the dependent variable is measured in real terms
and as a percentage of the total expenditure, and sub-panels c. and d. report
α4 interaction coefficient in equation (2) for the entire period when the dependent
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variable is measured in real terms (log) and as a percentage of the total expenditure.
As Table 17 showed, there is a clear cycle in total expenditure. The results in
Table 18 allow us to distinguish which of the different components this additional
expenditure was used for.
As this Table indicates, before 1936 the expenditure excess was used to increase
the infrastructure expenditure (panel A.).This component rises in real terms in pre-
election years and decreases during election years (sub-panel a.). The result is
also consistent with the percentages (sub-panel b.), where is shown that only this
expenditure increases its participation before elections.
These findings are first approximations that corroborate our hypothesis about
how the fiscal policy instruments in election times depend on the characteristics of
voters. Politicians prefer to focus on infrastructure expenditure instead of others
expenditures to attract more potential voters. The infrastructure spending was
related to investment projects to build roads or railways that help to reduce distances
and improve the transportation system and communication between regions. These
projects mostly benefited traders and landowners who were interested in increasing
their profits and expanding their markets.
According to Valencia (1988) and Perez (1942), during pre-industrial times in
Colombia, this expenditure was viewed as the main mechanism to achieve devel-
opment given the isolation of the regions and their effect on the economy. In this
sense "the promises of more infrastructure expenditure were used as political plat-
forms"(Valencia, 1988). Besides, the expenditure on investment projects had an im-
mense effect on commercial activities. For example, in 1878 a local newspaper ("El
Telegrafo") published the proposal of a group of traders, entrepreneurs, importers-
exporters and landowners. In this publication, they criticized the government’s use
of public resources and proposed building new roads and bridges to connect their
region and stimulate trade (Valencia, 1993).
The results before 1936 also show that infrastructure expenditure decreases dur-
ing election years. We can explain this change by the date of elections. Presidential
elections in Colombia have always taken place in the first semester of the year. Then,
once an election has occurred, politicians who are then in power try to compensate
for the excess of expenditure of the previous years by delaying or eliminating existing
or new projects.
For the period 1937-2000, infrastructure spending results non-significant in any
of the different election’s estimates. This results indicates that this expenditure
was not a priority for the government in electoral periods and was not used as a
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mechanism to attract new voters.
When we include the entire sample and estimate the interaction coefficient α4 in
equation (2) our hypothesis is reinforced: both measures of infrastructure expendi-
ture decrease in pre-election years for the years after 1936 compared with the years
before 1936.
Panel B reports the results when the dependent variable is social expenditure.
Before 1936 there are not significant changes in social expenditure for any of the
estimations.
This finding is also consistent with the hypothesis about the focus of expenditure
according to the types of voter. The main beneficiaries of this expenditure were the
illiterate and low-income population, who were not potential voters. Hence, politi-
cians did not have any incentives to increase this expenditure in electoral periods
nor to include it in their platforms.
This trend changed after 1936, although the cycle is not as strong as the one
of regarding infrastructure spending. For the period 1937-2000, social expenditure
is the only type of expenditure that increases significantly during elections. The
results show an increase of 8,414,090 pesos in real terms and of 14% in terms of
the sample average. This is consistent with the hypothesis that politicians prefer to
focus on a form of expenditure that benefits the majority of voters, which in this
case is social programs (education and health), not investment projects.
Although the definition of social expenditure during the 19th century may seem
unclear, disaggregated reports of this expenditure make clear how it was distributed.
Social expenditure was divided into two main categories: education and charity. The
first category, education, had more than 70% of the total social expenditure, which
was distributed mainly amongst primary and secondary schools across the country
(paying teachers and rents and building new schools). The second was used to
pay the maintenance of public hospitals and charity houses. The existence of a
clear social expenditure and its importance could also be observed in the common
idea among politicians about the necessity of education as one of the best ways to
generate economic growth and better standards of livings. However, despite the
usual highlighting of education by politicians, there is no evidence of an increase in
this expenditure during electoral years before 1936.
Once again, when we use the entire sample, the results still hold: social expen-
diture, mainly education and health spending, increases in election times for the
years after the new law was established compared with the period when voters were
a limited group. This result is significant whether it is measured as a percentage or
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as logarithm.
The significance of the results in both panels of the Table 18 reinforces our
hypothesis about the change in expenditure composition by the characteristics of
potential voters.
With respect to the timing of the cycle, the explanation of the change between
the two periods is related to the type of expenditure on which politicians choose
to focus. In accordance with the results of Gonzalez (2002) and Block (2002), the
increase in investment in infrastructure started relatively early in the pre-election
period: meanwhile social expenditure tends only to increase in election years (the
months before elections).
2.6.3 Other Expenditures and Deficit.
Tables 19 and 20 report results obtained from equation 1 and 2 for other types of
expenditure (finance, institutional, defense and debt) and deficit.
In general, there is not a clear cycle in most of these components or the deficit.
This result supports our previous findings, demonstrating that the increase observed
during electoral periods in total expenditure was spent mainly on "visible" expen-
diture: infrastructure before 1936 and on social goals after 1936.
Panel A in Table 19 indicates the absence of a cycle in the finance expenditure
in any period or electoral year. Panel B in Table 19 reports the results for institu-
tional expenditure, which is associated with bureaucratic spending. Estimates from
equation 1 (sub-panel a. and b.) did not show a clear cycle in the two different pe-
riods. However, estimates from equation 2 indicates that one year before elections
this expenditure decreases after 1936, compared with the years before 1936. This
trend shifts during election years, as institutional expenditure increases after 1936.
These results can be interpreted in terms of a change in the timing of payments
for political favors. Before 1936, these payments took place before elections (as a
prepayment) in order to attract new voters and increase the probability of staying
in power. After 1936, they occurred in elections years (often once the election was
underway) as a mechanism to pay favors (financing of political campaign) once the
candidate got to power.
Panel A in Table 20 shows the results when the dependent variable is defense
expenditure. There is no clear cycle in this component. The only interesting result
is the decrease before elections after 1936 compared with the period 1830-1936.
Panel B in Table 20 presents the results when the dependent variable is debt. This
indicates that before elections this component increases, but during election years
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after 1936 it decreases compared with the years before the electoral reform. In this
component there is also a change in the timing between the two periods. In terms
of the importance of the component within the budget (measured by the percentage
variable), before 1936 interests payments are less important in the budget during
pre-electoral periods but once elections are over, this component reaches almost the
weight that it had before. The opposite occurs for the period after 1936: before
elections this component becomes more important but during elections years this
importance is lost. The size of change between the two periods is also different: while
the change before 1936 is around 3%, after 1936 it is only 0.6%. We do not observe
significant changes when we estimate equation (1) for the two periods separately
but estimates of equation (2) are significant.
Finally, panel E reports the results for deficit. This variable increase in pre-
electoral periods before 1936 and decreases in post-electoral periods after 1936.The
growth in the variable before 1936 could explain the difference between the increase
in total expenditure versus the increase in total revenues before elections. Since
not all the increase in expenditure could be compensated for by more revenues (the
increase in expenditure was around 25% and that in revenues around 14%), the
excess was obtained from other resources despite all the constraints. For example,
rich local landowners or local banks that lend small quantities of money to the
government. The rise in the public deficit observed during these years is consistent
with some of the literature (Shi and Svensson, 2006; Block, 2002).
2.6.4 Revenues
Table 21 shows estimations for each election year variable when the dependent vari-
ables are the total revenues in real terms and in logs for different periods (1830-1936,
1937-2000, 1830-2000). The estimation shows the existence of a revenue cycle one
year before elections for the period 1830-1936, mainly, as we will see later, due to
an increase in the collection of indirect taxes (the most important revenue at that
time).
Before 1936, there is an increase in total revenues only one year before elections85.
In real terms, total revenues increase on average by 727.912 pesos one year before
elections. Evaluated at the sample average, the results imply that elections can
explain a 14% increase in total revenues during pre-election times.
After 1936, the results indicate that total revenues did not change significantly
during electoral periods and the inexistence of a revenue cycle. This result could be a
85This increase is also significant two years before elections at a10.2% significance level.
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consequence of major access to credit markets, making it easier for the government
to obtain extra resources through debt instead of taxes during electoral periods.
This new revenue source is less visible for the voters than higher taxes, and in
some instances it is institutionally cheaper and easier to obtain than the traditional
revenues.
Estimates when total revenues is the dependent variable from equation (2) are
presented in panel b. These outcomes confirm the previous results. There is an
important change in the revenue cycle before and after 1936 in the timing of the
cycle. Total revenues decrease in pre-electoral periods after 1936 compared with
previous years but they increase during electoral periods, although this increase is
smaller and only significant at 10% with controls.
Tables 22 and 23 report estimates obtained from equation 1 and 2 for different
revenues components. Panel A indicates that the percentage of direct taxes de-
creased in election years after 1936, and decreased in log terms in pre-election years
for the same period. This may be due to the late creation of its main component, i.e
income tax (established by law 56 of 1918 but only applied from 1922) which makes
the comparison of this variable between the two periods difficult.
Panels B and C show that, before 1936 the extra revenues came mainly from
indirect taxes and fees and fines, which increase on average 583,665 pesos and 106,255
pesos respectively. Again, in terms of the sample average, this means that, in these
years, indirect taxes and fees and fines augmented 20% and 22% respectively due to
the electoral process.
Public revenues have two important characteristics during this period: 1. Highly
dependent of customs and non-diversified: until the process of industrialization be-
gan in Colombia during the 1920’s, more than 70% of total revenues were obtained
from customs taxes (Gonzales and Calderon, 2002). 2. Limited access to credit:
during the 19th century, Colombia experienced serious problems accessing internal
and external credit markets. This restriction translates into greater fiscal instability
and fewer options during times of crisis. The constraints started to be overcome
during the 1920’s when the Kemmerer Commission (Junguito, 2009; López, 1992)
organized the national administration and the central bank, carried out a technical
revision of the administration and supervision of tax collection, and helped to create
a national institution for this purpose.
Thus, if the government wanted more revenues, it had to search for mechanisms
other than credit to obtain them86. These other resources came from revenues that
86The central bank was founded in 1923 and since then, and in particular during the 1930s,
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already existed as customs or fees.
Reviewing all the laws in public newspapers such as La Gaceta Oficial, El Registro
Oficial, El Diario Oficial y La Gaceta de la Nueva Granada, we found few increases
in the customs tariffs, reflecting their stability. Most increases occurred one year
after a presidential election87. In general, we could find only small tariff changes
regarding specific types of imported goods. This fact was reinforced by Ocampo
(2007), who points out that few laws completely changed the tariffs.
This means that revenues did not increase before elections due to higher tariffs
but because of higher collection rates. The means used to collect more revenues was
to increase those that were flexible in the collection and were getting less than their
potential: in some years, the customs revenues collected only 25% of what they were
supposed to collect (El Tiempo, May 22th 1855). In this sense, this was a target
revenue for the government.
Besides, the principal problem in the collection was smuggling, and the people
most affected by this crime were traders, who were also potential voters. Accord-
ing to Laurent (2008), this problem underlines the state’s inefficiency at improving
controls and taking action, but at the same time it was an example of its flexibil-
ity: with low effort and money the collection rate could be increased. This seems a
reasonable way to obtain more revenues during electoral periods.
Panel B and C also show the results when the dependent variable is measured as a
percentage of total revenues. The results do not show big changes in the composition
of revenues in electoral periods before 1936. This may be explained by the increase
in the total revenues found before. As total revenues, indirect taxes and fees and
fines grew in similar proportions, it was not necessary to redistribute the existing
revenues.
Related to the estimates of equation 2, we find that the sign of the coefficient of
the log of indirect taxes is consistent with what we found in equation 1 for the two
periods, but is not significant. The non-taxable revenue from fees and fines tend to
decrease both one and two years before elections for the years after 1936 compared
with the previous ones.
For the period 1830-1936, we can observe in panel D a decrease in the partic-
ipation of "national properties", which is a non-tax revenue, in pre-election and
post-election times, but an increase in electoral years. These revenues comprise the
state monopolies (mainly salt and tobacco) during the 19th century and the ex-
Colombia started an intense effort, within the international markets, to restore investor confidence.
87The years of the main tariff reforms are 1844, 1861, 1873, 1886, 1913 and 1931.
73
ploitation of mines and oil concessions during the 20th century. They also includes
the rents received from the sale of national properties, and transfers. The level of
this revenue increases before and after elections for the years after 1936, but de-
creases in electoral years in the same period. This trend is compared with the other
period (1937-2000) when we estimate equation 2. We find an important change in
the variable’s performance after 1936. This variable increases in pre-electoral and
post-electoral years but decreases in electoral years after 1936.
We find almost the opposite performance for the variable Treasury Balance Re-
sources (panel C in Table 23.), although most of the results are not significant.
2.7 Robustness Analysis
Natural concerns with the empirical strategy include potential overestimates arising
from spurious relationships or other shifts in the priorities or role of the central gov-
ernment. This section presents some robustness checks that address these concerns.
First, it could be the case that the investment projects were so many and perma-
nent before 1936 that Colombia built a good infrastructure system and then it was
not necessary to invest in important and ambitious projects any more; hence the
government could change priorities afterwards. At the same time, we might argue
that before 1936 the government and politicians did not care about education and
health or that the government role in this aspect was not well-defined and they had
other priorities.
With respect to the first concern, the answer would be pretty obvious for any-
one who travels within the country. Today, Colombia does not have any national
rail system and the gap in this regard is huge when we compare statistics with
other similar countries in the region. Even when it was clear that the country was
falling behind in terms of infrastructure, few initiatives were taken by the central
government, and even fewer succeeded.
The deficiencies of the country in this respect could be clearer when we compare
it with other countries in the region. Table 24 shows the number of kilometers per
capita of roads and the total routes-km of rail lines for most countries in Latin
America in the last decade. As the table points out, Colombia has one of the lowest
levels of roads per person (only above Brazil) and of routes per km of rail lines. This
suggests that the infrastructure expenditure must not have been a concern of the
government in the past, and that it is not correct to think that this was a minimal
problem after 1936 to the extent that politicians had no need to focus on this type
of spending.
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With respect to concerns about the importance of social expenditure before
1936, we can focus mainly on the role of the government in the education system.
As Ramirez and Salazar (2007) and Jaramillo (1980) have pointed out: although
Colombia had one of the lowest education levels in the 19th century (even lower than
the Latin American level) and its expansion during this period was low; education
in its three levels, primary, intermediate and superior had been one of the principal
interests since the first republican government of Bolivar. Table 25 shows the pro-
portion of students enrolled in primary school/population from the beginning of the
Republic up to 1905 and indicates that this proportion increased more than twofold
during this period. Table 26 shows the difference between public and private schools
and indicates the relative importance of the former compared to the latter. Besides,
the table clarifies that most of the schools were public instead of private.
The role of the government in education was also observable in their policies
to expand higher education in the country, and in the fact that the most impor-
tant public universities were founded during the 19th century. It was clear to the
government how important education was for achieving development. Most of the
politicians of that time, independently of their ideology, highlighted in their political
speeches the importance of education for the society and the role of the government
to boost it. At the time, the huge importance of education for development was
clear, and in this sense the discussion focused on the role that the Church should
have in it.
Another important concern is the year when the law changed. The 1920s and
1930s were important decades for social movements that claimed a new role for the
State and new rights (in terms of labor conditions and equality). Although Colombia
was not much of an open country ideologically speaking, many of these ideas arrived
in the country and their impact was perceived in the frequency on the newspapers
highlights. It is difficult to settle on a particular year to test this effect, since these
were two decades of different movements and ideologies. However, we can try to
separate the effect of the global movement from the effect of the electoral law, by
changing the dummy year variable (varying the year from 1936). If the effect is the
same in terms of magnitude when we move the dummy variable a few years earlier
or later, we can argue that the main effect was not due to 1936 by itself but instead
due to a more general effect that occurred throughout the decade, such as the labor
and social movements.
Table 27 shows the results for the main variables of the hypothesis (infrastructure
and social expenditure) when we change the dummy year (four years before and after
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the change in the law) in order to see if, when we take an additional election or we
drop the previous one, the coefficients change in magnitude. If it is true that 1936
was a random year or the result of a bigger change in an ideological trend, we would
expect similar results if we include one more or one fewer election, as the estimates
will capture a general effect in no particular year. However, if we observe small
differences in the magnitude and smaller coefficients in both new estimates, the
validity of regarding 1936 as the year of change will be higher. It is important to
note that we can only expect small differences in the coefficient because these are
associated with an average of many years and we are only increasing or reducing a
small portion of the variable (4 years).
As Table 27 indicates, the new estimates for the dummy year in 1932 and 1940 are
consistent with the estimates in Table 17 and 18 in terms of the sign of coefficients
and significance. However, all the coefficients are strictly smaller than in the original
regressions, showing that the strongest effect is concentrated around 1936. This
suggests that the change in the target expenditures is not a result of a general
change in an ideological trend, but that it is linked specifically to 1936.
To reinforce the results, we also ran the main regressions eliminating the periods
with elections every two years (1861-1884). The importance and significance of
the main results do not change when we exclude these years. Total expenditure
increases in pre-electoral years before 1936 and in electoral years after 1936; social
expenditure increases in election years after 1936; and infrastructure expenditure
increases in pre-electoral years before 1936.
2.8 Conclusions
The objective of this work is to analyses how the change in electoral legislation in
1936, regarding the characteristics of voters, affects fiscal policy in electoral peri-
ods. Using a new Colombian data set (1830-2000) we estimate OLS equations and
interpret the size and magnitude of the interaction coefficient. We find the exis-
tence of Political Budget Cycles in Colombian history. These cycles are stronger in
expenditure than in revenues.
In line with our hypothesis, we also show that before the electoral legislature
was reformed in 1936, total expenditure increased in pre-electoral periods and this
increase was due mainly to higher infrastructure spending. This pattern changed
after 1936, since when total expenditure has increased only in the election year.
This pattern was driven by higher social expenditure.
Another important finding is linked to the timing and size of the political budget
76
cycles in the two periods (before and after 1936). In the first period, the expenditure
cycle existed only in pre-electoral years (one year and two years before elections)
while in the second period, this cycle only existed during election years. The mag-
nitude of the coefficients also indicate that the cycle was stronger in the first period
than in the second one. This could be explained, in part, by the greater flexibility
that the government had to control and manipulate the budget and to the existence
of fewer government monitoring agencies.
We find the existence of a weaker revenue cycle. Total revenues increased before
1936 in pre-electoral periods, due to an increase in indirect taxes, but this trend
disappears after 1936. Hence, the higher expenditure in electoral year in the second
period must have been financed with debt. It is not clear if this is due to the change
in voters’ characteristics or to a greater access to credit markets.
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Chapter 3
On the Agrarian Origins of civil conflict in Colombia.
3.1 Introduction
The studies of the causes of civil conflicts have multiplied during the recent decades.
Diverse theories and hypotheses have been proposed and tested in order to determine
the origins of civil wars. The debate is still alive and conclusions usually depend
on the type of data or countries of study. However, most of the literature tends
to explain civil conflicts as a result of poverty or low economic performance. This
study, in contrast, examines the role of grievances stemming from peasants’ land
dispossessions as a historical cause of conflict.
Peasants’ land dispossessions may occur as a result of the failure of the state to
protect and enforce land property rights. Such dispossessions generate grievances
that may persist over time and will manifest in a civil conflict when the window of
opportunity emerges. We propose that a crucial factor to understand the origin of
rural guerrilla groups are land dispossessions generally by large landowners. Peas-
ants are expelled from their lands and lose, in most cases, their only productive
asset, are forced to migrate or become landless. This triggers the perception of in-
justice and lead to the rise of grievances, which will persist while the state does not
improve peasant’s living conditions or give them access to new lands.
As peasants are at risk of losing their jobs or income or facing repression, they
cannot manifest their grievances. The probability that peasants will succeed on their
claims by acting without coordination is low. They need resources and political
opportunities to organize themselves. Once the opportunity emerge, they will rebel
against the government. Thus, our approach reivindicates the role of motive -the
persistence of grievances- as the ultimate cause of civil conflict. We use the political
economy theory of the peasant society (Popkin 1992) and the resource mobilization
theory (Jenkins 1983; McAdam, McCarthy and Zaid 1987) to argue that peasants
organize and rebel as a response to new opportunities yet their grievances and claims
are endemic to the social structure and persist over time. Our paper contribute to
the quantitative literature of the origins of civil wars in two ways. On the one hand,
we use a precise measure of subnational historical grievances to explain the origins
of conflict. On the other hand, we explore different mechanisms that led to the
emergence of conflict.
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We propose two mechanisms through which old land dispossessions are likely to
determine the origin of guerrilla groups. On the one hand, the military feasibility
that is viable during civil war periods when peasants groups had access to weapons
and military equipment. On the other hand, the ideological politics of rebellion
developed by the guidance and support of the revolutionary parties that may con-
solidate peasants grievances, generate political awareness among the peasantry and
foster the formation of rebel groups.
We apply this reasoning to the rise of the most important Colombian guerrilla
movement, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) during the early
stage of the civil conflict in Colombia (1974-1985)88. The Colombian civil conflict
arose in the rural areas, where land conflicts have been visible since the late 19th
century. Instead of understanding the rural problems as an issue of distribution,
we suggest that the main cause has been a historic problem of weak enforcement
of property rights that led to the rise of grievances by the peasants, who were
dispossessed of their lands by large landowners, in many cases with the informal
approval of the State. Some of these grievances materialized in legal land conflicts,
in which the peasant filled a land protection petition or land restitution. The key
element of our argument is not only the existence of grievances, but their persistence
over time.
The role of land as a main cause of the Colombian conflict has been constantly
mentioned by academics, policy makers and guerrilla leaders. For example, the
agrarian agreement was the first one out of the six agreed during the recent peace
talks between the government and FARC. Since its foundation, this guerrilla has
had the land issue at the center of its political agenda. Their leaders often men-
tioned as the cause of armed conflict the expansion of the latifundio and the violent
dispossession of the peasant’ lands by the landowners, they demanded the abolition
of large properties that, according to them, consolidated through legal fraud and
dispossessions. Land dispossessions in the rural areas have also impacted the food’s
market and production and have led to forced displacement and more poverty of the
peasantry (Reyes, 2016).
Weak property rights that facilitate land dispossessions have been at the centre
of the political discussion in Colombia since 19th century. Important land reforms,
such the law 200 of 1936 or law 135 of 1961, aimed at facilitating the access of public
88The boundaries of the period of the study relate to the social foundation of the FARC (1964)
and the breakdown of the agreements of ’La Uribe" between Betancourt government and FARC
(1985). We exclude the following years since the civil war became more complex and hard to
disentangle due to the appearance of drug trafficking and the paramilitaries
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land to peasants and settlers but nonetheless failed. A solution of the land issues
was also the main claim that the guerrilla group FARC stated in its demands and
was at the center of the debate during the Second Guerrilla Conference in 1966 when
they decided to named themselves as FARC.
In the Colombian case, peasants’ claims have remained mostly unchanged during
the 20th century: access to land and higher provision of public goods. But the
opportunity to demand them without the use of violence were only possible when a
window of political opportunity and the economic resources appeared.
This work argues that the differences in the intensity of armed conflict at mu-
nicipal level during its early stage (1974-1985) were due to old peasant’s land dis-
possessions by large landowners that led to the rise and persistence of grievances.
To test this argument, we use historical data that includes, among others, measures
of land dispossessions, FARC rebel activities, exposure to the civil war and support
to revolutionary parties. We show, first, that there is a strong link between FARC
rebel activity(1974-1985) and land dispossessions during the export coffee expansion
(1916-1946). And second, that the link is mediated by the exposure to the previ-
ous civil war "La Violencia", facilitating that small peasant groups had access to
weapons and military experience (Molano 2015, Collier Collier, Hoeﬄer and Rohner
2009), and by an ideological cohesion lead by the communist party.
We follow the methodology used by Acemoglu et al (2012) and use an identifica-
tion strategy that combines a matching methodology with an instrumental variable
approach. We compare municipalities that experienced land dispossession during
the coffee expansion 1916-1948 and neighboring municipalities that did not. In or-
der to deal with the plausible endogeneity problems and measurement error, we
use as instrumental variable for land dispossessions floods during the export boom.
Floods can generate damages on land plots by eroding the boundaries of properties,
destroying crops, reducing their value and, in some cases, forcing peasants to mi-
grate. Landowners can easily cope with floods shocks since they can rely on multiple
sources of income or have easy access to credit. On the contrary, peasants, have lim-
ited access to markets and credits and rely entirely on their lands to survive. This
vulnerability of peasants to climate shocks can be exploited by landowners who can
dispossess the peasants from their lands.
By using the methodology proposed by Dipe et al (2017) we test different mech-
anisms through which land dispossessions led to the rise of guerrilla groups. The
mechanisms tested are the exposure to the previous civil war "La Violencia" and
political support to rebellion. We find that the mediators strongly associated to the
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rise of FARC.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly discuss the literature
related to the origins of civil conflicts. Section 3 provides a historical discussion
of Agrarian Reform, "La Violencia" and the Communist ideology and of the Origin
and expansion of FARC. Section 4 presents the data collected and used in this study.
Section 5 describes the process of land dispossession and their relation with natural
disasters, the identification strategy and results. Section 6 discusses the effects
of land dispossessions on rebel activity. Section 7 documents the methodology and
present the results of the effect of the plausible mechanisms on rebel activity. Section
8 concludes.
4 Literature Review
During the last decades, researchers have attempted to understand the origins of
civil wars. Causes, costs, duration and consequences are some of the issues that
have been addressed in theoretical and empirical works. This study contributes to a
vast literature on the origins and causes of conflict from a quantitative and historical
approach. This is the first study that, to the best of our knowledge, uses subnational
historical data to explain the variation in presence and intensity of armed conflict.
A prolific body of work has explored the causes of conflict and have suggested
that civil war are caused by "greed" rather than "grievance". The seminal paper by
Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) proposes an econometric model of civil war that predicts
the probability that a civil war will occur and test different hypothesis. This prob-
ability depends on the motivations of rebellions. They use as proxies for grievance
inequality, political rights, ethnic polarisation and religious fractionalisation, yet
these authors did not find enough empirical evidence that support the grievance hy-
pothesis. One alternative, proposed initially by a small economic theory literature
(Grossman, 1999) is that civil wars might be motivated purely by greed -income
that can be obtained either during rebellion or from state revenues after victory.
On the contrary, Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) support the idea that wars are more
likely where low opportunity costs of fighting exist and high presence of natural
resources facilitates looting and rent-seeking. Their quantitative indicators of this
"opportunity" view are: financial viability, military viability and history. Rebel
groups require important financial resources to build their organizations and pur-
chase armaments. They also need to meet a "survival constraint" determined by
relative size of their forces compare to the government ones and other given factors
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such as geography and population density. Finally, history matters: in a country
with previous conflict experience, a legacy of hatred could have been created that
may trigger further conflict. Empirically, all these variables of opportunities explain
to some extent the origin of conflicts, and are consistent with the economic theory
of rebellion as greed-motivated.
Similar to this approach, Fearon and Laitin (2003) find evidence that supports
the idea that the main factors determining civil wars are conditions that favour
insurgency, not ethnic or religious differences or grievances per se. These conditions
are mainly state weakness characterised by poverty, large population and instability.
More recently, Collier, Hoeﬄer and Rohner (2009) have stressed on greed-driven
arguments and have proposed a broader definition of opportunities, so called the
"feasibility hypothesis", which states that where civil war is feasible, it will occur.
Other alternative, presented by political scientists, offers an account of conflict in
terms of purely grievance -the opposition to perceived or actual injustice. Our paper
builds on and contributes to the literature on grievances as a cause of civil conflicts.
Although the most influential studies give little attention to the grievance-motivation
theory, works by Stewart (2008) and Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011)
have brought up the debate its pertinence. Stewart (2008) conceptualizes horizontal
inequality by considering political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions ex-
plicitly89. Cederman, Weidman and Gleditsch (2011) use a new geocoded data on
politically relevant ethnic group’s settlement areas and find that both political and
economic horizontal inequalities contribute to civil war. Their findings indicate that
countries where some ethnic groups with wealth levels far from the country average
are more likely to experience civil war. Ostby (2008) finds evidence that social hor-
izontal inequality causes civil war and that economic dimensions are less important.
Using data from sub-Saharian Africa Ostby, Nordas and Rod (2009) show that both
economic and social group-level differences are the main drivers of domestic conflict.
There are some other explanations consistent with rational behaviour of why
conflict occurs. Most of them appeal to a problem of asymmetric information. Brito
and Intriligator (1985) suggest that war emerge as a costly means of communications.
Fearon (1995) also suggests that, in settings of asymmetric information, war could
be chosen, in a preemptive and costly move, as a signal of strength in front of others.
Sanchez-Pages (2004) uses this line of analysis and supposes that information about
89Political horizontal inequality refers to limited access to central decision-making authority
within the state, the economic refers to the distribution of wealth among households. The social
measures groups’ uneven social access. The cultural captures group-level inequalities with respect
to cultural policies and symbols.
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the adversaries can be transmitted on the battlefield before and during negotiations
until a final settlement is reached or negotiations breakdown. Finally, Azam and
Mesnard (2003) and Bester and Warneryd (2006) identify some conditions under the
scenario of asymmetric information to show that the end of conflict is not possible.
Its defining feature is large scale organised violence on the part of a rebel army,
establishment is prohibitively expensive and extremely dangerous regardless of its
agenda (Collier, Hoeﬄer and Rohner, 2009).
Finally, in terms of the instrument, this paper also contributes to the literature
that relates natural disasters or climate variables and conflict. Some papers have
studied the relationship between rainfall and conflict, suggesting that rainfall af-
fects conflict only through its impact on income (Miguel et al 2004 and Bohlken
and Sergenti 2010). Sarsons (2015) suggests that rainfall affects conflict through
other channel, especially in those places where the existence of irrigation technology
reduces the dependency of agriculture on rainfall. This paper proposes a different
channel between rainfall shocks that lead to floods and conflict: land dispossessions
that lead to the rise and persistence of peasant’s grievances.
5 Historical Framework
Scholars agree with the statement that "appropriation, use and possession of lands
have been the base of the origin and persistence of the armed conflict in Colombia"
(Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2013). Conflicts over land can be traced
back as early as when land became a valuable and coveted asset during the first coffee
expansion in the late 19th and early 20th century (Saffon, 2015)90. In response to the
increasing international demands for agricultural products, public lands increasingly
started to be allocated to private individuals and been exchanged in the land markets
(Sanchez, Lopez-Uribe and Fazio, 2010).
The combination of high land values and low enforcement of property rights
during coffee expansion (1920s) encouraged landowners to invade land occupied by
squatters and peasant settlers, to extend their borders by encroaching upon occupied
neighbouring lands. As a result, conflicts related to land dispossessions intensified
during the 1920s.
The law 200 of 1936 -Colombia’s first land reform-, intended to increase the
bargaining power of peasants and reduce the number of conflicts. The law made
90The export boom was mainly driven by coffee exports, which share rose from 12% in 1885 to
79% in 1929 (LeGrand, 1986).
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harder to expel the settlers. The law made tenants and sharecroppers more likely
to contest the ownership rights of the landowners and claim the status of settler
(Hirschman, 1963)91.
However, the law did not foresee the cost of judicial procedures for settlers
to reclaim their lands and did not protect them against future dispossessions92.
Colombian historians (Fajardo 2015; Molano 2015; LeGrand 1986; Berry 2002;
Kalmanovitz and Lopez 2006) have suggested that the failure of the Law 200 to
protect the settlers from the large landowners encroachment was a key factor for
explaining the beginning of "La Violencia".
From 1948 to 1958, "La Violencia", the rural civil war in which the Liberals,
with the assistance of the Communist Party, organized and armed themselves to
fight the Conservative-led government, extended across Colombia and touched every
social institution. Though its intensity varied among regions, violence was intense
in Colombia. The number of causalities yet difficult to determine reached 135.000
deaths (Guzman et al 1980).
"La Violencia" was a rural conflict in which the lines of confrontation were defined
by loyalties to multi-class parties. It confronted liberals against conservatives and
did not seem to have had a class motivation. Rather than rich and poor fighting to
each other, Conservatives attacked Liberals. The lack of a class basis or of any other
pattern such as land tenure or level of education was an important characteristic of
this type of civil conflict. Instead, traditional party loyalties underlay "La Violencia"
(Oquist 1980; Hartlyn 1993).
Due to the weakness of the Conservative government, their leaders decided to
initiate violence against liberals. Conservative Ospina Perez won the presidency in
1946 after liberals split their votes in two candidates. However, liberals retained
their electoral majority in congressional and local elections and would likely regain
the presidency in 1950. In addition, liberals were increasing their urban vote more
rapidly than were conservatives and consolidated a powerful opposition of national
level led by Gaitan, who was the front-runner in the next presidential elections
(Weinert, 1966).
In order to offset the liberal urban majorities and retain power, conservatives
appealed to rural political repression and exploited the political resentments from
91The law established the state’s ownership for the lands which alleged owners could not exhibit
titles and recognised the right of settlers to claim the ownership of land that they had possessed
in good faith for more than five years (LeGrand, 1986).
92It did not ensure that the titles obtained by peasants would be immediately and gratuitously
authenticated and registered, nor did it confer inalienable rights (Saffon and Sanchez, 2017)
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previous conflicts. Conservatives were forced to use rural mobilisation to counter
liberal urban mobilisation. The spuring of rural violence by the conservatives at-
tempted to achieve two goals: more conservative votes in rural areas and justify
stronger national measures in the countryside that facilitated repression of liberals
in urban areas (Weinert,1966).
However, rather than representing purely a partisan violence, this civil war can
also be seen as the representation of a fundamental struggle -and ultimately failure-
to impose a hegemonic regional project of rule predicated on notions of cultural,
ethnic, and racial difference (Roldan, 2002). Between 1953 and 1955 the civil war
gradually started changing its character, transforming from politically to economi-
cally motivated and from guerrilla to bandit in character (Bailey 1967; Dugas 2009).
Moreover, "soviet republics" -areas governed by rebellious peasants- were formed and
by 1960, communists succeeded in ideologizing these "republics" and turning them
into Catroite strongholds (Bailey 1967).
Armed groups successfully established enclaves in which communist peasant
guerrillas were located, once the civil war ended. One of these groups, led by the
Communist leader Manuel Marulanda Velez, established the Marquetalia Republic.
This was the first of the guerrilla controlled territories known as "Independent Re-
publics"93. According to Molano (2000), such "republics" were communities based
on "economic self-management and military self-defense" and were "independent"
of the state control. These areas experienced widespread land conflicts in the 1920s
and 1930s, intensive mobilisation efforts by liberals and Communists in the 1930s
and 1940s and conservative repression during the 1950s94.
During the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla (1953), the Communist party (PCC)
was banned and the peasants enclaves were attacked, displacing peasants from their
lands and homes who had to resettle in regions such as Meta, Caqueta and Tolima.
These regions would become later the traditional strongholds of the FARC (Leech,
2011).
The PCC responded to the government attacks in a contradictory way. On
one hand, the party publicly denounced armed struggled being waged by peasants
as a way to support the guidelines of the twentieth congress of the Communist
party of the Soviet Union that urged its party affiliates to seek non-violent roads to
93Others include Sumapaz, Rio Chiquito, El Pato, Guayabero, Viota
94During the 1930s, the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) organise and politize peasants,
especially in the Andean region in the departments of Tolima and Cundinamarca. Since its foun-
dation, the party made organising the rural population a priority. The PCC played an important
role at organising the peasant self-defence movement during the 1950s.
85
revolution. On the other hand, the party kept its support to the self-defense groups
in the rural areas and in 1961, during its ninth congress, adopted a different position
supporting armed struggle as a way to revolution.
In May of 1964, the Colombian military attacked the Marquetalia Republic in
order to subject it under the control of the national government. This attack was also
part of the Latin American Security Operation, known as Plan LASO, a US-backed
initiative to combat growing communist influence in Colombia by using both military
operations and civic action programs in the violent areas. After the attack, the
guerrilla dispersed to other enclaves and months later re-organized as the "Southern
Bloc", officially renamed as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia -FARC-,
which was considered the military wing of the Communist party.
At the end of May 1964, the leaders Manuel Marulanda and Jacobo Arenas
and their followers drafted and signed what is considered the founding document
of FARC: "The agrarian program of the guerrillas", a document in which leaders
from different communist guerrilla groups agreed upon a collective strategy of the
political-militar organization and formulated an agrarian reform programme. The
document also created a more formal insurgent organization with the main goal of
seizing power from capitalists and transform the Colombian society according to the
Marxist doctrine.
The following year, the first guerrilla conference agreed to expand their field of
operations and moved from the Andean highlands to the eastern part of the country
to regions as Meta and Caqueta. In these areas, the peasants had colonized the land
and had established small farms, while the Southern Bloc defended the community
from both the military and the encroachment of large landowners who sought to
expropriate their new landholdings (Molano, 2015).
At their origins, the guerilla’s goals were strictly related to an agrarian reform
that would transform the social structure in the rural areas, in particular giving legal
rights to the peasants that work the land. However, after the second conference in
1966, the group turned from a peasant self-defense group to a revolutionary guerrilla
force that sought to expand operations over the whole country in order to overthrow
the government (Leech, 2011).
In the 1970s, the arrival of the Conservative government of Misael Pastrana
(1970-1974) meant the adoption of a rural development model that aimed to elimi-
nate all obstacles to free investment in the rural areas of the country. This program
worsened the economic conditions of the peasants, increased land concentration, un-
dermined the small-scale peasant producers and increased peasant proletarization.
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At the same time, the repression of the national peasant movement (ANUC)
and the expel of small tenants from their lands, brought near peasants that initially
were outside the political-militar strife to the newborn guerrilla group FARC. During
these years, FARC consolidated its influence, expanded to new areas and intensified
the military training of its leaders.
According to Molano (2000), between 1970 and 1982, an "early conflict" stage,
the FARC grew from a movement of 500 people to a small army of 3000, with a cen-
tralised hierarchical structure, military code, training school and political program.
Later on, during the seventh conference in May 1982, the guerrilla changed its name
to The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP).
During the presidency of Belisario Betancurt (1982-1986), the FARC-EP em-
barked in a peace negotiation process started with the government. The initial goal
of the government was to legalize the guerrilla’s political activity and to transform
their military force into a political party (Molano, 2000). This led to the foundation
of the Patriotic Union (UP) in May 1985, a legal political party originally affiliated
with the FARC and the communist party. The new party obtained significant parlia-
mentary representation during the 1986 elections. However, from 1986 to mid 1990s,
5000 activists, elected officials, candidates and community organisers belonging to
UP were assassinated (Pizarro, 2011).
Since the foundation of UP in 1985 and the Betancur’s peace negotiations, a
second stage of conflict started. This stage was characterised by an exacerbation
of the conflict and the strengthened military capacity of FARC, financed with drug
trafficking, extorsion and kidnapping.
6 Data
The unit of observation in this analysis is the Colombian municipality. We use
a data set of the 1120 municipalities which aggregates information for the period
1974-1985 mainly. Table 38 provides descriptive statistics.
We measure rebel activity as the number of violent events by the FARC and
ELN guerrilla groups between 1964-1985. It includes the number of threats to
civilians, attacks, assaults and extortions by these rural guerrilla groups. We add
up the number of events to calculate a cumulative indicator of the rebel activity at
municipal level.
The variable land dispossessions measures the number of land disputes or land
dispossessions between 1890 and 1946. Land disputes are defined as dispossessions
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of targeted settlers of public lands who had weak titles over them. Between 1827 and
1930, there are records of 600 land protection petitions. These petitions referred to
public lands susceptible of privatization and were made by settlers. In general, these
conflicts did not occur in the open agrarian frontier where most of the lands were not
only public but also vacant, but rather in the latifundia frontier where large tracts of
public lands were not so far away from old settlements, facilitating the encroachment
by nearby haciendas. Each event is defined as a peasant petition of land protection
or land restitution to a local, state or national authority. We aggregate the number
of grievances from 1918 to 1946, since after this year a civil war, known as "La
Violencia", began and other type of dispossessions occurred, for example, when
partisan guerrillas grabbed the lands of their opponents, making more difficult to
us to disentangle the real cause of the dispossession -agrarian problem or partisan
disputes-. Although this is the most complete source of land dispossessions for this
time period, underreporting is likely due to information costs and/or threats by
dispossessors or local authorities.
The variable floods is measured as the number of events between 1914 and 1946.
We give each of these events the same weight and calculate our variable by adding
up these events. In the sample, 28% of the municipalities experienced a flood during
this period. We also include as a control the number of floods between 1947 and
1985.
The variable land reform is an indicator of the intensity of the previous agrarian
reforms (1946-1964) and it is measured as the number of public lands allocated to
peasants (less than 20 has). The variable "La Violencia" is the measure of the
military feasibility and indicates the presence of the partisan guerrillas during the
partisan and rural civil war between 1948 and 1958.
The revolutionary political support is measured as the political support to the
radical left-wing parties. The variable is measure as the share of votes that the
revolutionary liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan got during the presidential elections
in 1946. We use this year’s election since was the last presidential election before
the civil war started and also because it was an election in which all radical left-wing
parties -Communist, Socialist, Maoist and radical liberals- supported one candidate.
As Green (2013) mentioned, it was clear that those regions where the Communist
part was strong and had support where the same regions were the was a high presence
of the liberals leftists.
We also include as controls proxies of coffee potential which are measured as the
presence of coffee plantations and the number of coffee trees in a municipality in
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1925. Other control variables are mainly geographical variables collected by Sanchez
and Nunez (2000) and include measures of altitude, rain precipitation, erosion index,
aptitude index, area and distance to the departmental capital.
7 Floods and Land Dispossessions
The variable land dispossessions suffers from measurement error as we only observe
those petitions of land protections submitted to the authorities. In order to examine
the impact of land dispossessions in 1914-1946 on subsequent rebel activities, we use
floods to instrument for land dispossessions. Floods damage and destroy land and
have a sizeable effects on production. These impacts include destruction of land
records, physical damage on crops and animals and deletion of boundaries (United
Nations 2010). Additional impacts include the loss of potential production due to
disturbed flow of goods and services, loss of production capacities and the increased
costs of production. Floods, for instance, make land unsuitable for agricultural
production until the waters receded.
Floods may also prompt displacement. Floods increase the vulnerability of rural
population and compel people to leave their homes and livelihoods just to survive
(Brown and Crawford 2006). The displaced people in rural areas, mainly poor
peasants, have to leave their communities in exchange for uncertainty in an attempt
to survive. People displaced by floods are usually the most vulnerable and their
survival depend upon leaving their home, facing uncertain future and often depended
on assistance (United Nations, 2010).
The greater peasant’s vulnerability during periods of floods facilitates the ex-
pansion of large properties that are more resilient to this type of shocks. Large
landowners usually do not rely entirely on one income source, have better knowl-
edge of the government benefits and programs and more access to credits (Work
and Woods 2015). The unequal impact of floods on peasants and landowners makes
easier for the latter to use these shocks to take advantage of the vulnerability of
the peasants. Landlords would extend the boundaries of their properties through
encroaching peasant to increase their potential revenues, but also as a mechanism
to reduce market competition and increase labor supply and political power.
Thus, we maintain that during periods of higher peasant vulnerability, such as
floods, the weak enforcement of property rights facilitates the land dispossession by
large landowners. We will test this hypothesis empirically. In this section, we explore
the first stage relationship between floods and land dispossessions, conditional on
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neighbors-pair fixed effects. We also test whether floods are correlated with a number
of important pre-characteristics and examine whether the size of the first stage
relationship differs across sub-groups.
7.1 Explaining the instrument
There is an extensive literature that relates weather shocks and conflict. Most of it
assumes that the main channel is income. Given that income is endogenous, most
of these works use rainfall measures as a source of exogenous variation for income.
Rainfall is a plausible instrument if the country is economically dependent on rain-
fed agriculture. Changes in rainfall have effects on crops, thereby affecting rural
incomes.
However, the principal assumption behind this instrument is that weather shocks
such as rainfall only affect conflict through its impact on income. For example,
Miguel et al (2004) use rainfall as an instrument of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa and
their result show that lower income increases the probability of a civil war. Bohlken
and Sergenti (2010) use a similar approach by instrumenting state-level GDP with
rainfall and finding that relatively low level of rainfall increases the number of riots
in a state in a particular year.
Other authors have used different channels to explain the relationship between
weather shocks and conflict. Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014) propose global cli-
mate shocks as the main driver in the relationship between rainfall and civil war.
In the case of India, Sarsons (2015) finds that the effect of rain shocks on conflict is
stronger in areas downstream of dams where agriculture is more dependent on rain-
fall. Her results suggest that rainfall might affect conflict through other channels
and caution about the use of rainfall as an instrument for income in regions that
have irrigation technology and hence are less dependent on agriculture.
Our paper proposes a different mechanism that relates weather shocks and con-
flict: land dispossessions that lead to the rise of grievances that persist over time.
First, we argue that floods are positive correlated with land dispossessions. These
shocks have direct and indirect effects. One of them is the displacement of rural
poor peasants who are vulnerable since they lack the proper infrastructure and good
access to markets. The vulnerability of this group facilitates land encroachments by
landowners who are more resilient to these shocks. This unequal impact of weather
shocks on peasants and landowners result of the differences in vulnerability, facili-
tating the dispossession of the former lands by the latter.
Peasants’ land dispossessions by landlords prompt the rise of grievances. During
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1914-1946 there were more than 400 land protection petitions filled by peasants.
Most of these dispossessions did not occur in the open agrarian frontier but near the
latifundia frontier. In these petitions, peasants claimed that landlords dispossessed
illegally from their land and subsequently legalize the dispossession. Most of these
disputes took place through the illegal use of legal procedure or abuse of the law.
We argue that both land dispossessions and the failure of the state to protect the
peasants and to enforce their rights over their lands strongly contributed to the rise
of peasants’ grievances. The low capacity of the state to enforce the law promoted
the recurrence of these disputes during decades contributing to the persistence of
the peasant’s grievances over time.
7.2 Identification Strategy
We test whether floods in the years leading up the organisation of guerrilla move-
ments affected land dispossessions by running a municipality-pair regression. From
the total number of municipalities in Colombia (1122), our analysis takes just the
municipalities that experienced land dispossessions between 1914-1946 (192 munic-
ipalities) and all their directly adjacent neighbours (529 municipalities). We use a
neighbor pair fixed-effect strategy, which allow to compare municipalities that are
expected to share economic, political, social and institutional characteristics but
that differ in having or not experienced land dispossessions.
We index the presence of land dispossession by d and non-land dispossessed
municipalities by nd. This estimation compares pairs of adjacent municipalities of
which one member had at least one land dispossession and the other member did
not.
In order to examine the impact of land dispossessions (1914-1946) on subsequent
rebel activity (1974-1985), we use floods presence to instrument for land disposses-
sions. The first stage relationship for each pair τ = (d, nd), nd  I(d) estimates
whether the presence of floods during 1914-1946 affected land dispossessions:
Land_dispossed = χ1Dd + χ2xd + λd,nd + d
Land_dispossend = χ1Dnd + χ2xnd + λd,nd + nd
where λd,nd are the neighbour-pair fixed effects, which capture unobservables com-
mon for the neighbor pair (d, nd). τ are τ -specific unobservables. Lτ is a dummy
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for land dispossession and Dτ is a dummy of floods between 1914 and 1946 in mu-
nicipality d.
We then use floods as an instrument for land dispossessions. We estimate the
following linear probabilistic model for each pair (d, nd):
Rebel_actd = β1Land_dispossed + β2xd + ζd,nd + νd
Rebel_actnd = β1Land_dispossend + β2xnd + ζd,nd + νnd
where Rebel_actτ is a dummy of the rebel activity of the FARC during the early
stage of conflict (1974-1985), Lτ is our dummy of land dispossession, xτ is a vector
of covariates that include geographical variables, land reform measures and number
of floods in the current period. ζd,nd are the neighbour-pair fixed effects, ντ are
τ -specific unobservables.
Even after controlling for common unobservables across the pair of municipali-
ties and their neighbors and control for some geographical and political variables,
it is possible that cov(Land_disposse, ν) 6= 0. In this case, land dispossession
Land_disposse can be conditionally correlated with municipality-specific unobserv-
ables. If this is the case, our identification strategy must assume that conditional
on the common unobservables for a pair of neighboring municipalities, the differ-
ence in land dispossession between each pair is due to exogenous shocks such as the
experience of a natural disaster in one of them.
The instrumental variables approach requires the following two assumptions (An-
grist, 2009). First, floods must be correlated with land dispossessions. If this cor-
relation is only marginally different from zero, the estimates of the instrumental
variable are unlikely to be informative. Second, the exclusion restriction states
that floods must be uncorrelated with any other determinants of interest: in other
words, corr(floodi, νi) = 0. It will obtain if floods is randomly assigned, conditional
on neighbors-pair fixed effects, and if floods during 1914-1946 has no effect on rebel
activity during 1970s and 1980s other than through the land dispossessions channel.
We use the extensive and intensive margins of the endogenous variable, land
dispossessions. Although, the extensive margin might better capture sources of
variation in the long-run that might affect the development of the rebel activity,
the intensive margin of land dispossession gives the intensity of the effect of land
dispossession on conflict.
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7.3 Similarity of neighbours
Our strategy compares municipalities that experienced land dispossession with mu-
nicipalities without land dispossessions. Following the matching methodologies that
create pairs based on the observables characteristics, we need to show that the pairs
of neighbours do not differ significantly on the relevant observable characteristics.
We estimate a standards OLS neighbour-pair fixed effect regression to show the re-
lationship of different observables characteristics on land dispossession. In our case,
presence of floods could be determined by geographical conditions.
Gd = φ+ β2Fd + δd,nd + d
Gnd = φ+ β2Fnd + δd,nd + nd
In equation (X), Gg,i is any geographical variable such as altitude, soil fertility,
land flatness or erosion. Table 32 shows no difference between the different pairs
of neighbors when we take into account observable characteristics such as altitude
and land flatness index. The only geographical variable that seems to differ between
neighbors is soil fertility index.
7.4 Results
Table 29 documents the first stage relationship between 1914-1946 floods and land
dispossessions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and all columns include
neighbors-pair fixed effects. Column 1 and 2 uses a dummy and column 3 and 4 uses
the log of of land dispossessions. In both cases, the correlation between floods and
land dispossessions between 1914-1946 is statistically significant at the one percent
level, with a somewhat stronger relationship in the log case without controls (first
stage F-statistic of 201.78) than when we include controls (first stage F-statistic of
23.01).
The introduction of geographical controls reduces the magnitude of the correla-
tion from 0.61 to 0.23 in the dummy case and from 0.32 to 0.13 in the log case, but
the estimates remain highly significant. Column 2 indicates that municipalities that
experienced floods during 1914-1946 have a 17% higher probability of experiencing
land dispossessions during the same period. Overall, the first stage results show
that the presence of floods is associated with a 15-17% higher likelihood of having
land dispossessions during the same period (1890-1946).
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The instrumental variable approach will estimate the impact of land disposses-
sions on rebel activities for those municipalities that were induced by a flood to
experience land dispossessions. We can not observe whether landlords in a given
municipality grabbed a peasant’s land in response to floods, Table 30 sheds light on
which sorts of municipalities were influenced by the floods by examining the size of
the first stage for different sub-samples.
Column 1 reports the baseline first stage relationship from the full sample, re-
producing column 2 of Table 29. Column 2 limits the sample to municipalities in
which the share of land owners working the land is higher than the median share,
and column 3 limits the sample to municipalities that are below the median. The
coefficient on floods in the full sample is 0.399 (s.e = 0.054). This coefficient is 0.453
for places above the median and 0.338 below the median. Both are statistically
different than zero, and they are not statistically distinguishable from each other.
Columns 4 and 5 divide the sample by whether a municipality had a higher
number of land credits during the years 1958-1962 than the median municipality
(which is equal to 0). The correlation between floods and land dispossessions is
statistically significant in both sample and the size of coefficients are very similar.
Next, column 6 and 7 divide the sample by whether the municipality had a higher
daily wage in 1968 relative to the median municipality. The relationship between
floods and land dispossessions is large and highly statistically significant for both
samples. Finally, column 8 and 9 divide the sample by whether the municipality had
a higher number of public land allocations to peasants between 1930-1960 than in
the median municipality. The correlation between land dispossessions and floods is
statistically significant in both sample but is substantially larger in the municipalities
the higher land reform, at 0.185, than in the lower land reform.
Overall, these results indicate that floods led to land dispossessions in munici-
palities with a wide variety of initial characteristics, and that this relationship was
particularly pronounced in municipalities where peasants received more public lands.
Identification requires floods between 1914 and 1946 to be as if randomly as-
signed. In this sense, in the absence of differences in floods during these years,
municipalities that suffered floods would not have been different on average from
municipalities that experienced floods. To shed light on the plausibility of this as-
sumption, table 40 regresses a variety of outcomes from the agricultural census in
1960, the Population census in 1964 and the agricultural census in 1970 on floods,
measured as a binary variable during 1914-1946. The sample sizes are different
across outcomes, as there is no information for all municipalities in the different
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census.
For comparison purposes, column 1 reports the first stage relationship between
floods and land dispossessions from table 29. The dependent variable in column
2 is the percentage of the municipal population that read and write in 1964. The
dependent variable in column 3 is the log of the total number of houses in 1960. The
dependent variable in column 4 is the log of the total number of properties that had
irrigation in 1960. The dependent variables in column 5 and 6 are the km of roads
and railroads in 1970.
The correlations between these outcomes and floods are all statistically insignif-
icant. The magnitudes of these relationships also tend to be smaller, relative to
the sample mean, than the magnitude of the relationship between floods and land
dispossessions.
8 Rebel activity
This section uses an instrumental variable approach to test whether land disposses-
sions affected the consolidation of guerrilla groups in the years following the Cuban
revolution and the civil war "La Violencia". The most important guerrilla move-
ment in Colombia, FARC, formed in 1964 as the military wing of the Colombian
Communist Party. In the late 1960s, the FARC was a relative marginal force with
internal divisions but by the end of 1970s, social and political support for the guer-
rillas peaked, nourished by the lack of space for political participation. By 1983,
the FARC had more than eighteen fronts and added the title of "the people’s army"
to their name. We find that land dispossessions were concentrated in municipalities
where FARC was stronger.
The estimates we have presented so far assume that any difference in the presence
of historical land dispossession (1914-1946) across municipalities is conditionally
uncorrelated with unobservables that vary within the pairs land dispossession/non
land dispossession pair. We exploit the exogenous variation in the presence of natural
disasters during the export boom (1914-1946) as an instrument for the presence
of historical land dispossession during this period. Table 33 tests whether land
dispossessions between 1914-1946 influenced the rebel activity of FARC during the
years that the movement consolidated (1974-1985), using both the dummy and the
log of FARC rebel activities as the dependent variable. Column 2 and 4 report the
IV estimates, and for comparison column 1 and 3 report the OLS estimates. The
presence of floods during 1914-1946 is used as the instrument. All the estimates
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control for geographical variables and the presence of floods during the following
decades (1947-1985).
Overall, Table 33 provides evidence that land dispossessions during the export
boom (1914-1946) led to increased FARC rebel activities during the early stage of
conflict. The IV estimates in column 2 indicate that the presence of land disposses-
sion produced a 61% percentage point (s.e=0.122) change in the probability that a
rebel activity occurs, relative to the sample mean of 26.5 percent. Similarly, column
4 document that the presence of land dispossession produced a 81% change in the
number of rebel activities.
Table 34 documents the results when we divide the sample depending on the
land reform intensity. Column 1 reports the baseline second stage relationship from
the full sample. When we focus attention on municipalities where land reform -
number of public lands allocated to peasants- between 1961 to 1970 was above the
median, the estimated effect is 96.5 percentage points, and this effect is statistically
significant at the one percent level. In contrast, the impact of land dispossession
is smaller and not statistically different from zero in the sample below the median
land reform.
The process of claiming the titles for the lands the settlers occupied was not
easy, since it was costly and landowners used their local influences to prevent them
from doing so. Cultivated lands were targeted because lands were only valuable
and ready for production after they had been cleaned from shrubs and tilled, and
because seizing them from cultivators was the only way of ensuing their labor. The
strategy used by landowners was to wait until the settlers prepared the land for
cultivation and thereby increased its value; then claim it and force settlers to become
hacienda tenants under the threat that they would otherwise be evicted without
compensation.
The IV estimates are larger than the OLS estimates. There are different reasons
to explain this result. First, because of measurement error in the land dispossession
variable. This reason is plausible since we only have information about the reported
cases of land dispossessions that peasants reported during 1914-1946. It is likely
that some cases were not reported by peasants since this could be an expensive
process in terms of money and time.
Second, because of omitted variables bias in the OLS specification. This is also
likely since we are mainly controlling for geographical variables and some political
or land-related variables but there might other variables that could explain the land
dispossessions that we are not capturing in our OLS specification.
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Third, because the IV is measuring a local average treatment effect on munici-
palities induced to land dispossession by floods whereas the OLS is just measuring
a correlation between the FARC rebel activity and the land dispossession across
the entire sample. When we examine the estimates across different sub-samples
(see Table 30), the land dispossession coefficient is not substantially different in the
different sub-samples. We do not find any significant difference across subsamples.
Finally, because floods violates the IV exclusion restriction. This is unlikely since
the instrument is uncorrelated with different pre-determined characteristics.
9 Mechanisms
Using the analysis of mediation methodology proposed by Dippel et al 2017, we de-
compose the total effect of land dispossessions (estimated through the instrumental
variable) into the effect produced by those dispossessions in isolation, on one hand,
and the indirect effect produced through the mediating variable, on the other hand.
For the mediators we focus on the military feasibility and the political support to
rebellion. The military feasibility has been previously proposed by Collier, Hoeﬄer
and Rohner (2009) as a factor that might trigger conflict. Rebel groups need to
have military training and capacity in order to counteract the state actions and
consolidate their territory. We use as a proxy of military feasibility being exposure
to the civil war "La Violencia" during 1948-1958. The civil war was a result of
discord between Colombia’s two political parties, Conservative and Liberals, that
triggered a breakdown of existing institutional structures and a partial collapse of the
state. As a result of the chaotic environment and of the provisional access to military
weaponry, liberal and conservative peasants organize self-defense groups leading to
the formation of different guerrilla movements. The variable "La Violencia" is a
binary variable that takes value 1 if the municipality experienced a violent event
during the civil war and 0 otherwise.
The political support to rebellion is based on the guidance and support that
the Communist Party gave to movements and peasants leagues in rural areas in
Colombia. In particular, after the Cuban Revolution the political approval of the
rebel groups by the Communist Party was indispensable. Although the influence
of this party seems unobservable nationwide since it coincides with a period of
apparent political exclusion (the National Front); the impact and penetration of the
communist ideology was higher in rural areas and it was latent in particular after the
revolution in the island ended. For instance, FARC was considered the military wing
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of the Colombian Communist Party. We then use as a proxy of the political support
to rebellion the share votes that the radical left-wing parties obtained during the
presidential election in 1946, when all radical parties (Communist, Maoist, Socialist
and radical liberal) supported one candidate.
We divide the estimation of the mediation effect in two steps. First, we estimate
the effect on land dispossessions on the mediators, M : La Violencia and Communist
support, our two proxies for military feasibility and political support to rebellion
using the instrumental variable approach. We then estimate the following equation:
Md = θ1Land_dispossed + θ2xd + δd,nd + µd
Mnd = θ1Land_dispossend + θ2xnd + δd,nd + µnd
where M is either a dummy for the exposure to the civil war La Violencia or the
share of votes that the Communist parties obtained during the presidential elections
in 1946. θ1 is our estimator for the effect of land dispossessions on these mediators.
Land dispossessions Land_disposse, control variables x and instrument Floods are
the same as the ones used to estimate the effect of land dispossessions on rebel ac-
tivity in the original equation. We just replace the rebel activity with the mediators
as dependent variable.
The OLS results are displayed in column 1 and the IV results in column 2 of
Table 35. Panel A reports the estimates when the mediator is the Communist vote
share in 1946 and Panel B when the mediator is the binary variable of exposure to
civil war (1948-1958). Each panel also presents the first stage results.
Land dispossession during the export boom (1914-1946) has a significantly posi-
tive effect on the Communist support and on the exposure to civil war. The presence
of land dispossessions generates an increase of 23 percentage points in vote share that
communists obtained in 1946. Similarly, the presence of land dispossessions between
1914-1946 produce a 41 percentage point change in the probability of participating
in the civil war during 1948-1958. These results are consistent with the qualitative
literature that has highlighted the role of peasant grievances as a mechanism to
capture support for revolutionary causes in the rural areas.
We also decompose the effect of land dispossessions on the mediators by inten-
sity of land reform during 1961-1970. Table 36 reports the IV results for different
samples. Column 1 documents the results for the full sample, column 2 for the sub-
sample that includes only municipalities that experienced higher land reform during
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the years 1961-1970 than the median and column 3 for the pairs that had low land
reform on the same years. The impact of land dispossessions is not statistically
different from zero in both sub-samples. However, when we focus only on those
municipalities that experienced high land reform intensity, the estimated effect is
30 percentage points, and this effect is statistically significant at the one percent
level. In contrast, the impact of land dispossessions on the communist support on
those municipalities that experienced low intensity of land reform is negative and
not statistically significant.
We are interested in understanding to what extent the communist support and
the participation in civil war mediate the causal relationship between land dispos-
sessions and FARC rebel activity.The next step is to identify the causal mechanism
underlying the effect of land dispossessions on FARC rebel activities. For this pur-
pose, we need to decompose the total effect of land dispossessions on FARC rebel
activities (estimated by β1), into and "indirect" effect that works through the two
mediators -military feasibility and political support to rebellion- and a residual "di-
rect" effect.
To decompose β1 into a direct and an indirect effect of land dispossessions on
FARC rebel activity, we also need to estimate the effect of the mediators (γ2) and
land dispossessions (γ1) on the rebel activities when we include as controls the
mediators. We run two different instrumental variable regressions. The first stage
now uses as dependent variable the mediators and the original independent variable
is instrumented and takes the following form:
Md = α1Floodsd + α2Land_dispossed + α3xd + δd,nd + ηd
Mnd = α1Floodsnd + α2Land_dispossend + α3xnd + δd,nd + ηnd
where M is any of the both mediators: dummy of La Violencia or Communist
support in 1946. These equations differ from the preliminary first stage equation in
that land dispossession is now included.
The second stage equation uses as dependent variable the outcome of interest,
Rebel_act, the mediator is instrumented and the original independent variable is
included as a control. We estimate the following equation:
Rebel_actd = γ1Land_dispossed + γ2Md + γ3xd + ζd,nd + ξd
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Rebel_actnd = γ1Land_dispossend + γ2Mnd + γ3xnd + ζd,nd + ξnd
We are now interested in the casual effect of the mediators M on the rebel activity
instead of the effect of land dispossessions on the rebel activity. Table 37 reports the
estimates of the second stage. Estimate γ2 gives the effect of the mediators military
feasibility and political support to rebellion on rebel activity over the period 1974-
1985. The variable M is either the communist vote share in 1946 or a dummy for
exposure to the civil war "La Violencia". Results indicate that increases in the
communist vote share or having participated in the civil war produce a positive
change in the probability that a municipality experience a FARC rebel event.
The indirect effect of the independent variable on the outcome produced through
the mediator is obtained by multiplying the IV estimator of the independent vari-
able on the outcomes in the second regression. The direct effect produced by the
independent variable is the estimator of that variable (used as control) in the sec-
ond regression. The total effect should be equal to the sum of the indirect and the
direct effects. This implies that the effect of land dispossessions-military feasibility
and land dispossessions-political support to rebellion on rebel activity, that is the
mediated effect of Land_disposse on Rebel_act, can be derived by multiplying γˆ2
by θˆ1. This is equivalent to combine table 37 with column 2 in Table 35. The im-
plied magnitude of the indirect effect γˆ2 ∗ θˆ1 is 0.773 (3.318*0.233) in the case of the
communist support and 0.683 (3.318*0.233) in the case of presence of La Violencia.
The direct effect of land dispossession on FARC rebel activities that is unrelated
to communist support or participation in the civil war is given by γˆ1 and is equal to
-0.155 and -0.065 respectively in table 37. This direct effect on rebel activity is in
fact moderating. Disregarding the communist support or the presence of civil war,
increasing in land dispossessions decreases the presence of rebel activities. This
estimate is significant in the case of the Communist support (Panel A) and not
statistically significant in the case of the La Violencia (Panel B). The estimated
effects of -0.155 and -0.065 implies that direct effect is almost null compared to the
total effect of 0.617 reported in table 33.
The mediation analysis shows that the total effect of land dispossessions on
FARC rebel activities in the early stage of conflict consists of a large effect that
runs through the communist support and La Violencia mechanisms. However, we
should be cautious about the interpretation on the size of the coefficients since
the endogenous variable (land dispossession) has measurement error. These results
also indicate that γˆ2 ∗ θˆ1 is larger than β1, which means that the communists and
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exposure to violence have stronger implications for the consolidation of FARC during
the following decades than just a simple study of the land dispossession on FARC
activities.
10 Concluding remarks
This study identifies how peasants’ land dispossessions during the export boom
1914-1946 affected subsequent guerrilla movement organization and consolidation by
using floods as an instrument for land dispossessions, conditional on municipality-
pair fixed effects and geographical controls. Instrumental variables estimates doc-
ument that municipalities that had land dispossessions experienced substantially
more FARC rebel activities in the years following the civil war La Violencia.
Based on quantitative and historical evidence, we hypothesize that the rise of
peasant grievances after experiencing land dispossessions during the export boom
period facilitated the consolidation of the rural guerrilla movement FARC. But the
manifestation of grievances in a guerrilla could only be manifested after peasants
had access to military armies and with the support of a revolutionary political party.
This study highlights the potential agrarian causes of the civil war that Colombia
lived for more than 30 years and supports a view of history in which grievances
persist over time and manifest when there is a window of opportunity to organize
and transform these grievances into a material revolutionary representation that will
challenge the status quo.
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Conclusion
A number of conclusions on the two topics of democratization and redistribution and
on the causes of civil conflict in Colombia emerge from the three essays presented in
this thesis. In chapter one and two, the thesis investigates two forms of democratiza-
tion -defined as a continuous process- and their relationship with redistribution and
politicians’ behavior. Chapter one estimates the effect of a type of democratic re-
form -organization and political participation of a peasant movement- on broad and
targeted redistribution in Colombian municipalities during the years of a potential
threat of a Communist revolution (1957-1985). It shows that in those municipalities
were the peasants were empowered -an association getting legal entitlement- broad
redistributive variables decrease during the years that the government supported
the peasant movement (1967-1972), while simultaneously targeted redistribution in-
creased. The chapter proposes the drivers of the increase in targeted redistribution:
more public jobs in municipalities empowered and more public lands for the peasant
leaders. It also provides suggestive evidence of the negative correlation between the
co-optation of the peasant leaders and the public disorders events that Colombia
experienced during the 1970s and 1980s.
These results are consistent with previous findings in the autocracy case that have
suggested the strategies of the government to co-opt leaders of opposite groups by
providing them with rent-seeking opportunities. The findings of this paper, insofar
as they provide evidence on the effects of democratization on targeted redistribution
and the effectiveness of this strategy during times of a threat of revolution, have
important implications for theories of conflict, democratization and redistribution.
If governments recognize that to avoid public disorder, targeted redistribution to
well-connected social movements leaders can be more successful than reforms aimed
at increasing broad redistribution, particularistic benefits to the leaders become
more likely despite increases in inequality with the threatening group.
Chapter two explores how the change in electoral legislation in 1936, regarding
the characteristics of voters in terms of income and literacy, affects fiscal policy in
electoral periods. The results suggest that before the electoral legislature was re-
formed in 1936, total expenditure increased in pre-electoral periods and this increase
was due mainly to higher infrastructure spending. This pattern changed after 1936,
since when total expenditure has increased only in the election year. This pattern
was driven by higher social expenditure. Another important conclusion is in terms
of the timing and the size of the political budget cycles. In the first period, the
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expenditure cycle existed only in pre-electoral years (one year and two years before
elections) while in the second period, this cycle only existed during election years.
The magnitude of the coefficients also indicates that the cycle was stronger in the
first period than in the second one. This could be explained, in part, by the greater
flexibility that the government had to control and manipulate the budget and to
the existence of fewer government monitoring agencies. The chapter also has some
findings in terms of the revenues cycle. Total revenues increased before 1936 in
pre-electoral periods, due to an increase in indirect taxes, but this trend disappears
after 1936. Hence, the higher expenditure in electoral year in the second period must
have been financed with debt. These findings are consistent with the literature.
Finally, chapter 3 studies how peasants’ land dispossessions during the export
boom (1914-1946) affected subsequent guerrilla movement organization and con-
solidation by using floods as an instrument for land dispossessions, conditional on
municipality-pair fixed effects and geographical controls. Instrumental variables
estimates indicate that municipalities that had land dispossessions experienced sub-
stantially more FARC rebel activities in the years following the civil war La Violencia
(1974-1985). In this chapter, we propose two mechanisms through which old land
dispossessions are likely to determine the origin of guerrilla groups. On the one
hand, the military feasibility that is viable during civil war periods when peasants
groups had access to weapons and military equipment. On the other hand, the
ideological political of rebellion developed by the guidance and support of the revo-
lutionary parties that may trigger peasants grievances, generate political awareness
among the peasantry and foster the formation of rebel groups. Using a mediation
analysis, we decompose the total effect of land dispossessions on the conflict into
the direct and indirect effect. Results indicate that a large part of this effect runs
through the communist support and La Violencia mechanism.
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Table 1: Franchise extension, Peasant movements, Land reforms and Guerrilla
movements.
Communist Party Franchise Land Peasant Movement Land Guerrilla
foundation extension reform I foundation reform II movements
Argentina 1918 1916 1970(ERP)
Ecuador 1925 1924 1968 1965-1975
Peru 1928 1931 1960 1964-1968 1964(APRA)
Brazil 1922 1932 1960 1962-1964
Chile 1922 1934 1967 1962-1967
Colombia 1930 1936 1936 1967 1961-1971 1964 (FARC/ELN)
Venezuela 1931 1945 1945-1948 1959 1958-1968 1963(FALN)
Costa Rica 1931 1949 1969 1961
Bolivia 1950 1952 1953 1952 1953
Uruguay 1920 1927
Mexico 1919 1947 1934
Panama 1930 1941 1961 1962
El Salvador 1930 1950 1961
Nicaragua 1967 1955 1979 1961(FSLN)
Guatemala 1922 1946 1950 1952-1954 1962(FAR)
Dominican Republic 1939 1942 1962 1962
Cuba 1925 1940
Chile: Confederacion Triunfo.
Colombia: Asociacion Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos (ANUC).
Venezuela: National Peasant Federation.
Costa Rica: Federacion Nacional Unitaria de trabajadores agricolas y de campesinos.
Panama: 1 Liga campesina en Carrizal (congreso campesino).
Guatemala: National confederation of Guatemala.
Ecuador: Federacion Nacional de Organizacion Campesina (FENAC).
Peru: Rural workers federation of Peru (FENCAP).
Brazil: Parana peasant league and National Confederation of Agricultural workers.
El Salvador: Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista (ORDEN).
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Table 2: Legal Status and Legal Entitlement
Municipal Peasant Associations
Year Legal Status Legal Entitlement
1961 0 0
1962 0 0
1963 0 0
1964 0 0
1965 0 0
1966 0 0
1967 0 0
1968 48 0
1969 225 1
1970 246 408
1971 95 123
1972 30 20
1973 0 0
1974 0 0
1975 0 0
Total 644 552
Notes: The full sample includes 1088 municipalities and the data includes the years 1957-1975.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev
A. Public Finance (in real terms and logs)
Total Revenue 16994 13.5 1.61
Land Tax revenue 16870 12.2 1.59
Sales Tax revenue 16868 10.7 1.93
Capital revenue 13428 11.0 2.24
Central Transfers 16486 11.2 1.88
Total Expenditure 16774 12.8 1.57
Social Expenditure 15697 10.3 2.01
Tax Collection Expenditure 16302 10.4 1.92
Bureaucratic Expenditure 16493 11.7 1.69
Economic Promotion Expenditure 10334 11.2 1.92
Debt 2582 11.2 2.19
B. Peasant Municipal Associations
Legal Status (dummy) 1088 0.62 0.49
Legal Entitlement (dummy) 1088 0.54 0.42
C. Public Land allocated to Peasants
Public Lands (Plots) 20596 5.16 25.34
Public Lands Has (in thousands and logs) 20596 0.02 0.14
D. Co-optation Variables
Peasant Leaders (dummy) 1094 0.20 0.40
Peasant Leaders 1094 0.55 1.27
Land Share- Peasant Leaders 1094 0.02 0.07
E. Other Variables
Income Shocks 20520 9.16 9.02
Vote Share Leftist Parties (1946) 1085 0.30 0.30
Peasant Campaign Budget (in thousands, real terms) 19 30342 44365
Peasant Leagues (1914-1947) 1090 0.76 6.25
Union Members (1914-1947) 1090 152.4 1449.2
Peasant Union Members (1914-1947) 1090 13.75 78.5
Slaves Palenques (1650-1851, dummy) 1097 0.03 0.21
Indigenous Resguardos (1531-1851, dummy) 1097 0.18 0.38
Daily Wage (1968, log) 877 2.71 0.30
Tractors (1960) 871 18.33 93.88
No land owners (%, number, 1960) 808 0.27 0.17
No land owners (%, area, 1960) 807 0.15 0.14
F. Threat of Revolution
La Violencia (dummy) 1047 0.18 0.38
Land Invasions (1971-1978) 1095 0.99 3.22
Rebel Activity (1974-1985) 1046 1.28 12.36
Peasant Protests (1974-1995) 1094 2.75 3.97
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Table 4: The Effect of Legal Entitlement on Broad redistribution 1957-1975 (in
log).
Land Tax Revenues Central transfers Social expenditure
Restricted Restricted Full Restricted Restricted Full Restricted Restricted Full
Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable Mean 12.0 12.0 12.4 11.1 11.1 11.2 10.4 10.4 10.3
Legal Entitlement. -0.136*** -0.233*** -0.241*** 0.083 0.008 0.203* -0.151** -0.198* -0.196***
(0.054) (0.036) (0.047) (0.093) (0.063) (0.062) (0.097) (0.116) (0.059)
Income Shock -0.004 0.002 0.026*** -0.018** -0.015* -0.009 -0.002 -0.014* -0.014
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011)
Observations 11.368 11.368 17.866 11.074 11.074 16.467 10.738 10.738 15.598
Clusters 625 625 1080 621 621 924 616 616 909
Municip. FE X X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X X
State-time trend X X X X X X
Municip-time trend X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Notes: All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in
parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The restricted sample is a municipality-
level panel of 644 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The
explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had
State support (1967-1972) and control group is just receiving legal status during the same period in the restricted sample. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,
*p<0.1.
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Table 5: Legal Entitlement and land tax base, 1957-1972
Rural Rural and Urban
Number Cadastral Number Cadastral
Taxable Plots Value Taxable Plots Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Legal Entitlement 0.172*** 0.143*** 0.103*** 0.133***
(0.031) (0.049) (0.024) (0.048)
Income shock 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 6676 6676 6669 6669
Clusters 595 595 593 593
Municip. FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
State-time trend X X X X
Controls X X X X
Notes: All regressions control for year, municipality and region-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors,
clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Dependent Variables: log of the number of
taxable plots in both rural and urban areas and log of total payable tax in 1957 COP millions.***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 6: The Effect of Legal Entitlement on Targeted redistribution 1957-1975
(in log).
Bureaucratic Expenditure Public Land Allocations
Restricted Restricted Full Restricted Restricted Full
Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Mean 11.4 11.4 11.7 0.04 0.04 0.02
Legal Entitlement 0.252*** 0.376*** 0.173*** 0.013*** 0.009* 0.013***
(0.058) (0.067) (0.037) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Income shock -0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 11.242 11.242 16.493 12.216 12.216 20.520
Clusters 620 620 918 644 644 1080
Municip. FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
State-time trend X X X X
Municip-time trend X X
Controls X X X X
Notes: All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality
level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a
time trend. The restricted sample is a municipality-level panel of 644 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of
observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a
municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had State support (1968-1972)
and control group is just receiving legal status during the same period. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 7: Legal Entitlement and the number of municipal employees, 1957-1972
General Judicial Tax Education Total
Direction System Collection and Health
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Municipalities 0.084* -0.041* -0.052** -0.000 -0.018
Legal entitlement (%) (0.051) (0.024) (0.025) (0.072) (0.032)
Observations 380 380 364 380 364
Clusters 32 32 32 32 32
State Fixed Effect X X X X X
Year Fixed Effect X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
Notes: Dependent variable: number of employees in each section of the municipality (in logs). Explanatory variable:
percentage of municipalities that have legal entitlement in a state relative to the municipalities with legal status. All
regressions control for year and state fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at state level, are presented in
parentheses. The sample is a state-level panel of 32 states for the years 1957-1972.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 8: Matching names of peasant leaders and peasant beneficiaries of the
agrarian reform, 1957-1972 (1088 municipalities)
Allocated land Association Peasant leader Number of
to peasants Legal Entitlement beneficiaries Municipalities
x 462 (=42%)
x x 295 (=63%)
x x x 210 (=71%)
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Table 9: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on
Redistribution (restricted sample).
Broad Redistribution (in log) Targeted Redistribution (in log)
Land Tax Central Social Bureaucratic Public Land
Revenues Transfers Expenditure Expenditure allocations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Legal Entitlement (Baseline) -0.114** 0.096 -0.195** 0.255*** 0.014***
(0.052) (0.099) (0.095) (0.056) (0.005)
A: Communist Support (dummy around the median)
Legal Entitlement -0.073 -0.006 -0.130 0.135*** 0.017***
(0.060) (0.102) (0.112) (0.067) (0.006)
Legal Entitlement * Communist -0.075* 0.123 -0.103 0.191** 0.005
(0.045) (0.093) (0.085) (0.054) (0.006)
Income shock 0.004 -0.020* -0.015* -0.000 -0.000
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.000)
Observations 11.387 11.074 10.738 11.242 12.216
Clusters 625 620 616 620 643
Municip. FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
State-time trend X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
B: "La Violencia" (dummy)
Legal Entitlement -0.068 0.285*** -0.185*** 0.240*** 0.008*
(0.050) (0.087) (0.067) (0.059) (0.005)
Legal Entitlement * "La Violencia" -0.137*** -0.022 -0.271*** 0.098* 0.023**
(0.052) (0.101) (0.061) (0.058) (0.010)
Income shock 0.005 -0.017* -0.020** -0.010 -0.000
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.000)
Observations 11.348 11.019 10.718 11.242 12.102
Clusters 622 616 613 620 637
Municip. FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
State-time trend X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects and state-time trends. Robust standard errors, clustered
at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964)
interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel for the years 1957-1975.The explanatory variable is
the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had
state support (1967-1972) and the interaction of this variable with Communist support in 1946 or the exposure to the civil
war "La Violencia". ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 10: Leaders co-opted
OLS
Leaders Co-opted (1967-1972)
Number Land Share
(1) (2)
A. Geographical Variables
Rainfall (log) -0.065 0.010
(0.169) (0.012)
Altitude (log) 0.031 0.003
(0.083) (0.006)
Temperature 0.026 0.000
(0.021) (0.001)
Area(log) 0.351 -0.011*
(0.076) (0.006)
Distance to Capital 0.141* -0.000
(0.084) (0.006)
B. Economic and Social Variables
Population (1970) (in log) -0.120 0.005
(0.116) (0.008)
No owners Land (%,1960) 0.504 -0.001
(0.364) (0.026)
Tractors (1960) -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Railroads (1960) 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Irrigated lands (1960) -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Daily Wage (log, 1968) 0.626*** 0.001
(0.229) (0.001)
C. Historical and Political Variables
Peasant Leagues (1945) -0.099* 0.002
(0.060) (0.004)
"La Violencia" (dummy) 0.791*** 0.019*
(0.164) (0.011)
Left-wing support (%, elections 1946) 0.547*** 0.036**
(0.214) (0.015)
Land Conflicts (1878-1964) 0.099** 0.003
(0.041) (0.003)
Share votes winner elections (1966) -0.312 -0.000
(0.320) (0.023)
Observations 716 716
R-squared 0.221 0.056
Notes: The dependent variable is either the number of peasant leaders co-opted or the
share of land these leaders received during 1967-1972. The variables are in levels unless
otherwise stated. The variable "Land Reform (1930-1960)" measures the number of plots
given to peasants during these years. The variable "No owners Land" is the share of
farmers that work on a land that is not owned by themselves out of the total number
of farmers (tenants, sharecroppers, settlers, agricultural workers). The variable "Peasant
leagues" measures the number of legal peasant leagues between 1918-1945. The variable
"Tractors" is the number of machines and agricultural workers in a municipality. The
variable d_"La Violencia" takes value 1 if that municipality was affected by this civil
war and 0 otherwise. The variable "Left-wing support" is the share of votes that the left-
wing candidate obtained during the presidential elections in 1946 and the variable "Share
votes winner elections" is the share of votes that the winner obtained in the presidential
elections in 1966". Robust standard errors in brackets.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 11: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on
Redistribution.
Broad Redistribution(in log) Targeted Redistribution (in log)
Land Tax Central Social Bureaucratic Public Land
Revenues Transfers Expenditure Expenditure allocations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Legal Entitlement (Baseline) -0.114** 0.096 -0.195** 0.255*** 0.014***
(0.052) (0.099) (0.095) (0.056) (0.005)
A: Peasant Leagues (Number of peasant leagues legally recognized, 1918-1947)
Legal Entitlement -0.111* 0.109 -0.186* 0.238*** 0.013***
(0.059) (0.101) (0.109) (0.061) (0.005)
Legal Entitlement * Peasant Leagues -0.043 -0.139** -0.162** 0.062 0.002
(0.038) (0.071) (0.073) (0.044) (0.007)
Income shock 0.004 -0.021** -0.015 0.009 -0.000
(0.005) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.000)
Observations 11.387 11.074 10.738 11.242 12.216
Clusters 625 620 616 620 643
Municip. FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
State-time trend X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
B: Colonial Collective Organizations (Slave palenques and Indigenous Resguardos, 1550-1851)
Legal Entitlement -0.124* 0.076 -0.237*** 0.260*** 0.011***
(0.058) (0.102) (0.068) (0.061) (0.005)
Legal Entitlement * Colonial Collective Organization -0.011 -0.062 -0.037 0.008 0.005
(0.048) (0.097) (0.055) (0.052) (0.007)
Income shock 0.004 -0.021** -0.014* 0.009 -0.000
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.000)
Observations 11.387 11.074 10.738 11.242 12.216
Clusters 625 620 616 620 643
Municip. FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
State-time trend X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects and state-time trends. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented
in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel
for the years 1957-1975.The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the
peasant movement had state support (1967-1972). The variable peasantleagues is the number of peasant leagues that were legally recognized between
1918-1947. The variable ColonialCollectiveOrganization takes value 1 if the municipality had a slave palenque or an indigenous resguardo between
1550-1851 and 0 otherwise. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 12: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on
Redistribution.
Broad Redistribution(in log) Targeted Redistribution (in log)
Land Tax Central Social Bureaucratic Public Land
Revenues Transfers Expenditure Expenditure allocations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Legal Entitlement (Baseline) -0.114** 0.096 -0.195** 0.255*** 0.014***
(0.052) (0.099) (0.095) (0.056) (0.005)
A: Wages (dummy around the median, log, 1968)
Legal Entitlement -0.099* -0.024 -0.269*** 0.222*** 0.015***
(0.059) (0.109) (0.104) (0.064) (0.006)
Legal Entitlement *wages (1968) -0.022 0.167* 0.085 0.075 0.002
(0.044) (0.095) (0.086) (0.054) (0.008)
Income shock -0.003 -0.017* -0.000 -0.003 -0.000
(0.004) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.000)
Observations 11.110 10.834 10.452 10.880 11.361
Clusters 598 595 591 593 598
Municip. FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
State-time trend X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
B: Tractors (dummy around the median, 1960)
Legal Entitlement -0.096 0.073 -0.163 0.278*** 0.030***
(0.080) (0.130) (0.135) (0.061) (0.004)
Legal Entitlement *Tractors -0.014 0.020 0.011 0.013 -0.019**
(0.069) (0.115) (0.113) (0.076) (0.008)
Income shock 0.006 -0.023** -0.014 0.009 -0.000
(0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000)
Observations 10.976 10.695 10.504 10.905 11.285
Clusters 593 590 591 593 594
Municip. FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
State-time trend X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects and state-time trends. Robust standard errors, clustered
at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964)
interacted with a time trend. Panel B only includes as a control Population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The
sample is a municipality-level panel for the years 1957-1975. The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal
association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972). The
dummy variable wages takes value 1 if the log daily wage in 1968 is above the median and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable
tractors takes value 1 if the number of tractors in 1960 is above the median and 0 otherwise. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 13: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on
Redistribution.
Broad Redistribution(in log) Targeted Redistribution (in log)
Land Tax Central Social Bureaucratic Public Land
Revenues Transfers Expenditure Expenditure allocations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Legal Entitlement (Baseline) -0.114** 0.096 -0.195** 0.255*** 0.014***
(0.052) (0.099) (0.095) (0.056) (0.005)
A: No owners (dummy number of properties around median, 1960)
Legal Entitlement -0.040 0.000 -0.160 0.362*** 0.019***
(0.058) (0.099) (0.114) (0.063) (0.006)
Legal Entitlement * % no owners -0.063 0.085 -0.017 -0.128*** -0.017**
(0.040) (0.084) (0.087) (0.052) (0.009)
Income shock 0.002 -0.014 -0.002 0.005 -0.000
(0.004) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.000)
Observations 10.390 10.165 10.041 10.355 10.449
Clusters 550 549 550 550 550
Municip. FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
State-time trend X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
B: No owners (dummy area around median, 1960)
Legal Entitlement -0.076 0.050 -0.174 0.299*** 0.007
(0.055) (0.101) (0.111) (0.061) (0.005)
Legal Entitlement * % no owners 0.005 -0.011 0.009 -0.007 0.006
(0.040) (0.085) (0.089) (0.051) (0.007)
Income shock -0.002 -0.015* -0.002 -0.004 -0.000
(0.004) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.000)
Observations 10.390 10.165 10.041 10.335 10.449
Clusters 550 549 550 550 550
Municip. FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
State-time trend X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects and state-time trends. Robust standard errors, clustered
at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964)
interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel for the years 1957-1975.The explanatory variable
is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement
had state support (1967-1972). In panel A, the dummy variable noowner takes value 1 if the share of the total number of
properties that are worked by no land owners in 1960 is above the median and 0 otherwise. In panel B, the dummy variable
noowner takes value 1 if the share of the total area of properties that are worked by no land owners in 1960 is above the
median and 0 otherwise. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 14: OLS: Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972) and
Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).
Land invasions FARC Rebel activity Peasant Protests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Legal Entitlement 0.767* 0.810** 0.761** 0.387 0.694 0.608 0.141 0.069 -0.081
(0.045) (0.392) (0.392) (0.438) (0.494) (0.350) (0.464) (0.471) (0.466)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy) -1.066*** -1.625*** -1.062***
(0.359) (0.372) (0.381)
Peasant leaders co-opted (number) -0.291*** -0.418** -0.272***
(0.074) (0.137) (0.114)
Share land peasant leaders -2.868*** -3.726*** -2.384
(0.859) (1.979) (1.648)
Peasant Leagues (1947) -0.081 -0.100 -0.051 0.688*** 0.676*** 0.731*** -0.172 -0.228 -0.200
(0.161) (0.161) (0.162) (0.167) (0.168) (0.169) (0.171) (0.178) (0.178)
Observations 591 591 591 590 590 590 591 591 591
State Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X X X X
All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation),
population (1964), Communist Support (1946), peasant leagues (1931-1947) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable
land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978 and FARC rebel actions is measured as
the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985.The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if
municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders co-opted takes value
between 0 and 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 15: Negative Binomial: Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972)
and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).
Land invasions FARC Rebel activity Peasant Protests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Legal Entitlement 0.227 0.327 0.120 0.018 0.025 0.066 0.197* 0.182* 0.163
(0.300) (0.285) (0.299) (0.289) (0.290) (0.290) (0.101) (0.100) (0.127)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy) -0.534*** -0.640*** -0.136
(0.218) (0.261) (0.107)
Peasant leaders co-opted (number) -0.385*** -0.145** -0.028
(0.076) (0.077) (0.031)
Share land peasant leaders -3.295*** -1.323 -0.305
(1.754) (1.461) (0.505)
Peasant Leagues (1947) 0.075 0.057 0.086 0.423*** 0.427*** 0.431*** 0.095** 0.096** 0.099***
(0.079) (0.078) (0.080) (0.085) (0.085) (0.081) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041)
Observations 591 591 591 590 590 590 591 591 591
State Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X X X X
All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation),
population (1964), Communist Support (1946), peasant leagues (1931-1947) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable
land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978 and FARC rebel actions is measured as
the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985.The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if
municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders co-opted takes value
between 0 and 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 16: Negative Binomial-IRR: Peasant Empowerment, co-optation
(1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).
Land invasions FARC Rebel activity Peasant Protests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Legal Entitlement 1.256 1.387 1.159 0.981 0.974 0.935 1.236* 1.200* 1.177
(0.76) (1.15) (0.50) (0.06) (0.09) (0.23) (1.66) (1.75) (1.28)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy) 0.586*** 0.526*** 0.845
(-2.48) (-2.45) (-1.58)
Peasant leaders co-opted (number) 0.683*** 0.864** 0.9718
(-4.99) (-1.86) (-0.91)
Share land peasant leaders 0.035*** 0.266 0.736
(-2.02) (-0.91) (-0.60)
Peasant Leagues (1947) 1.078 1.058 1.090 1.527*** 1.533*** 1.539*** 1.073** 1.101** 1.104***
(0.085) (0.082) (0.087) (0.131) (0.130) (0.125) (2.19) (2.28) (2.36)
Observations 591 591 591 590 590 590 591 591 591
State Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X X X X
Z-statistics in parenthesis. All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital,
altitude, precipitation), population (1964), Communist Support (1946), peasant leagues (1931-1947) and land conflicts
(1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978 and FARC rebel
actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985.The variable legal entitlement is a dummy
that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders
co-opted takes value between 0 and 5. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 18: Infrastructure and Social Expenditure.
One and two Years before Elections One year before Elections Election Year One year after Elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Infrastructure Expenditure
Dependent Variable in real terms- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 786339*** 1081e+06*** 849408*** 925953*** -652603** -591678** 44191 119712
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.025) (0.027) (0.851) (0.630)
1937-2000 2044e+06 1664e+06 2643e+06 2381e+06 -2192e+06 -2275e+06 -1151e+06 -47016
(0.192) (0.275) (0.124) (0.160) (0.270) (0.254) (0.612) (0.982)
Dependent Variable in percentage- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 0.047*** 0.053** 0.039* 0.038* -0.025 -0.025 0.003 0.005
(0.007) (0.018) (0.054) (0.092) (0.236) (0.210) (0.844) (0.780)
1937-2000 0.020 0.020 -0.002 -0.001 -0.017 -0.016 -0.004 -0.002
(0.103) (0.110) (0.809) (0.865) (0.137) (0.183) (0.745) (0.887)
Dependent Variable in log- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 -0.584*** -0.568*** -0.697*** -0.680*** 0.313 0.369 -0.002 0.060
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.101) (0.159) (0.988) (0.754)
Dependent Variable: Total Expenditure in percentage- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 -0.055** -0.057** -0.052** -0.051** 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.024
(0.005) (0.009) (0.018) (0.027) (0.466) (0.399) (0.291) (0.216)
B. Social Expenditure
Dependent Variable in real terms- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 68477 57865 93877 79355 -86877 -90439 53058 24812
(0.241) (0.300) (0.148) (0.262) (0.100) (0.136) (0.133) (0.530)
1937-2000 -4991e+06* -5786e+06* -203050 -807854 9527e+06** 8473e+06** -859472 -526477
(0.080) (0.051) (0.933) (0.738) (0.018) (0.026) (0.794) (0.861)
Dependent Variable in percentage- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 0.003 0.000 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.521) (0.925) (0.322) (0.155) (0.369) (0.389) (0.589) (0.674)
1937-2000 0.000 -0.002 0.005 0.004 0.025 0.023 -0.006 -0.002
(0.980) (0.817) (0.489) (0.636) (0.182) (0.241) (0.532) (0.790)
Dependent Variable in log- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 -0.382*** -0.298** -0.262 -0.255 0.436*** 0.414*** -0.217 -0.176
(0.005) (0.037) (0.130) (0.154) (0.002) (0.003) (0.114) (0.167)
Dependent Variable in percentage- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 -0.007 -0.004 0.012 0.015 0.031* 0.029* -0.017 -0.014
(0.674) (0.827) (0.547) (0.465) (0.052) (0.068) (0.363) (0.439)
Controls Included No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Notes: The table reports OLS estimates and p- values of equation 1 and 2. Each cell is a different regression. In a) is reported
β4 coefficient and the dependent variable is Total expenditure in real terms. In b) is reported α4 coefficient and the dependent variable
is Total Expenditure in log. Columns (1) to (8) indicates the timing of the variable "electiont+i" where i−2,−1, 0, 1.Columns (1)
and (2) reports the results when i = −2, columns (3) and (4) when i = −1, columns (5) and (6) when i = 0 and columns (7) and
(8) when i = 1. For each combination of the dependent variable and the election variable we run two type of regressions: without
and with controls. The estimation without controls only includes the "trend" and the "cyclicalcomponent". The estimation with
controls also include the variable "hegemony" that takes the value 1 if the conservative party was in power in year t and 0 if it
was the liberal or a dictator; the variable "war" takes the value 1 if in year t there was a civil war and 0 otherwise; the variable
"constitution" takes the value 1 in the years where a new constitution was established and 0 otherwise, the variable "coup" takes
the value 1 in the years where there was a coup and 0 otherwise, the dummy "d1910" takes the value 1 in 1910 and 0 otherwise and
measures the change from indirect to direct voting system and the variable "d1957" takes the value 1 in 1957 and 0 otherwise and
measure the year that the women’s suffrage was implemented. P-values are reported for the respective tests. *** Denotes significance
at 1% level. ** Denotes significance at 5% level. * Denotes significance at 10% level.
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Table 19: Other Expenditures: Finance and Institutional Expenditure.
One and two Years before Elections One year before Elections Election Year One year after Elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Finance Expenditure
Dependent Variable in real terms- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 42700 83771 6928 12386 -54310 -47484 -91434 -90769
(0.730) (0.482) (0.949) (0.910) (0.738) (0.790) (0.527) (0.557)
1937-2000 -2.614e+06 -508160 -1.039e+07 -9.143e+06 93841 951089 1929327 -1.621e+06
(0.568) (0.8965) (0.152) (0.202) (0.974) (0.736) (0.765) (0.754)
Dependent Variable in percentage- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 -0.009 -0.008 -0.025 -0.023 0.003 0.000 -0.016 -0.014
(0.509) (0.599) (0.142) (0.177) (0.857) (0.972) (0.297) (0.359)
1937-2000 -0.023 -0.021 -0.025 -0.024 -0.015 -0.013 0.013 0.006
(0.156) (0.223) (0.239) (0.283) (0.137) (0.188) (0.478) (0.742)
Dependent Variable in log- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 -0.063 -0.071 -0.081 -0.074 0.061 0.091 -0.015 -0.026
(0.662) (0.622) (0.582) (0.614) (0.677) (0.547) (0.935) (0.887)
Dependent Variable in percentage- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 0.020 0.017 0.023 0.022 -0.009 -0.006 0.018 0.014
(0.304) (0.389) (0.258) (0.289) (0.653) (0.772) (0.422) (0.507)
B. Institutional Expenditure
Dependent Variable in real terms- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 62442 92133 327465 337281 -347450** -288100* -65174 -54561
(0.780) (0.714) (0.408) (0.412) (0.042) (0.068) (0.606) (0.670)
1937-2000 -3.127e+06 -3.130e+06 -1.963e+06 -1.991e+06 1.054e+07 1.076e+07 -3.082e+06 -3.084e+06
(0.505) (0.532) (0.593) (0.602) (0.235) (0.242) (0.400) (0.431)
Dependent Variable in percentage- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 -0.010 -0.008 -0.000 -0.000 -0.022 -0.016 -0.001 0.001
(0.442) (0.542) (0.962) (0.990) (0.134) (0.261) (0.900) (0.933)
1937-2000 -2.84e+05 -0.000 0.002 0.001 0.016 0.016 -0.003 -0.005
(0.998) (0.929) (0.778) (0.850) (0.294) (0.331) (0.693) (0.564)
Dependent Variable in log- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 -0.117 -0.123 -0.257** -0.257** 0.444*** 0.456*** -0.184 -0.191
(0.345) (0.303) (0.032) (0.031) (0.004) (0.003) (0.124) (0.114)
Dependent Variable in percentage- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 0.004 0.000 -0.004 -0.007 0.049** 0.041* -0.013 -0.013
(0.800) (0.958) (0.765) (0.636) (0.038) (0.086) (0.459) (0.447)
Controls Included No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates and p- values of equation 1 and 2. Each cell is a different regression. Column (1) indicates the period
that is included in the estimation. The table presents five panels. Panel A) shows results when dependent variable is Finance Expenditure, panel
B) when is Institutional Expenditure, panel C) when is Defense Expenditure, panel D) when is Debt Expenditure, panel E) when is Deficit. In
each panel: a) reports β4 coefficient when the dependent variable is in real terms. b) reports β4 coefficient when the dependent variable is in
percentage. In c) reports α4 when the dependent variable is in log and in d) reports α4 when the dependent variable is in percentage. Columns
(2) to (9) indicates the timing of the variable ”electiont+i” where i−2,−1, 0, 1.Columns (2) and (3) reports the results when i=-2, columns (4)
and (5) when i=-1, columns (6) and (7) when i=0 and columns (8) and (9) when i=1. For each combination of the dependent variable and the
election variable we run two type of regressions: without and with controls. The estimation without controls only includes the "trend" and the
"cyclical component". The estimation with controls also include the variable "hegemony" that takes the value 1 if the conservative party was in
power in year t and 0 if it was the liberal or a dictator; the variable "war" takes the value 1 if in year t there was a civil war and 0 otherwise; the
variable "constitution" takes the value 1 in the years where a new constitution was established and 0 otherwise, the variable "coup" takes the
value 1 in the years where there was a coup and 0 otherwise, the dummy ”d1910” takes the value 1 in 1910 and 0 otherwise and measures the
change from indirect to direct voting system and the variable ”d1957” takes the value 1 in 1957 and 0 otherwise and measure the year that was
established the women’s suffrage. P-values are reported for the respective tests. *** Denotes significance at 1% level. ** Denotes significance
at 5% level. * Denotes significance at 10% level.
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Table 20: Other Expenditures: Defence and Debt Expenditure and Deficit.
One and two Years before Elections One year before Elections Election Year One year after Elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C. Defence Expenditure
Dependent Variable in real terms- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 68477 57865 93877 79355 -86877 -90439.5 53058 24812
(0.241) (0.300) (0.148) (0.262) (0.100) (0.136) (0.133) (0.530)
1937-2000 -464221 -540081 -1.011e+06 -1.107e+06 -1.595e+06 -1.590e+06 1.864e+06 2.485e+06*
(0.704) (0.671) (0.546) (0.520) (0.134) (0.164) (0.140) (0.061)
Dependent Variable in percentage- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 -0.027 -0.012 0.024 0.035 -0.010 -0.011 0.018 0.029
(0.291) (0.614) (0.410) (0.223) (0.678) (0.672) (0.524) (0.265)
1937-2000 -0.000 0.002 -0.009 -0.007 -0.019** -0.018** 0.018** 0.021**
(0.972) (0.826) (0.351) (0.461) (0.012) (0.014) (0.049) (0.017)
Dependent Variable in log- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 -0.113 -0.126 -0.391** -0.393** 0.067 0.094 -0.000 -0.038
(0.481) (0.410) (0.033) (0.025) (0.656) (0.533) (0.997) (0.830)
Dependent Variable in percentage- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 0.029 0.004 -0.026 -0.031 -0.012 -0.008 -0.004 -0.013
(0.262) (0.341) (0.358) (0.244) (0.636) (0.732) (0.882) (0.631)
B. Debt Expenditure
Dependent Variable in real terms- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 147296 123245 105878 83549 185081 127748 -14657 -72184
(0.337) (0.363) (0.454) (0.550) (0.340) (0.462) (0.926) (0.640)
1937-2000 1.031e+06 1.042e+06 71254 56988 -881411 -881593 -2.799e+06 -2.958e+06
(0.597) (0.609) (0.970) (0.977) (0.639) (0.651) (0.147) (0.139)
Dependent Variable in percentage- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 0.003 -0.004 -0.025 -0.030* 0.040 0.036 -0.018 -0.027
(0.862) (0.832) (0.152) (0.099) (0.105) (0.111) (0.354) (0.189)
1937-2000 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.011
(0.873) (0.910) (0.637) (0.656) (0.495) (0.465) (0.317) (0.292)
Dependent Variable in log- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 -0.113 -0.118 0.026 0.049 -0.190 -0.167 0.025 0.043
(0.456) (0.500) (0.880) (0.783) (0.334) (0.382) (0.879) (0.794)
Dependent Variable in percentage- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 -0.001 0.001 0.037* 0.040* -0.052* -0.049* 0.008 0.014
(0.940) (0.944) (0.082) (0.068) (0.061) (0.062) (0.682) (0.528)
C. Deficit
Dependent Variable in real terms- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 902455 1298273 1684460** 1802758** -929364 -851650 550605 712609
(0.231) (0.105) (0.044) (0.034) (0.247) (0.321) (0.508) (0.410)
1937-2000 1.15e+07 1.24e+07 5515193 6329632 2.15e+07 2.20e+07 -3.79e+07** -4.24e+07**
(0.475) (0.456) (0.769) (0.744) (0.251) (0.254) (0.041) (0.029)
Controls Included No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates and p- values of equation 1 and 2. Each cell is a different regression. Column (1) indicates the period
that is included in the estimation. The table presents five panels. Panel A) shows results when dependent variable is Defense Expenditure, panel
B) when is Debt Expenditure, panel C) when is Deficit. In each panel: a) reports β4 coefficient when the dependent variable is in real terms. b)
reports β4 coefficient when the dependent variable is in percentage. In c) reports α4 when the dependent variable is in log and in d) reports α4
when the dependent variable is in percentage. Columns (2) to (9) indicates the timing of the variable ”electiont+i” where i−2,−1, 0, 1.Columns
(2) and (3) reports the results when i=-2, columns (4) and (5) when i=-1, columns (6) and (7) when i=0 and columns (8) and (9) when i=1. For
each combination of the dependent variable and the election variable we run two type of regressions: without and with controls. The estimation
without controls only includes the "trend" and the "cyclical component". The estimation with controls also include the variable "hegemony"
that takes the value 1 if the conservative party was in power in year t and 0 if it was the liberal or a dictator; the variable "war" takes the
value 1 if in year t there was a civil war and 0 otherwise; the variable "constitution" takes the value 1 in the years where a new constitution was
established and 0 otherwise, the variable "coup" takes the value 1 in the years where there was a coup and 0 otherwise, the dummy ”d1910”
takes the value 1 in 1910 and 0 otherwise and measures the change from indirect to direct voting system and the variable ”d1957” takes the
value 1 in 1957 and 0 otherwise and measure the year that was established the women’s suffrage. P-values are reported for the respective tests.
*** Denotes significance at 1% level. ** Denotes significance at 5% level. * Denotes significance at 10% level.
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Table 22: Revenues: Direct and Indirect taxes.
One and two Years before Elections One year before Elections Election Year One year after Elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Direct Taxes
Dependent Variable in real terms- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 29165 16697 -832.9 -10065 -23805 -29077 -10207 -25365
(0.391) (0.634) (0.967) (0.664) (0.417) (0.377) (0.756) (0.454)
1937-2000 -3247e+06 -1594e+06 -4453e+06 -3427e+06 905584 2087e+06 2275e+06 -1694e+06
(0.289) (0.532) (0.126) (0.202) (0.721) (0.362) (0.651) (0.610)
Dependent Variable in percentage- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 0.005 0.006 -0.004 -0.007
(0.634) (0.440) (0.467) (0.321) (0.454) (0.432) (0.422) (0.268)
1937-2000 0.020 0.023 0.003 0.005 -0.025** -0.024* 0.002 -0.008
(0.183) (0.130) (0.812) (0.738) (0.040) (0.051) (0.907) (0.699)
Dependent Variable in log- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 -0.327* -0.380** -0.286* -0.292 0.272 0.285 -0.033 -0.060
(0.087) (0.039) (0.093) (0.133) (0.442) (0.417) (0.863) (0.759)
Dependent Variable in percentage- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 0.026 0.024 0.004 0.003 -0.029** -0.030** 0.007 0.004
(0.111) (0.154) (0.780) (0.822) (0.049) (0.045) (0.727) (0.831)
B. Indirect Taxes
Dependent Variable in real terms- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 380343** 400812** 573000*** 583665*** -230931 -236192 31238 19279
(0.017) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.250) (0.241) (0.857) (0.920)
1937-2000 2258e+06 1005e+06 7267e+06 6310e+06 -3118e+06 -2685e+06 -3531e+06 -1993e+06
(0.505) (0.771) (0.112) (0.149) (0.467) (0.518) (0.328) (0.573)
Dependent Variable in percentage- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 0.014 0.007 0.010 0.004 -0.017 -0.015 0.020 0.022
(0.500) (0.745) (0.663) (0.857) (0.504) (0.558) (0.369) (0.320)
1937-2000 0.028 0.027 0.036** 0.035* -0.014 -0.015 -0.017 -0.013
(0.114) (0.156) (0.040) (0.052) (0.458) (0.449) (0.447) (0.590)
Dependent Variable in log- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 -0.102 -0.094 -0.108 -0.105 0.048 0.066 -0.071 -0.055
(0.156) (0.182) (0.189) (0.195) (0.609) (0.489) (0.385) (0.515)
Dependent Variable in percentage- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 0.014 0.017 0.020 0.024 0.000 -0.002 -0.041 -0.037
(0.605) (0.522) (0.507) (0.436) (0.975) (0.937) (0.175) (0.245)
Controls Included No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Notes: The table reports OLS estimates and p- values for equation 1 and 2. Each cell is a different regression. Column
(1) indicates the period that is included in the estimation. The table presents five panels. Panel A) shows results when dependent
variable is Direct Taxes, panel B) when is Indirect Taxes, panel C) when is Fees and Fines, panel D) when is National Properties,
panel E) when is Treasury Balance Resources. In each panel: a) reports β4 coefficient when the dependent variable is in real terms.
b) reports β4 coefficient when the dependent variable is in percentage. In c) reports α5 when the dependent variable is in log and in
d) reports α5 when the dependent variable is in percentage. Columns (2) to (9) indicates the timing of the variable "election_t+i"
where i−2,−1, 0, 1.Columns (2) and (3) reports the results when i=-2, columns (4) and (5) when i=-1, columns (6) and (7) when
i=0 and columns (8) and (9) when i=1. For each combination of the dependent variable and the election variable we run two type
of regressions: without and with controls. The estimation without controls only includes the "trend" and the "cyclical component".
The estimation with controls also include the variable "hegemony" that takes the value 1 if the conservative party was in power in
year t and 0 if it was the liberal or a dictator; the variable "war" takes the value 1 if in year t there was a civil war and 0 otherwise;
the variable "constitution" takes the value 1 in the years where a new constitution was established and 0 otherwise, the variable
"coup" takes the value 1 in the years where there was a coup and 0 otherwise, the dummy "d_1910" takes the value 1 in 1910 and
0 otherwise and measures the change from indirect to direct voting system and the variable "d_1957" takes the value 1 in 1957 and
0 otherwise and measure the year that was established the women’s suffrage. P-values are reported for the respective tests. ***
Denotes significance at 1% level. ** Denotes significance at 5% level. * Denotes significance at 10% level. Denotes significance at
5% level. * Denotes significance at 10% level.
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Table 23: Revenues: Other Revenues
One and two Years before Elections One year before Elections Election Year One year after Elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Fees and Fines
Dependent Variable in real terms- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 19425 2572 105388* 106255* 31973 29836 39630 34864
(0.681) (0.963) (0.057) (0.060) (0.606) (0.640) (0.525) (0.581)
1937-2000 -1791e+06** -1621e+06* -160890 -207111 593046 737082 1262e+06 990449
(0.047) (0.090) (0.820) (0.770) (0.599) (0.512) (0.307) (0.464)
Dependent Variable in percentage- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.016* 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002
(0.908) (0.994) (0.134) (0.098) (0.812) (0.991) (0.944) (0.800)
1937-2000 -0.026** -0.025** 0.000 0.001 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.013
(0.010) (0.013) (0.973) (0.929) (0.221) (0.214) (0.190) (0.209)
Dependent Variable in log- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 -0.459** -0.400** -0.203 -0.191 0.154 0.207 0.053 0.110
(0.010) (0.027) (0.312) (0.313) (0.396) (0.255) (0.793) (0.571)
Dependent Variable in percentage- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 -0.026* -0.025* -0.007 -0.008 0.006 0.007 0.011 0.010
(0.055) (0.068) (0.641) (0.612) (0.595) (0.553) (0.415) (0.433)
B. National Properties
Dependent Variable in real terms- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 24735 2501 -19363 -14991 213768 151894 -77263 -95992
(0.784) (0.971) (0.851) (0.884) (0.144) (0.239) (0.459) (0.398)
1937-2000 -1796e+06* -1863e+06* -455630 -455453 708826 644188 1770e+06 1914e+06
(0.064) (0.071) (0.660) (0.678) (0.642) (0.683) (0.284) (0.268)
Dependent Variable in percentage- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 -0.031** -0.023** -0.034** -0.027* 0.045** 0.046*** -0.029** -0.029*
(0.018) (0.021) (0.032) (0.055) (0.011) (0.002) (0.028) (0.081)
1937-2000 0.000 0.000 0.0006 0.006 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.787) (0.807) (0.117) (0.110) (0.702) (0.832) (0.745) (0.912)
Dependent Variable in log- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 -0.134 -0.125 0.100 0.098 -0.363 -0.326 0.411 0.423
(0.515) (0.528) (0.636) (0.640) (0.188) (0.244) (0.140) (0.155)
Dependent Variable in percentage- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 0.033** 0.029** 0.046*** 0.042*** -0.047** -0.047*** 0.032** 0.025*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.017) (0.089)
C. Treasury Balance Resources
Dependent Variable in real terms- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 48624 66534 95392 104242 -137391** -124265** -86112 -75495
(0.501) (0.460) (0.421) (0.413) (0.042) (0.037) (0.174) (0.153)
1937-2000 -2281e+06** -2339e+06** -1559e+06* -1658e+06* -712433 -568370 3860e+06*** 4014e+06**
(0.043) (0.046) (0.086) (0.077) (0.557) (0.645) (0.009) (0.011)
Dependent Variable in percentage- β4 coefficient - Equation 1.
1830-1936 0.008 0.009 0.014 0.015 -0.021 -0.022 -0.016 -0.015*
(0.524) (0.547) (0.493) (0.490) (0.110) (0.103) (0.121) (0.099)
1937-2000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.011* -0.012* -0.003 -0.002 0.011 0.011
(0.520) (0.534) (0.051) (0.056) (0.649) (0.739) (0.155) (0.160)
Dependent Variable in log- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 -0.332 -0.294 -0.663 -0.631 0.497 0.507 0.626 0.727
(0.497) (0.562) (0.275) (0.308) (0.347) (0.334) (0.223) (0.163)
Dependent Variable in percentage- α4 coefficient - Equation 2.
1830-2000 -0.011 -0.011 -0.024 -0.025 0.021 0.022 0.027** 0.028**
(0.439) (0.457) (0.262) (0.270) (0.139) (0.120) (0.029) (0.024)
Controls Included No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Notes: The table reports OLS estimates and p- values for equation 1 and 2. Each cell is a different regression. Column
(1) indicates the period that is included in the estimation. The table presents five panels. Panel A) shows results when dependent
variable is Direct Taxes, panel B) when is Indirect Taxes, panel C) when is Fees and Fines, panel D) when is National Properties,
panel E) when is Treasury Balance Resources. In each panel: a) reports β4 coefficient when the dependent variable is in real terms.
b) reports β4 coefficient when the dependent variable is in percentage. In c) reports α5 when the dependent variable is in log and in
d) reports α5 when the dependent variable is in percentage. Columns (2) to (9) indicates the timing of the variable "election_t+i"
where i−2,−1, 0, 1.Columns (2) and (3) reports the results when i=-2, columns (4) and (5) when i=-1, columns (6) and (7) when
i=0 and columns (8) and (9) when i=1. For each combination of the dependent variable and the election variable we run two type
of regressions: without and with controls. The estimation without controls only includes the "trend" and the "cyclical component".
The estimation with controls also include the variable "hegemony" that takes the value 1 if the conservative party was in power in
year t and 0 if it was the liberal or a dictator; the variable "war" takes the value 1 if in year t there was a civil war and 0 otherwise;
the variable "constitution" takes the value 1 in the years where a new constitution was established and 0 otherwise, the variable
"coup" takes the value 1 in the years where there was a coup and 0 otherwise, the dummy "d_1910" takes the value 1 in 1910 and
0 otherwise and measures the change from indirect to direct voting system and the variable "d_1957" takes the value 1 in 1957 and
0 otherwise and measure the year that was established the women’s suffrage. P-values are reported for the respective tests. ***
Denotes significance at 1% level. ** Denotes significance at 5% level. * Denotes significance at 10% level. Denotes significance at
5% level. * Denotes significance at 10% level.
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Table 24: Road and Rail Lines in Latin America
Country Year Roads, Total Network Year Rail Lines
(Km per person) (Total Route-Km)
Colombia 2009 0.284 2009 1672
Argentina 2003 0.609 2010 25.023
Bolivia 2009 0.822 2009 2.866
Chile 2009 0.474 2010 5.352
Brazil 2004 0.096 2010 29.817
Costa Rica 2009 0.850
Ecuador 2007 0.315
Jamaica 2009 0.821
Mexico 2009 0.327 2010 26.704
Nicaragua 2009 0.385
Paraguay 2008 0.506
Peru 2009 0.440 2010 2.020
Puerto Rico 2008 0.709
Uruguay 2004 2.354 2008 2.993
Venezuela 2008 336
Source: World Bank
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Table 25: Students Enrollment in Primary School/Population
Year Enrollment Primary
School
1827 150
1835 119
1837 152
1838 160
1843 139
1844 138
1845 134
1847 137
1848 137
1850 131
1851 125
1874 269
1882 221
1887 215
1890 206
1891 220
1893 217
1894 211
1896 226
1898 256
1903 259
1905 480
Source: Ramirez and Salazar (2007)
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Table 26: Number of Students enrolled in Primary School
Year Public Private
Schools Schools
1837 21.168 4.903
1838 22.343 6.015
1843 18.359 7.933
1844 19.361 7.763
1845 19.418 7.401
1848 21.511 7.631
1850 21.678 7.143
...
1916 329.573 18.412
...
1950 758.156 50.338
Source: Ramirez and Salazar (2007)
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Table 29: Effects of Land dispossession (1914-1946) on Rebel Activity
(1974-1985): First Stage IV Estimation
Land Dispossession (1914-1946)
Dummy Log
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Floods (1914-1946) 0.617*** 0.399*** 0.600*** 0.326***
(0.048) (0.054) (0.042) (0.068)
Floods (1947-1985) 0.137** 0.188***
(0.054) (0.029)
Distance to Capital -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Altitude -0.022 -0.039
(0.024) (0.026)
Area 0.228*** 0.205***
(0.031) (0.033)
Soil Fertility Index 0.033 0.006
(0.030) (0.032)
Land Flatness Index -0.001 -0.014
(0.013) (0.017)
Erosion Index -0.009 -0.025
(0.031) (0.032)
Population 1960 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Land Reform 1946-1964 0.002*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000)
F-test 161.9 53.69 201.78 23.01
Observations 1758 1758 1758 1758
Number of pairs 879 879 879 879
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 31: Placebo Tests
Land Literate Housing Irrigated Roads Railroads
Dispossessions Rate Lands
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Floods (1914-1946) 0.399*** 0.019 0.010 0.171 0.024 0.211
(0.054) (0.037) (0.048) (0.230) (0.180) (0.196)
F-test 112.9
Observations 1758 1166 1131 775 873 344
Number of pairs 879 786 696 552 661 257
Mean Dep.Var 0.28 0.71 7.29 2.35 9.32 9.35
Floods is a binary variable that takes value 1 if between 1914-1946 a municipality experienced a flood. All columns include geographical control
variables and neighbors-pair fixed effect. The dependent variable in column 1 is land dispossessions, a dummy equal 1 if the municipality
experienced land dispossessions during 1914-1946 and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in column 2 is the literate rate in 1964 (in
percentage), in column 3 is the log of number of housing in 1960, in column 4 is the log of the number of irrigated lands in 1960, in column 5
is the log of km of roads in 1970 and in column 6 is the log of the km of railroads in 1970. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 32: Similarity of neighbors
Altitude (log) Land Flatness Index Soil fertility index
Floods 1914-1946 (log) -0.081 0.027 0.156***
(0.055) (0.085) (0.047)
Observations 1758 1758 1758
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.012
Number of pairs 879 879 879
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 33: Effects of Land dispossession (1914-1946) on FARC Rebel Activity
(1974-1985)
Dummy Log
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Land Dispossession 0.074*** 0.617*** 0.003 0.820***
(0.018) (0.122) (0.034) (0.240)
Floods (1947-1985) 0.147*** 0.058 0.192*** 0.022
(0.031) (0.049) (0.025) (0.066)
Observations 1758 1758 1758 1758
Number of pairs 879 879 879 879
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Table 34: Effects of Land dispossession (1914-1946) on FARC Rebel Activity
(1974-1985)
Dummy
Full More Less
Sample Land Reform 1961-1970
(1) (2) (3)
Land Dispossession 0.617*** 0.965*** 0.790
(0.122) (0.281) (0.965)
Floods (1947-1985) 0.058 0.026 0.037
(0.049) (0.126) (0.171)
Observations 1758 620 378
Number of pairs 879 310 189
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Table 35: Effects of Land dispossession (1914-1946) on Communist Support and
Exposure to "La Violencia"
OLS IV
(1) (2)
Panel A: Communist vote share 1946 (%)
Land dispossessions (dummy) 0.069*** 0.233***
(0.009) (0.050)
First Stage
Floods 1914-1946 (dummy) 0.399***
(0.061)
F-test of excluded instruments 42.27
Panel B: La Violencia (dummy)
Land dispossessions (dummy) 0.085*** 0.416***
(0.019) (0.104)
First Stage
Floods 1914-1946 (dummy) 0.399***
(0.061)
F-test of excluded instruments 42.27
Observations 1758 1758
Geographical controls Yes Yes
Number of Pairs 879 879
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 36: Effects of Land dispossession (1914-1946) on Communist Support and
Exposure to "La Violencia" -Sub sample
Full More Less
Sample Land Reform 1961-1970
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Communist vote share 1946 (%)
Land dispossessions (dummy) 0.233*** 0.306*** -0.189
(0.050) (0.102) (0.321)
First Stage
Floods 1914-1946 (dummy) 0.399*** 0.370*** 0.150
(0.061) (0.098) (0.151)
F-test of excluded instruments 42.27 14.19 0.98
Panel B: La Violencia (dummy)
Land dispossessions (dummy) 0.416*** 0.091 0.546
(0.104) (0.181) (0.708)
First Stage
Floods 1914-1946 (dummy) 0.399*** 0.370*** 0.150
(0.061) (0.098) (0.151)
F-test of excluded instruments 42.27 14.19 0.98
Observations 1758 620 378
Geographical controls Yes Yes Yes
Number of Pairs 879 310 189
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 37: Effects of Land dispossession (1914-1946) and Communist
Support and Exposure to "La Violencia" on FARC Rebel Activity
Rebel Activity 1974-1985 (dummy)
IV
(1)
Panel A: Communist vote share 1946 (%)
Communist vote share 1946 (%) 3.318***
(0.979)
Land dispossessions (dummy) -0.155**
(0.076)
First Stage
Floods 1914-1946 (dummy) 0.069***
(0.017)
Land dispossessions (dummy) 0.061***
(0.009)
F-test of excluded instruments 18.27
Panel B: La Violencia (dummy)
La Violencia (dummy) 1.642***
(0.476)
Land dispossessions (dummy) -0.065
(0.053)
First Stage
Floods 1914-1946 (dummy) 0.139***
(0.037)
Land dispossessions (dummy) 0.069***
(0.020)
F-test of excluded instruments 14.22
Observations 1758
Geographical controls Yes
Number of Pairs 879
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Figure 1: Months between Legal Status and Legal Entitlement
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Figure 2: Municipalities with legal entitlement and legal status (only), 1967-1972
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Figure 3: Pre-trends of broad and targeted redistribution, 1957-1966
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Figure 4: Evolution of broad and targeted redistribution, 1963-1973
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Figure 5: Distribution of Individual Public land allocations by area, 1967-1972
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
D
en
si
ty
0 5 10 15 20
Area (in has)
(a) Municipalities with Legal Entitlement
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
D
en
si
ty
0 5 10 15 20
Area (in has)
(b) Municipalities with Legal Status
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
D
en
si
ty
0 5 10 15 20
Area (in has)
(c) Municipalities without Legal
Entitlement or Status
145
Figure 6: Land share of peasant leaders and Communist support (1946)
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Figure 7: Land Invasions 1971-1978
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Figure 8: Land Dispossessions 1914-1946 by year
148
Figure 9: Land Dispossessions 1914-1946 Intensity Distribution
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11 Appendix A: Empirical Appendix
Table 38: Descriptive Statistics for treatment (legal entitlement) and control
groups before treatment (1957-1966).
Treatment Control-Full sample Control-Restricted sample
532 municipalities 556 municipalities 92 municipalities
Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev
Land Tax revenues (logs) 12.4 1.31 12.0 1.59 12.1 1.46
Central Transfers (logs) 11.2 0.69 11.0 1.98 11.1 1.66
Social Expenditure (logs) 10.3 1.6 10.5 1.92 10.4 1.56
Bureaucratic Expenditure (logs) 11.7 1.31 11.6 1.69 11.3 1.36
Public Lands Has (in thousands and logs) 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.08
Notes: All revenues and expenditure are in log. Variable on Public Land allocations are expressed in thousands of has
and logs.
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Table 39: Pre-treatment: The Effect of Legal Entitlement on Redistribution
1957-1966
Broad Redistribution (in log) Targeted Redistribution (in log)
Land Tax Revenues Central Transfers Social Expenditure Bureaucratic Expenditure Public Land Allocations
Restricted Full Restricted Full Restricted Full Restricted Full Restricted Full
Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dummy Legal Entitlement -0.017 0.115 0.157 0.198 0.013 0.044 0.015 0.029 0.003 0.317
(0.146) (0.109) (0.165) (0.092) (0.166) (0.049) (0.167) (0.022) (0.007) (0.194)
Income shock -0.000 0.026*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 0.006 0.003 -0.000 -0.000 0.005
(0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.000) (0.009)
Observations 5.347 8.151 5.293 8.643 5.122 7.994 5.280 8.185 5.560 10.800
Clusters 545 859 541 886 533 858 538 864 556 1080
Year FE X X X X X X X X X X
State-time trend X X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Note: All regressions control for year fixed effect and state specific-time trend. Regressions include geographical, economic and social variables. Robust standard
errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The full sample is a municipality-level panel of 1080 municipalities and the restricted sample is a
municipality-level of 644 municipalities for the years 1957-1966. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The dummy
explanatory variable takes value 1 if the municipal association received legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972) and
0 if only got legal status. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 40: Placebo test: The Effect of Legal Entitlement on Redistribution
1957-1966
Broad Redistribution (in log) Targeted Redistribution (in log)
Land Tax Revenues Central Transfers Social Expenditure Bureaucratic Expenditure Public Land Allocations
Restricted Full Restricted Full Restricted Full Restricted Full Restricted Full
Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dummy Legal Entitlement 0.020 0.094*** 0.052 0.065 -0.007 0.001 0.025 0.028 -0.000 0.008***
(0.030) (0.024) (0.056) (0.043) (0.039) (0.031) (0.026) (0.190) (0.003) (0.002)
Income shock 0.004 -0.003 -0.017** -0.014** -0.009 -0.006 0.003 0.002 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 5.854 8.658 5.811 8.643 5.507 8.006 5.707 8.322 6.430 10.800
Clusters 603 891 596 886 582 858 591 873 643 1.080
Municip. FE X X X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X X X
State-time trend X X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Note: All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effect and state specific-time trend. Regressions include geographical, economic and social variables. Robust
standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The legal entitlement years are shifted from 1969-1972 to 1960-1963. The full sample is a
municipality-level panel of 1080 municipalities and the restricted sample is a municipality-level of 644 municipalities for the years 1957-1966. The number of observations
vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 41: Legal Entitlement (1967-1972)
OLS Probit
Full Sample Restricted Sample Full Sample Restricted Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Geographical Variables
Rainfall (log) -0.084* 0.007 -0.268* 0.057
(0.048) (0.036) (0.164) (0.216)
Altitude (log) -0.069*** -0.005 -0.297*** -0.029
(0.017) (0.017) (0.099) (0.096)
Temperature -0.007 -0.004 -0.049** -0.034
(0.006) (0.005) (0.024) (0.033)
Area(log) 0.005 0.011 -0.003 0.070
(0.024) (0.016) (0.074) (0.093)
Distance to Capital -0.000** -0.007 -0.086 -0.036
(0.000) (0.017) (0.083) (0.110)
B. Economic and Social Variables
Population (log, 1964) 0.135*** 0.034 0.431*** 0.207
(0.035) (0.026) (0.126) (0.163)
Land reform (1930-1960) (plots) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
No owners Land (%,1960) -0.071 0.026 -0.284 0.135
(0.104) (0.092) (0.348) (0.506)
Tenants (%,1960) 0.059 0.065 0.262 0.352
(0.103) (0.084) (0.382) (0.432)
Tractors (log, 1960) 0.034*** 0.006 0.097*** 0.048
(0.011) (0.008) (0.039) (0.051)
Workers (log, 1960) 0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.031
(0.022) (0.013) (0.067) (0.078)
Daily Wage (1968) 0.006 0.005 0.017 0.028
(0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.023)
Coffee Lands (1960) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Banana Lands (1960) 0.000 -0.000 0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Railroads (log, 1960) 0.000 0.000 0.026 -0.007
(0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.021)
Roads (log, 1960) 0.007 0.002 0.022 0.016
(0.004) (0.004) (0.018) (0.023)
Housing (log, 1960) -0.028*** -0.007 -0.130*** -0.077
(0.006) (0.005) (0.038) (0.055)
Irrigated lands (1960) -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Literacy rate(1964) 0.003 0.014 0.002 0.010
(0.022) (0.088) (0.016) (0.078)
C. Historical and Political Variables
Peasant Leagues (1945) 0.022 0.011 0.073 0.012
(0.019) (0.012) (0.067) (0.090)
d_"La Violencia" 0.050 0.068** 0.182 0.478*
(0.044) (0.038) (0.141) (0.262)
Left-wing support (%, elections 1946) 0.219*** -0.061 0.701*** -0.321
(0.057) (0.054) (0.182) (0.277)
Share votes winner elections (1966) 0.123 -0.013 0.340 -0.015
(0.092) (0.075) (0.283) (0.421)
Observations 745 507 745 507
R-squared 0.172 0.037 0.165 0.062
Note: In the full sample the dependent variable takes value 1 if the municipality got legal entitlement between
1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. In the restricted sample the dependent variable takes value 1 if the municipality got
legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 if only got legal status. The variables are in levels unless otherwise
stated. The variable "Land Reform (1930-1960) measures the number of plots given to peasants during these years.
The variable "No owners Land" is the share of farmers that work on a land that is not owned by themselves out
of the total number of farmers (tenants, sharecroppers, settlers, agricultural workers). The variable "Tenants" is
the share of tenants out of the total number of farmers. The variables "Tractors" and "workers" are the log of
number of machines and agricultural workers in a municipality. The variables "Coffee Lands" and "Banana Lands"
are the number of plots that cultivated these crops. The variable "Housing" measures the number of houses in a
municipality. The variable d_"La Violencia" takes value 1 if that municipality was affected by this civil war and 0
otherwise. The variable "Left-wing support" is the share of votes that the left-wing candidate obtained during the
presidential elections in 1946 and the variable "Share votes winner elections" is the share of votes that the winner
obtained in the presidential elections in 1966". Robust standard errors in brackets.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 42: Legal Entitlement Timing (1967-1972)
Ordered Response Model
Full Sample Restricted Sample
(1) (2)
A. Geographical Variables
Rainfall (log) -0.249* -0.060
(0.149) (0.176)
Altitude (log) -0.203*** -0.106
(0.086) (0.099)
Temperature -0.052*** -0.051*
(0.022) (0.027)
Area(log) 0.092 0.058
(0.062) (0.072)
Distance to Capital -0.061 -0.054
(0.070) (0.087)
B. Economic and Social Variables
Population (log, 1964) 0.322*** 0.114
(0.097) (0.126)
Land reform (1930-1960) (plots) 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
No owners Land (%,1960) 0.017 0.0156
(0.298) (0.373)
Tenants (%,1960) 0.454 0.407
(0.295) (0.351)
Tractors (log, 1960) 0.074** 0.019
(0.031) (0.035)
Workers (log, 1960) 0.054 0.044
(0.058) (0.070)
Daily Wage (log, 1968) 0.330* 0.610**
(0.195) (0.247)
Coffee Lands (log,1960) -0.004 -0.017
(0.048) (0.058)
Banana Lands (log, 1960) 0.012 0.030
(0.051) (0.057)
Railroads (log, 1960) 0.022 0.020
(0.013) (0.016)
Roads (log, 1960) 0.012 0.013
(0.015) (0.018)
Housing (log, 1960) -0.135*** -0.110***
(0.028) (0.033)
Irrigated lands (1960) -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Literacy rate(1964) 0.002 0.010
(0.022) (0.088)
C. Historical and Political Variables
Peasant Leagues (1945) 0.325*** 0.262*
(0.126) (0.142)
"La Violencia" (dummy) 0.129 0.206
(0.125) (0.158)
Left-wing support (%, elections 1946) 0.571*** 0.265
(0.163) (0.206)
Share votes winner elections (1966) 0.150 0.256
(0.092) (0.322)
Observations 745 498
R-squared 0.105 0.049
Note: In the full sample the dependent variable takes value 3 if the municipality got legal entitle-
ment in 1970, 2 if it got it in 1971, 1 if it got it in 1972 and 0 otherwise. In the restricted sample
the dependent variable takes value 3 if the municipality got legal entitlement in 1970, 2 if it got
it in 1971, 1 if it got it in 1972 and 0 if only got legal status. The variables are in levels unless
otherwise stated. The variable "Land Reform (1930-1960) measures the number of plots given to
peasants during these years. The variable "No owners Land" is the share of farmers that work on a
land that is not owned by themselves out of the total number of farmers (tenants, sharecroppers,
settlers, agricultural workers). The variable "Tenants" is the share of tenants out of the total
number of farmers. The variables "Tractors" and "workers" are the log of number of machines
and agricultural workers in a municipality. The variables "Coffee Lands" and "Banana Lands" are
the number of plots that cultivated these crops. The variable "Housing" measures the number of
houses in a municipality. The variable d_"La Violencia" takes value 1 if that municipality was
affected by this civil war and 0 otherwise. The variable "Left-wing support" is the share of votes
that the left-wing candidate obtained during the presidential elections in 1946 and the variable
"Share votes winner elections" is the share of votes that the winner obtained in the presidential
elections in 1966". Robust standard errors in brackets.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 43: Restricted Sample-Without Controls: The Effect of Legal Entitlement
of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution 1957-1975
Broad Redistribution (in log) Targeted Redistribution (in log)
Land Tax Central Social Bureaucratic Public Land
Revenues Transfers Expenditure Expenditure allocations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dummy Legal Entitlement -0.115* 0.086 -0.270*** 0.259*** 0.011**
(0.059) (0.105) (0.107) (0.064) (0.005)
Observations 11.368 11.074 10.738 11.242 12.235
Clusters 625 620 616 620 644
Municipality Fixed Effects X X X X X
Year Fixed Effect X X X X X
Controls
Notes: All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects. Robust standard errors,
clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The sample is a municipality-level
panel of 1080 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because
of missing values in the dependent variable. The dummy explanatory variable takes value 1 if
the municipal association received legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement
had state support (1967-1972) and 0 otherwise. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 44: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on
Redistribution (Control group: Municipalities that got just legal status).
Total Revenues (in log) Total Expenditure (in log)
(1) (2)
Legal Entitlement 0.019 -0.078
(0.031) (0.065)
Income shock -0.002 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
Observations 11.445 10.995
Clusters 625 620
Municipality Fixed Effect X X
Year Fixed Effect X X
State-time trend X X
Municip-time trend X X
All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effect and state-time trend. Robust standard errors, clustered at
municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The restricted sample is a municipality-level panel of 644 municipalities
for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The
explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the
peasant movement had state support (1967-1972) and control group is just receiving legal status during the same period.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 45: The Effect of Legal Entitlement on Indirect Tax Revenues 1957-1975
(in log).
Indirect Taxes Revenues
Restricted Restricted Full
Sample Sample Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Legal Entitlement. 0.069 0.025 0.234***
(0.075) (0.092) (0.047)
Income Shock 0.032*** 0.025*** 0.027***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 11.374 11.387 17.917
Clusters 625 625 1080
Municip. FE X X X
Year FE X X X
State-time trend X X
Municip-time trend X
Notes: All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects. Robust standard
errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The restricted
sample is a municipality-level panel of 644 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The
number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The
explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal
entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had State support (1967-
1972) and control group is just receiving legal status during the same period in the
restricted sample. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 46: Full Sample: Legal entitlement and the land tax base, 1957-1972
Rural Rural and Urban
Number Cadastral Number Cadastral
Taxable Plots Value Taxable Plots Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Legal Status 144.35 0.209*** -1105.8 0.162***
(151.981) (0.060) (976.92) (0.056)
Legal Entitlement 35.76 0.149*** -1174.7 0.098**
(122.94) (0.053) (790.6) (0.050)
Observations 13792 13792 13792 13792
Clusters 862 862 862 862
Municipality Fixed Effects X X X X
Year Fixed Effect X X X X
Controls X X X X
Notes: All regressions control for year, municipality and region-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at
municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Dependent Variables: number of taxable plots in rural and both rural and
urban areas and Total payable tax in 1957 COP millions. The sample is a municipal-level panel of 862 municipalities for
the years 1957-1973. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 47: Full Sample: Legal entitlement and the number of municipal
employees, 1957-1972
General Judicial Tax Education Total
Direction System Collection and Health
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Municipalities 0.463** -0.047 -0.025 -0.322 0.038
Legal entitlement (%) (0.221) (0.150) (0.125) (0.277) (0.104)
Observations 364 364 364 364 364
Clusters 31 31 31 31 31
State Fixed Effect X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
Notes: Dependent variable: log of the number of employees in each section of the municipality. Explanatory variable:
percentage of municipalities that have legal entitlement in a state relative to the total number of municipalities. All
regressions control for year and state fixed effects.
Robust standard errors, clustered at state level, are presented in parentheses. The sample is a state-level panel of 31 states
for the years 1957-1972.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 48: 1971 Municipalities: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal
Peasant Associations on Redistribution 1957-1975 (Restricted Sample)
Broad Redistribution (in log) Targeted Redistribution (in log)
Land Tax Central Social Institutional Public Land
Revenues Transfers Expenditure Expenditure allocations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dummy Legal Entitlement -0.001 0.338 -0.280 0.142 0.007
(0.120) (0.220) (0.198) (0.161) (0.014)
Income shock -0.000 0.032 -0.007 0.010 -0.002
(0.011) (0.027) (0.034) (0.017) (0.001)
Observations 1617 1595 1520 1621 1783
Clusters 92 91 91 90 96
Municip. FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
State-time trend X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
Notes: All regressions control for municipality and year fixed effects and state fixed effects-time trend. Robust standard
errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and
population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel of 95 municipalities for the years
1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The dummy explanatory
variable takes value 1 if the municipal association received legal entitlement during 1971 and 1972 and 0 if only got legal
status. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 49: Leads and Lags: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant
Associations on Redistribution 1957-1975 (Restricted Sample)
Broad Redistribution (in log) Targeted Redistribution (in log)
Land Tax Central Social Institutional Public Land
Revenues Transfers Expenditure Expenditure allocations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Legal Entitlement leads and lags
Legal Entitlementt+2 0.048 0.130** -0.088 0.030 -0.002
(0.035) (0.061) (0.060) (0.039) (0.006)
Legal Entitlementt+1 0.061** 0.055 -0.070* 0.030 0.000
(0.026) (0.044) (0.041) (0.032) (0.005)
Legal Entitlementt0 -0.239*** 0.031 -0.220*** 0.311*** 0.009
(0.031) (0.038) (0.046) (0.043) (0.006)
Legal Entitlementt−1 0.038** 0.027 -0.007 -0.038 0.006
(0.018) (0.039) (0.071) (0.031) (0.006)
Legal Entitlementt−2 0.055** 0.018 0.239 -0.172** 0.003
(0.027) (0.060) (0.176) (0.076) (0.006)
Income shock -0.003 -0.022** -0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007) (0.000)
Observations 10.132 9.956 9.575 10.006 10.930
Clusters 625 620 616 620 643
Municip. FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
State-time trend X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
Notes: All regressions control for municipality and year fixed effects and state fixed effects-time trend. Robust standard
errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and
population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel of 1088 municipalities for the years
1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The dummy explanatory
variable takes value 1 if the municipal association received legal entitlement during 1967 and 1972 and 0 if only got legal
status. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 50: Restricted Sample-Seemingly Unrelated Regression: The Effect of
Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution 1957-1975
Broad Redistribution (in log) Targeted Redistribution (in log)
Land Tax Central Social Bureaucratic
Revenues Transfers Expenditure Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Legal Entitlement -0.088* 0.193*** -0.051 0.226***
(0.047) (0.064) (0.080) (0.047)
Observations 10.376 10.376 10.376 10.376
Municipality Fixed Effects X X X X
Year Fixed Effect X X X X
State-time trend X X X X
Controls X X X X
Notes: Seemingly unrelated regressions allow error terms in the equations separately to be correlated. The regression
perform the join test that the coefficients on the legal entitlement for the four regressions are equal to zero. Results indicate
that, for the same municipalities, the hypothesis that the correlation of the residuals in the four redistributive variables
is zero is rejected. All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects and state specific time trends. Robust
standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The sample is a municipality-level panel of
1080 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The dummy explanatory variable takes value 1 if the municipal association
received legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972) and 0 if just got legal
status. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 51: Correlation across municipalities of the share of votes of Communist
1946,1962,1966.
Share of votes left-wing parties
Departmental assembly elections 1966
Departmental assembly elections 1962 0.405***
Presidential elections 1946 0.236***
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 52: OLS-Extensive Margin: Peasant Empowerment, co-optation
(1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).
Land invasions FARC Rebel activity Peasant Protests
(1) (2) (3)
Legal Entitlement 0.439 -0.721 0.761**
(0.438) (0.458) (0.392)
1 peasant leader co-opted -0.129 -1.011* -1.041*
(0.543) (0.567) (0.580)
2 peasant leaders co-opted -0.509 -1.928*** -0.878
(0.679) (0.707) (0.724)
3 peasant leaders co-opted -2.041** -2.140** -0.793
(0.995) (1.037) (1.062)
4 peasant leaders co-opted -1.732*** -1.777*** -1.153**
(0.472) (0.494) (0.504)
5 peasant leaders co-opted -1.432 -2.096** -1.373
(1.043) (1.086) (1.112)
Peasant Leagues (1947) -0.094 0.668*** -0.172
(0.094) (0.169) (0.173)
Observations 591 590 591
State Fixed Effects X X X
Controls X X X
All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude,
precipitation), population (1964), Communist Support (1946), peasant leagues (1931-1947) and land conflicts
(1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978 and
FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985.The variable
legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972
and 0 otherwise. The base group of the variable peasant_leaders_coopted is 0. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 53: OLS-Full Sample: The Effect of Peasant Empowerment and
Co-optation between 1967-1972 on the potential threat of revolution between
1972-1985.
Land invasions FARC Rebel activity Peasant Protests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Legal Entitlement 0.952*** 1.317*** 1.078*** 1.215*** 1.126*** 0.964*** 0.800*** 0.653*** 0.554**
(0.225) (0.217) (0.208) (0.238) (0.360) (0.350) (0.264) (0.264) (0.254)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy) -0.931*** -1.42*** -0.768***
(0.274) (0.288) (0.316)
Peasant leaders co-opted (number) -0.377*** -0.346** -0.203**
(0.081) (0.137) (0.096)
Share land peasant leaders -3.523*** -3.295* -2.455*
(1.177) (1.979) (1.445)
Observations 1.040 1.040 1.040 1.002 1.002 1.002 987 961 961
State Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X X X X
All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964), Communist
Support (1946), peasant leagues (1931-1947) and land conflicts (1878-1964).The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions
between 1972-1978 and FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985.The variable legal entitlement is a
dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1971 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders co-opted takes value
between 0 and 5. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Figure 10: Sample of list of peasant leagues and beneficiaries of land reform
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